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INTRODUCTION 
Commercial boycotts have a storied history in the United 
States.  In some quarters, in fact, boycotts are seen as a “ringing 
affirmation of the constitutional right of all citizens to organize . . . 
to achieve political, economic[,] and social change.”1  As with any 
other right, however, the right to boycott is not without 
limitations.  When the desire of individuals to effect change 
through boycotts intersects with the legitimate goals of 
government, the right to boycott is often inhibited, if not 
suppressed in its entirety.  As the United States Supreme Court 
stated in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.: 
Governmental regulation that has an incidental effect on 
First Amendment freedoms may be justified in certain 
narrowly defined instances.  A nonviolent and totally 
voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on local 
economic conditions.  This Court has recognized the 
strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic 
regulation, even though such regulation may have an 
incidental effect on rights of speech and association.  The 
right of business entities to “associate” to suppress 
competition may be curtailed.  Unfair trade practices may 
be restricted.  Secondary boycotts and picketing by labor 
unions may be prohibited, as part of Congress’ striking of 
the delicate balance between union freedom of expression 
and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and 
consumers to remain free from coerced participation in 
industrial strife.2 
Since it has been well established that there are limits on the 
free-speech rights accompanying commercial boycotts, the obvious 
inquiry is where the line between permissible restrictions and 
impermissible infringements on First Amendment rights resides.  
In Claiborne, the Court addressed the rights of United States 
 
The title of this Article is based on an oft-repeated passage from the play 
Romeo and Juliet commonly understood to stand for the truism that changing 
the name of something does not change its underlying nature: “What’s in a 
name? That which we call a rose; By any other name would smell as sweet; 
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d, Retain that dear perfection which 
he owes . . . .” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 1.   
 1.  Leonard Orland, Protection for Boycotts, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 1982), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/31/opinion/protection-for-boycotts.html. 
 2. 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982) (citations omitted).  
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citizens who boycotted certain local commercial enterprises as 
part of a campaign to realize equal rights under domestic law.3  In 
essence, the boycotters used their First Amendment rights to 
demand enforcement of existing domestic civil rights laws in their 
communities.4  Thus, it is not surprising that the Court held that 
the primary boycotts in Claiborne were protected.  In doing so, 
though, the Court reiterated that the situation would have been 
dramatically different if the government had interposed a 
compelling rationale for limiting the right to boycott, such as 
protecting the right of “consumers to remain free from coerced 
participation in industrial strife.”5 
Both the United States Congress and the United States 
Supreme Court have followed the general principle that when a 
boycott interferes with commerce or disrupts important policy 
goals of the government, the right to boycott is vulnerable to 
government infringement, especially if the boycott is of a 
secondary or tertiary nature.6  It is under this principle that we 
must examine a particularly noxious strain of boycott whose 
supporters claim an exemption from the application of United 
States anti-boycott laws:  foreign boycotts of Israel and its 
affiliates that are forced upon individuals and companies in the 
United States. 
The “BDS Movement,”7 a Palestinian Arab organization with 
supporters and affiliates throughout the world, is the most 
prominent organization today to promote a boycott and 
divestment campaign against Israel.8  The BDS Movement has 
 
 3.  Id. at 886. 
 4.  Id.  For a more detailed analysis of the BDS Movement’s activity 
under the First Amendment, see Marc A. Greendorfer, The Inapplicability of 
First Amendment Protections to BDS Movement Boycotts, 2016 CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 112 (2016).  In short, there is no supportable legal basis for 
claims that BDS Movement activity has the same protected status as the 
primary boycott activity at issue in Claiborne and, in fact, there is ample 
precedent for the position that BDS Movement activity, as a form of 
discriminatory conduct, is not protected by the First Amendment. 
 5.  Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886 at 912. 
 6.  See infra Part II for a discussion of the characteristics of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary boycotts. 
 7.  “BDS” is an acronym standing for “Boycott, Divest, and Sanction” 
that is used by a number of affiliated groups seeking to foster, inter alia, 
boycotts of Israel.  
 8.  Though the history of the BDS Movement is not clearly defined, 
according to the BDS National Committee, the self-acknowledged global 
organizing and coordinating entity of the BDS Movement, BDS: 
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heretofore relied on the United States government’s failure to 
enforce existing anti-boycott laws to grow its influence in the 
United States and, as a result, has lured United States entities 
and individuals, including unions, into implementing its illegal 
boycotts.9  This lack of enforcement, however, should not mean 
that the BDS Movement’s activities are lawful or that those who 
support and participate in its activities are immune from civil and 
criminal prosecution.  In fact, this Article will show that, because 
the BDS Movement is affiliated with other illegal foreign boycotts 
and has ties to designated foreign terror organizations, supporters 
face significant risks, including severe monetary penalties and 
criminal liability under federal anti-boycott, anti-trust, and anti-
racketeering laws. 
Part I of this Article examines the BDS Movement, including 
the history of other foreign boycotts against Israel, to determine 
whether existing federal laws apply to the BDS Movement’s 
activities—specifically, the anti-boycott provisions of the Export 
Administration Amendments of 1977, as amended (EAA Anti-
Boycott Law).10  Part II of this Article discusses the legislative 
history of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and the global events that 
occurred during the congressional debates on the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law to demonstrate that the purpose of the law was to 
broadly prohibit foreign interference in domestic commerce and 
 
[W]as launched in July 2005 with the initial endorsement of over 170 
Palestinian organizations . . . .  The efforts to coordinate the BDS 
campaign, that began to grow rapidly since the 2005 Call was made 
public, culminated in the first Palestinian BDS Conference held in 
Ramallah in November 2007.  Out of this conference emerged the 
BDS National Committee (BNC) as the Palestinian coordinating 
body for the BDS campaign worldwide.  
Palestinian BDS National Committee, BDS MOVEMENT, http://www. 
bdsmovement.net/bnc (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).  This website claims to be 
the official outlet for the BDS National Committee, which in turn claims to be 
the Palestinian Arab authority in charge of the BDS Movement. 
 9.  See Mario Vasquez, UE Becomes First National Union in U.S. to 
Endorse BDS Against Israel, IN THESE TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015, 3:56 PM), 
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18361/ue-unions-israel-bds-palestine-  
labor (recognizing that the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of 
America was the first national union in the United States to endorse the BDS 
Movement).  
 10.  Pub. L. No. 95–52, 91 Stat. 235 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 4607 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244)).  For a detailed examination of the 
EAA Anti-Boycott Law, see Alan S. Dubin, A Journey Through the Anti-
Boycott Laws, 14 TULSA L. REV. 695 (1979). 
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affairs.  Part III of this Article examines whether other existing 
federal laws apply to the BDS Movement’s activities, including 
anti-trust, anti-terrorism, and anti-racketeering laws.  Finally, 
this Article concludes by providing suggestions for private actions 
against and government prosecutions of the BDS Movement’s 
illegal activities. As with any prosecution or litigation, the 
outcome of legal action against the BDS Movement and its 
supporters cannot be predicted with certainty; what is certain, 
however, is that the BDS Movement and its supporters are being 
misled by advice and opinions claiming that their activity is lawful 
and without risk. 
I. THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN BOYCOTTS AGAINST ISRAEL 
A. Before BDS: The Arab League’s Direct Boycott 
Before there was a BDS Movement, or even an Arab League 
or a State of Israel, there were boycotts against Jews, especially 
those advocating for the establishment of a modern state of 
Israel.11  During the Ottoman reign over the land of Israel, which 
was commonly referred to as Palestine at that time, there were 
numerous calls for Arab boycotts of Jews.12  Once the British 
succeeded the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century and 
began recognizing the rights of Jews to their historic homeland, 
the Arab boycott of Jews in Palestine intensified13 and quickly 
became a pan-Arab movement that threatened to expand into a 
general boycott of British goods.14  Between 1909 and 1939, at 
 
 11.  This Article assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of 
the history of Israel.  For a general overview of the history of Israel prior to 
its founding in 1948, see generally JOAN PETERS, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: THE 
ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE (1984) and ILAN 
PAPPE, A HISTORY OF MODERN PALESTINE: ONE LAND, TWO PEOPLES (2d ed. 
2006).  I have purposely referred to books containing opposing views of the  
modern history of Israel to provide, what I hope, is a balanced background on 
the topic.  I am not endorsing either point of view by including them here.  
 12.  AARON J. SARNA, BOYCOTT AND BLACKLIST: A HISTORY OF ARAB 
ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST ISRAEL 3 (1986) (documenting boycotts in 1891, 
1908, and 1911).   
 13.  Id. at 5 (“Following Arab pogroms of Jews in 1920 and 1921, the 
boycott weapon was further developed as a major instrument in the campaign 
against Jewish settlement.  In 1922, the Fifth Palestine Arab Congress 
passed a resolution calling on Arabs to boycott Jewish businesses.  This 
policy was widely adopted in western Palestine in 1929, a year of bloody 
outbreaks of Arab violence against Jews incited by the mufti.”). 
 14.  Id. at 6–7 (“The boycott became a pan-Arab issue at an October 27 
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least thirteen different Arab boycotts were implemented, 
including one that was fostered by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, 
Haj Amin al-Husseini, who later collaborated with Adolf Hitler 
during World War II and reportedly modeled his boycott after the 
pre-World War II Nazi boycott of Jewish businesses in Europe.15  
The early Arab boycotts, however, while far-reaching and lethal in 
their objectives, were disorganized and ineffectual in practice. 
A more organized and enduring boycott was established 
immediately after World War II, concurrent with the 
establishment of a pan-Arab organization known as the Arab 
League.16  The origins of the BDS Movement can be traced 
directly to the boycott of Israel that was initiated by members of 
the Arab League in response to the creation of the modern State of 
Israel in 1948 (Arab League Boycott).17  In fact, the Arab League 
was so intent on engaging in a boycott of Israel that it started its 
boycott nearly three years before the establishment of the modern 
State of Israel.18 
 
[1929] congress of 800 Arabs from western Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, 
Iraq and Egypt.  The congress vowed to boycott all Jewish merchandise and 
to compel other Arabs to do the same . . . .  [At a successor congress in 1937, 
[r]esolutions were passed demanding the repeal of the Balfour Declaration 
[wherein the British promised to establish a Jewish state in Palestine] and a 
boycott against Jews as a patriotic duty.  Unless Britain altered its policy, a 
boycott of British goods by Arab and Moslem countries was threatened.”). 
 15.  GIL FEILER, FROM BOYCOTT TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL 21–24 (1998).   
 16.  As a response to the Balfour Declaration and the progress then being 
made by Zionists to fulfill the dream of re-establishing a Jewish state, the 
Arab League, also known as the League of Arab States, was founded in 1944 
with “strong support” from Britain.  SARNA, supra note 12, at 7.  The purpose 
of the Arab League was “to promote pan-Arab cooperation in the political, 
military, economic, and social spheres.” Id.  Though the Arab League was not 
founded solely to deny Jews the right to their own state in Palestine, that 
objective has always been a central focus of the Arab League.  Id.  The Arab 
League currently consists of twenty-two members.  See Profile: Arab League, 
BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
15747941.  Among the twenty-two members is “Palestine,” which is not 
generally recognized as a state under international law.  See Rick Richman, 
“Palestine” Does Not Qualify as a “State”, COMMENT. MAG. (Nov. 13, 2012), 
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/11/13/palestine-does-not-qualify-
as-a-state/.  
 17.  See The History and Antisemitic Nature of Boycott, Divestment, and 
Sanctions Campaigns, AMCHA INITIATIVE, http://www.amchainitiative.org/ 
1842-2/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2016).  
 18.  MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33961, ARAB LEAGUE 
BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL 1 (2015) (“The Arab League was founded in 1944, and in 
1945 began a boycott of Zionist goods and services in the British controlled 
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While previous boycotts against Jews intended to prevent the 
re-establishment of a large Jewish population in Palestine, the 
Arab League Boycott intended to politically and commercially 
isolate the state of Israel and its Jewish population, preserve Arab 
purity and hegemony over the territory of Palestine,19 and 
ultimately, complement Arab military attempts to destroy Israel 
as a recognized political state.20 Using the terms Zionist and Jew 
interchangeably,21 in 1945 the Arab League Council declared 
(Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945) that: 
Jewish products and manufactured (goods) in Palestine 
shall be (considered) undesirable in the Arab countries; to 
permit them to enter the Arab countries would lead to the 
realization of the Zionist political objectives.  Accordingly, 
 
mandate territory of Palestine.  In 1948, following the war establishing 
Israel’s independence, the boycott was formalized against the state of Israel 
and broadened to include non-Israelis who maintain economic relations with 
Israel or who are perceived to support it.  The boycott is administered by the 
Central Boycott Office, a specialized bureau of the Arab League based in 
Damascus but believed for many decades to be operating out of Cairo, 
Egypt.”). 
 19.  See [2 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS] MUHAMMAD KHALIL, THE ARAB STATES 
AND THE ARAB LEAGUE, A DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 161 (1962).  The resolution 
of the Arab League to boycott Jews and Zionists, dated December 2, 1945, is 
contained in this volume of Khalil’s work and states that the boycott was 
enacted so that “Palestine will remain an Arab (country).”  Id.  
 20.  FEILER, supra note 15, at 9 (“The original purpose of the Arab states 
when they declared the boycott in December 1945—two and a half years 
before the State of Israel was proclaimed—was to prevent its emergence as a 
state. Later the boycott was one of the means used to try and destroy the 
Jewish state—in other words, it was not an alternative to the use of military 
force, but a supplementary means.”). 
 21.  In this Article, I will primarily use the term “anti-Israel” to refer to 
the ideology of various organizations and individuals who seek the 
destruction of Israel.  However, the term “anti-Zionist” is in many ways 
equally applicable, since the goal of both ideologies is the elimination of 
Israel.  To some, the term “anti-Zionist” is actually a broader term that 
includes a genocidal component since Zionism is synonymous with Jews.  For 
the purposes of this Article, however, any distinction between “anti-Israel” 
and “anti-Zionist” terminology is presumed to be outside the scope of this 
analysis.  In the same vein, in the context of the ideological conflict with the 
existence of Israel as a Jewish state, I will use the terms “Arab” and “Islamic” 
interchangeably, while acknowledging that in other contexts there are 
fundamental distinctions between the two terms: not all Arabs are Muslim 
and not all Muslims are Arabs.  In the Middle East, however, especially vis-à-
vis the conflict with Israel, Israel’s protagonists are overwhelmingly Muslim 
Arabs.  A notable exception is Iran—an Islamic republic that is not Arabic—
but is extremely active in anti-Zionist affairs. 
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until these objectives are changed, the Council of the 
League decides that every State of the League should, 
before January 1, 1946, take measures which they 
consider fit and which will be in conformity with the 
principles of administration and legislation therein, such 
as making use of import licenses in this respect in order 
to prevent these products and manufactured (goods) from 
entering (these) countries regardless of whether they 
have come directly from Palestine or by any other route. 
(These States should) also oppose Jewish industry by all 
possible means.22 
Participation in the Arab League Boycott was not limited to 
established states.  Indeed, the boycott declaration directed: 
[P]eoples not represented on the Council of the League to 
collaborate and co-operate with the States of the League 
concerning this decision, so that the institutions, 
organizations, merchants, commission agents, and 
individuals in these (States) will refuse to deal in, 
distribute, or consume Zionist products and 
manufactured (goods).23 
The meaning of this may not be obvious on its face, but 
fortuitously, the boycott declaration provided an explanation: 
The Committee further draws attention to (the fact) that 
the boycott (of Zionist goods) should not be confined to 
governmental action only, but should also be 
(undertaken) through the people.  Thus, necessary 
propaganda should be conducted in order to convince the 
Arab peoples of the necessity of boycotting Zionist goods, 
so that the boycott becomes the firm creed of every Arab 
which he may most enthusiastically preach to all and 
which he may defend faithfully and genuinely.24 
This declaration shows that the Arab League Boycott was 
intended to be carried out through multiple and coordinated 
channels, using state and non-state actors.  On the one hand, the 
members were to engage in primary boycotts.  Concurrently, non-
government organizations, through individuals and groups of 
 
 22.  KHALIL, supra note 19, at 161 (emphasis added). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 163 (emphasis added). 
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individuals, were directed to maintain a concerted propaganda 
effort aimed at furthering the goals of the boycott.  Because the 
Arab League believed that Jews were using resources from around 
the globe to establish their state, the Arab League Boycott 
targeted Jewish economic interests globally through secondary 
and tertiary boycotts.25 
The operational terms of the Arab League Boycott were 
further solidified upon the establishment of the State of Israel in 
1948, expanding upon and formalizing the principles of the Arab 
League Boycott Declaration of 1945 into a true bureaucratic 
enterprise.  As it has recently been described in a report to the 
United States Congress: 
The boycott [after its 1948 formalization] is administered 
by the Central Boycott Office, a specialized bureau of the 
Arab League based in Damascus but believed for many 
decades to be operating out of Cairo, Egypt. 
. . . . 
The boycott has three tiers.  The primary boycott 
prohibits citizens of an Arab League member from buying 
from, selling to, or entering into a business contract with 
either the Israeli government or an Israeli citizen.  The 
secondary boycott extends the primary boycott to any 
entity world-wide that does business with Israel.  A 
blacklist of global firms that engage in business with 
Israel is maintained by the Central Boycott Office, and 
disseminated to Arab League members.  The tertiary 
boycott prohibits an Arab League member and its 
nationals from doing business with a company that in 
turn deals with companies that have been blacklisted by 
the Arab League.  The boycott also applies to companies 
that the Arab League identifies as having “Zionist 
sympathizers” in executive positions or on the board of 
the company.  According to one analyst, the “nature and 
detail of these rules reflect the boycotting countries’ 
tolerance for only the most minimal contacts with 
Israel.”26 
From its initial tactic to generally boycott Jewish goods, the 
 
 25.  See id. at 161.  
 26. WEISS, supra note 18, at 1–2 (citations omitted). 
10 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
Arab League Boycott steadily progressed into a broader and more 
regulated endeavor.  The Arab League’s Central Boycott Office 
initially provided oversight of the boycott, and the movement was 
bolstered by the establishment of state-level boycott offices in each 
Arab League state.27  The first tangible directive from the Arab 
League was a requirement that anyone selling goods to a member 
would have to provide a negative certification (a certification that 
the goods being sold were not of Israeli origin).28  This certification 
requirement led to the creation of a propaganda unit which 
ensured that the boycott of Jewish goods was strictly enforced and 
well publicized.29  These directives were quickly implemented and 
successful.30 
Shortly after the establishment of the modern State of Israel 
in 1948, the Arab League Boycott was expanded to include a total 
ban on all commercial and financial transactions with Israel as 
well as a sea and air blockade.31  The Arab League Boycott gained 
a powerful new weapon in 1954.  Pursuant to Arab League 
Council Resolution 849, the Central Office for the Boycott of Israel 
(CBO), which had been established and incorporated into the 
political apparatus of Arab League states several years earlier, 
promulgated a wide-ranging and unified set of rules and 
regulations binding all Arab states.32  Under these rules and 
regulations, a primary boycott of Israel and Israeli products was 
formalized, making illegal any dealings between Arab individuals 
and entities and Israel or Israeli individuals and companies.33  In 
addition to the primary boycott of Israel, secondary and tertiary 
boycotts were instituted to prohibit any dealings between Arab 
League members and any entity that:  (1) did business with Israel 
either directly or indirectly, (2) provided support to Israel, or (3) 
processed goods or services through Israeli facilities prior to their 
introduction into Arab markets.34 
By 1959, the most notorious weapon in the Arab League 
Boycott’s arsenal was adopted: the blacklist.  An entity could be 
 
 27. Id. at 1; KHALIL, supra note 19, at 163. 
 28. KHALIL, supra note 19, at 163. 
 29. FEILER, supra note 15, at 25. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 27. 
 32. Id. at 32.  
 33.  Id. at 32–33; SARNA, supra note 12, at 40–41.   
 34.  See WEISS, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
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placed on the Arab League blacklist for numerous reasons 
including having operations or branches in Israel; manufacturing 
goods or components in Israel; providing intellectual property 
rights to Israeli companies; owning equity of Israeli companies; 
rendering consulting and technical services to Israel; or even 
simply having a “bias in favour of Israel,” or refusing to answer 
Arab League questionnaires regarding Israel.35  The financial 
consequence of being placed on the Arab League blacklist was 
severe: the offending party was forced to choose between either 
terminating the offending acts or losing access to Arab League 
member markets.36 It should be noted, however, that while the 
CBO was responsible for establishing a uniform set of rules and 
maintaining the blacklist, the enforcement of the boycott was and 
still is effectuated by, and at the discretion of, individual Arab 
League members.37 
Furthermore, as the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945 
set forth, non-members and non-governmental organizations 
supporting the Palestinian Arab cause were expected to 
participate in the propaganda efforts as well as the boycott 
itself.38  The best modern example of this is the case of Iran.  
Though a non-member of the Arab League, Iran is one of the most 
vehement supporters and advocates of the Arab League Boycott 
and anti-Israel agitprop.39  In fact, the secondary and tertiary 
elements of the Arab League Boycott are actively supported by a 
wide range of non-Arab League entities.40 
In many ways, it is the non-member and non-governmental 
organization participants in the Arab League Boycott who wield 
the most enforcement power.41  This is logical, given that the Arab 
 
 35.  FEILER, supra note 15, at 34.  
 36.  Id. at 37 (“[I]f a company was blacklisted, no private or public factor 
in the Arab world was to trade with it.  Anyone found to have broken the 
regulations was liable to be fined, imprisoned or have boycotted goods 
confiscated.”). 
 37.  WEISS, supra note 18, at 2. 
 38.  See KHALIL, supra note 19, at 163. 
 39.  See FEILER, supra note 15, at 40. 
 40.  See SARNA, supra note 12, at 39 (listing Bangladesh, Iran, Malaysia, 
Mali, Pakistan, and Uganda as boycott participants and further identifying 
joint Arab-foreign chambers of commerce as being major NGO enforcement 
agents of the boycott). 
 41.  Id. at 40.  While there are only twenty-two members of the Arab 
League, Sarna points to far more than twenty-two entities that enforce the 
boycott internationally.  See id. at 38–40. 
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League Boycott had always been presented as “one of the Arab 
weapons in confronting the Zionist entity . . . .”42  Just as the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and other non-state 
paramilitary terror organizations have carried out the majority of 
acts constituting the violent resistance prong of the Arab League’s 
Palestine agenda, non-governmental organizations have carried 
out a significant portion of the economic and political resistance 
prong of that agenda. 
The Arab League Boycott blacklist has had extensive and 
crippling consequences for companies that refuse to comply with 
the boycott.  Among the first companies to succumb to the 
blacklist threat and comply with the Arab League Boycott by 
terminating business operations in Israel were American Express, 
Brown and Williamson, Shell Oil, British Petroleum, Standard 
Oil, Socony Mobil, Texaco, British Overseas Airways, Japan Air 
Lines, Iberia, Qantas, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Yamaha, Toyota, 
Honda and Nissan.43  Companies that refused to comply with the 
Arab League Boycott and were thus placed on the blacklist include 
Renault, TWA, Coca Cola, Ford Motor Company, and RCA 
Limited.44  At its height in the mid-1970s, the Arab League 
Boycott’s blacklist applied to over 6,300 entities from nearly 100 
countries as well as over 600 cargo ships.45  The number of 
companies and entities that chose to comply with the boycott is 
impossible to know but must surely have been more than the 
6,300 entities that are known to have refused to comply. 
The original Arab League Boycott continues to this day, 
though at this point it has been described as frequently ineffectual 
due to the varied and, at times, conflicting interests of its 
members.46  Indeed, the Arab League Boycott has always been 
something of a hydra.  On the one hand, the boycott is the child of 
 
 42.  FEILER, supra note 15, at 40 (quoting the CBO Commissioner 
General). 
 43.  SARNA, supra note 12, at 15–27. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 34–35. 
 46. WEISS, supra note 18, at 2 (“Overall enforcement of the boycott by 
member countries appears sporadic.  Some Arab League members have 
limited trading relations with Israel.  The Arab League does not formally or 
publicly state which countries enforce the boycott and which do not.  Some 
Arab League member governments have maintained that only the Arab 
League, as the formal body enforcing the boycott, can revoke the boycott.  
However, adherence to the boycott is an individual matter for each Arab 
League member and enforcement varies by state.”). 
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Arab world bigotry, particularly against Jews who accede to the 
position of a political ruling class.  The treatment of Jews (among 
others) as “dhimmis” (a minority group allowed to continue his or 
her faith in exchange for the payment of a tax and the acceptance 
of second-class status within Arab society) is a well-documented 
historical example of the antipathy directed against non-Muslims 
generally, and against Israel’s existence as a Jewish state in a 
region dominated by Muslim Arab states, specifically.47  From this 
perspective, Israel is not an existential threat, but rather, a 
“blight upon the neighborhood” and an affront to the dignity of the 
Arab ego. 
On the other hand, Palestinian Arabs see boycotts as a means 
to an end: the destruction of Israel and corresponding 
establishment of a Palestinian Arab state that supplants it.48  
Just as two people cannot simultaneously occupy the same space, 
two countries cannot simultaneously exist within the same 
territory.  Israel’s existence is an existential impediment to the 
creation of a Palestinian Arab state.49  Consequently, for those in 
Arab states who do not put the issue of Palestinian Arab 
statehood as a primary cause, the Arab League Boycott is a 
tangential matter at best.  For nationalistic Palestinian Arabs and 
their supporters, however, the perceived lack of progress being 
made through the existing enforcement of the Arab League 
Boycott has been untenable. 
As a result, more radical supporters of the Palestinian Arab 
cause sought a way to return the Arab League Boycott to its 
foundational principle of weakening and isolating Israel (with the 
 
 47.  For an overview of the concept of the dhimmi and its treatment in 
Islamic countries, see generally BAT YE’OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS 
UNDER ISLAM (1985).  Even though there are states with Islamic governments 
or populations that are not Arab states, such as Iran, terms that refer to 
Islamic states generally are discussed herein in the context of Arab states as 
members of the Arab League. 
 48.  There are some Palestinian Arabs who accept the right of Israel to 
exist as a Jewish state and seek a two-state solution, see infra Part I.A, but 
neither the BDS Movement nor its affiliates take this position.   
 49.  Though there are some who argue that a Palestinian Arab state 
already exists in the form of Jordan, for purposes of this Article the argument 
that Jordan is not Palestine, favored by many in the Arab world, will be 
adopted.  For an overview on the topic of Jordan as the Palestinian Arab 
state, see generally Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, Is Jordan Palestine?, 
DANIEL PIPES MIDDLE EAST FORUM (Oct. 1988), http://www.danielpipes.org 
/298/is-jordan-palestine. 
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ultimate goal of creating a Palestinian Arab state in the stead of 
Israel).50  This internal conflict came to the fore in 2001 at the 
United Nations-authorized “2001 World Conference against 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance” held in Durban, South Africa (Durban I). 
1. The Durban Conference and the Rise of the NGO Arm of the 
Arab League 
Durban I consisted primarily of two facially separate but 
parallel and concurrent conferences.  At one of the conferences 
(Governmental Durban Conference), recognized governments and 
related entities met51 while literally across the street from the 
 
 50.  This goal, from the original Arab League Boycott declaration, 
KHALIL, supra note 19, at 162–63, is regularly championed by more militant 
supporters of Palestinian Arabs, such as the government of Iran.  See, e.g., 
Michael Segall & Daniel Rubenstein, Sworn to Destruction: What Iranian 
Leaders Continue to Say about Israel in the Rouhani Era, JERUSALEM CTR. 
FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (Jan. 7, 2014), http://jcpa.org/article/20-threats-iranian-
leaders-made-in-2013 (“In 2012, the Jerusalem Center published a collection 
of Iranian leaders’ statements from 2009–2012.  The study proved that anti-
Israel incitement was never confined to Ahmadinejad, who in any event is no 
longer in power.  The entire Iranian leadership, which takes its cues from 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his predecessor, the late Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, yearns for the day when Israel will be destroyed.”).  
Additionally, Hamas, the entity that governs the Gaza portion of the 
Palestinian territories, was formed with the destruction of Israel as an 
explicit goal.  That goal was sanitized in recent years so that statement is 
less certain, but the generally accepted understanding is that the softening of 
language calling for the destruction of Israel was for political posturing and 
did not reflect an actual change in purpose.  See Chris McGreal, Hamas 
Drops Call for Destruction of Israel from Manifesto, GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 
2006), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/12/israel; see also 
Khameni Manifesto, infra note 444 (a proclamation calling for the destruction 
of Israel from the supreme leader of Iran). 
 51.  According to the United Nations, the following is a list of 
participants at Durban I:  
All Member States of the United Nations; [a]ll regional organizations 
and commissions involved in the preparation of regional meetings; 
[r]epresentatives of organizations which have received a standing 
invitation from the General Assembly to participate as observers; 
UN specialized agencies, regional commissions, bodies and 
programmes; [r]epresentatives of UN mechanisms in the field of 
human rights; [i]nterested non-governmental organizations to be 
represented by observers, in accordance with UN Economic and 
Social Council resolution 1996/31; [o]ther interested governmental 
organizations, to be represented as observers. 
Participation in the Conference, WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST RACISM, 
http://www.un.org/WCAR/particip.htm (last visited July 6, 2016). 
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Governmental Durban Conference, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)52 held their conference (NGO Durban 
Conference). 
Durban I was widely considered to have been a debacle, a 
conference against racism that had, as its primary focus, the 
promulgation of racism against Israel and Jews.53  Durban I did 
not start out with that focus, though.  Prior to Durban I, a series 
of regional meetings were held to formulate an agenda and plan of 
action that would be the focus of the conferences at Durban I.54  
Initially, the regional meetings appeared to have made progress in 
moving away from the racist and discredited “Zionism-is-racism” 
theme that had infected the international body for decades.55 
This period of comity ended at the fourth and final regional 
meeting held in Tehran, Iran, as Islamic states commandeered the 
agenda and turned it on its head.  What had started as a 
repudiation of the international community’s past anti-Israel 
activities turned into an agenda that was focused upon reiterating 
and expanding upon prior anti-Israel screeds, complete with 
repeated accusations that Israel was in the process of “ethnically 
cleansing” its Arab population.56  In fact, by the end of the 
meeting in Tehran, the Durban I Declaration and Plan of Action 
 
 52.  Though a complete list of NGOs attending Durban I is too long to 
include in this Article, the United Nations reported that approximately 4,000 
separate NGOs were in attendance.  Press Release, World Conference 
Against Racism, Call to Eradicate Discrimination and Intolerance Marks 
Conclusion of World Conference Against Racism, Agrees on Need for 
Remedial Measures; Urges End to Middle East Violence, U.N. Press Release 
RD/D/45 (Sept. 8, 2001), http://www.un.org/WCAR/pressreleases/rd-d45.htm.   
 53.  Tom Lantos, The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the UN World 
Conference Against Racism, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 31 (2002).  
Congressman Lantos, a United States delegate to Durban I and the founder 
of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, described Durban I as “an anti-
American, anti-Israel circus” that was organized as “a transparent attempt to 
de-legitimize the moral argument for Israel’s existence as a haven for Jews.”  
Id. at 31, 37. 
 54.  Id. at 34. 
 55.  Id. (“The documents that emerged from [the first three regional 
meetings] attempted to tackle a range of vexing issues from the legacy of 
slavery to the need to confront the global resurgence of anti-Semitism.  
Significantly, the Europe and Latin American regional conferences took 
concrete steps to prevent the return of the anti-Israel ‘Zionism-is-racism’ 
language that doomed the two previous World Conferences.  Further, they 
explicitly condemned anti-Semitism in their draft documents.”). 
 56.  Id. at 36. 
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deemed Israeli policies to be a “crime against humanity,”57 a 
theme which would become a central plank of the BDS 
Movement’s attack on Israel. 
It is important to note here that the propaganda agenda 
agreed upon at the regional meeting in Iran was exactly the type 
of propaganda that the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945 
ordered non-government actors to disseminate.58  Not 
coincidentally, after the conclusion of Durban I in October 2001, 
the Arab League’s Central Boycott Office met and an 
overwhelmingly majority of member-states called for the 
revitalization of the Arab League Boycott.59 
While the Governmental Durban Conference started with the 
same anti-Israel agenda that infected the regional meeting in 
Iran, the withdrawal of the United States and Israeli delegations 
early on led to a minor retrenchment away from overt bigotry and 
anti-Israel propaganda by the remaining Governmental Durban 
delegations.60  Nonetheless, until the last minutes of the 
Governmental Durban Conference, Islamic states that had 
historically supported the Arab League Boycott attempted to force 
amendments that mirrored the extremist anti-Israeli language 
which would be formalized in the NGO Durban Conference 
documents, including the new thematic demonization of Israel as 
an “apartheid” state.61 
 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  KHALIL, supra note 19, at 163.   
 59.  Towards a Global Movement: A Framework for Today’s Anti-
Apartheid Activism, BDS MOVEMENT 24 (June 2007), https://www.bds 
movement.net/files/bds%20report%20small.pdf [hereinafter BDS Manifesto]; 
see also Dina Ezzat, A Peaceful Weapon, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Oct. 18–24, 
2001).  
 60.  It may be too charitable to describe the final statement of the 
Governmental Durban Conference as less bigoted, but some progress was 
made in toning down the rhetoric.  As Congressman Lantos described the 
document, “[t]he compromise . . . removed some of the anti-Israeli 
language . . . .  Not only does the final document single out one regional 
conflict for discussion, it does so in a biased way: the suffering of the 
Palestinian people is highlighted, but there is no discussion of the Palestinian 
terrorists attacks on Israeli citizens.”  Lantos, supra note 53, at 48. 
 61.  Id.  According to Congressman Lantos, the Islamic state delegates 
“continued to show the intransigence they had demonstrated in negotiations 
with the United States, launching a last minute parliamentary maneuver to 
salvage three of the most extreme paragraphs of anti-Israeli language that 
they had inserted into the conference documents in Geneva.  [They] lost on a 
procedural motion offered by Brazil.” Id.   
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The NGO Durban Conference became, as expected, an orgy of 
anti-Semitism on a global scale.  That conference hewed to the 
extremist propaganda campaign against Israel and Jews rooted in 
the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945.  It was as though 
Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, who was described 
as being the ringleader of the anti-Israel agenda at Durban I, had 
declared a rebirth of the Arab League’s campaign against Israel, 
all the way down to the use of non-governmental forces to 
spearhead the hitherto near-dormant Arab League Boycott.62  
Like the Arab League Boycott, the NGO Durban Conference 
resulted in a forum declaration that included an explicit call for “a 
policy of complete and total isolation of Israel as an apartheid 
state . . . which means the imposition of mandatory and 
comprehensive sanctions and embargoes, the full cessation of all 
links (diplomatic, economic, social, aid, military cooperation, and 
training) between all states and Israel.”63 
Both conferences at Durban I also witnessed the official 
unveiling of a new tactic: the attempt to institutionalize anti-
apartheid language against Israel.  This tactic, which has its roots 
in the Iranian regional meeting (where the member-states of the 
Arab League had significant influence), is now the centerpiece of 
the BDS Movement’s agenda against Israel.  While the NGO 
Durban Conference declaration was clearly a continuation of the 
Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945, it did not directly take 
on a life of its own upon the conclusion of Durban I.  In the wake 
of Durban I there was strong condemnation of its anti-Semitic 
focus.  Even the then-UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, 
Mary Robinson, could not deny that the conference had been 
hijacked by anti-Jewish extremists: 
I also admit that it was an extremely difficult conference.  
 
 62.  Dalia Shehori & Yair Sheleg, Israel, U.S. Leave Durban; Peres Dubs 
Meet a Farce, HAARETZ (Sept. 4, 2001, 12:00 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/ 
print-edition/news/israel-u-s-leave-durban-peres-dubs-meet-a-farce-1.68858 
(“Foreign Ministry sources said the Muslim bloc’s rejectionism was 
spearheaded by Arab League Secretary-General and former Egyptian foreign 
minister Amr Moussa and current Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher.  
Though the U.S. did not publicly blame anyone, off the record, American 
government sources also said that Amr Moussa had been the main 
troublemaker.”).   
 63.  NGO Forum Declaration, Article 425, WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST 
RACISM (Sept. 3, 2001), http://ipo.org/racism-ngo-decl.htm [hereinafter 
Durban NGO Declaration] (emphasis added). 
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That there was horrible anti-Semitism present—
particularly in some of the NGO discussions.  A number 
[of] people came to me and said they’ve never been so 
hurt or so harassed or been so blatantly faced with an 
anti-Semitism.64 
Commissioner Robinson’s choice of words should not be 
overlooked.  What went on at Durban I was not just anti-Israel 
venom.  It transcended the political issue of the State of Israel and 
descended into anti-Jewish hate.  This was the mindset behind the 
birth of the BDS Movement. So while the extremist Islamic states 
had their way with the agenda at Durban I, the western world 
saw Durban I as a festival of bigotry and extremism.  This, 
combined with the Islamic terror attacks against the United 
States on September 11, 2001—mere days after the conclusion of 
Durban I—tainted any immediate attempts to advance the 
movement against Israel that was at the core of the NGO Durban 
Conference’s declaration. 
The Durban I boycott movement sat fallow for several years 
after the September 11th terrorist attacks, but as time passed, the 
landscape once again changed.  In the wake of the United States’ 
2003 invasion of Iraq, a large anti-war movement had taken hold 
throughout the western world.  This movement was, in many 
ways, co-opted by, or operating in conjunction with, pro-Islamic, 
and, in particular, anti-Israel groups.65  As the American public’s 
distaste for the war in Iraq grew, and the influence of anti-war 
 
 64.  Talking Point Special, BBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2002, 9:48 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/forum/1673034.stm. 
 65.  For example, International A.N.S.W.E.R. was exceedingly active in 
anti-war protests in the United States after the September 11th Islamic 
terror attacks.  These protests frequently were dominated by pro-Palestinian 
Arab, anti-Israel and anti-Semitic themes. See, e.g., International Action 
Center & ANSWER: An ADL Backgrounder, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Jan. 
5, 2009), http://archive.adl.org/main_anti_israel/iac_answer_backgrounder 
2cb9.html#.U_-4SzKwI3h (“ANSWER has consistently linked its anti-war 
initiatives and campaigns with an anti-Israel agenda. ANSWER considers 
Israel to be a capitalist outpost for the West, and regards terrorist 
organizations that advocate for Israel’s destruction, including Hamas and 
Hezbollah, to be legitimate resistance organizations.  During a July 31, 2006, 
interview with FOX News, ANSWER’s national director, Brian Becker, said: 
‘Do I consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization?  The answer is no.’  
ANSWER’s rallies opposing the United States wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
often include signs condemning Israel and praising anti-Israel terrorist 
groups.”). 
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movements spread, there was a greater acceptance for the anti-
war movement’s anti-Israel message. 
2. Rebranding the Arab League Boycott, Post-Durban: The 
Ascension of the BDS Movement 
The genesis of the BDS Movement, much like the workings of 
the Arab League Boycott that spawned it, is somewhat 
amorphous.  In July 2005, the NGO Durban Conference’s spirit, if 
not body, was reanimated by over 100 non-governmental 
organizations that reasserted the call for a global movement 
against Israel.66  The movement that they called for had the same 
essential goals and means as the NGO Durban Conference’s 
declaration, and the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945 
before it: the use of boycotts to isolate and weaken Israel.67  From 
this call, the BDS Movement was publicly unveiled. 
By design, the BDS Movement is not an organization with a 
clear and identifiable body.  That is not to say that there is no 
such body; rather, in an attempt to avoid the reach of, inter alia, 
anti-boycott laws in the United States and elsewhere, the BDS 
Movement, as the latest iteration of the Arab League Boycott, 
simply presents a disembodied face to the world.  Notwithstanding 
its claim to be a grassroots organization, the BDS movement’s 
primary website shows that it is a thinly-veiled organ of the 
longstanding Arab League Boycott.68  Indeed, a review of the 
 
 66.  Palestinian BDS National Committee, BDS MOVEMENT, 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/bnc (“The broad consensus among Palestinian 
civil society about the need for a broad and sustained Campaign for Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) resulted in the Palestinian Call for boycott, 
divestment and sanctions against Israel that was launched in July 2005 with 
the initial endorsement of over 170 Palestinian organizations.  The 
signatories to this call represent the three major components of the 
Palestinian people: the refugees in exile, Palestinians under occupation in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip and the discriminated Palestinian citizens of the 
Israeli state.”). 
 67.  Id.  (“The BNC’s mandate and role is: [t]o strengthen and spread the 
culture of boycott as a central form of civil resistance to Israeli occupation, 
colonialism and apartheid; [t]o formulate strategies and programs of action in 
accordance with the 9 July 2005 Palestinian Civil Society BDS Call; [t]o serve 
as the Palestinian reference point for BDS campaigns in the region and 
worldwide; [t]o serve as the national reference point for anti-normalization 
campaigns within Palestine; [and to] facilitate coordination and provide 
support [and] encouragement to the various BDS campaign efforts in all 
locations.”). 
 68.  See id.   
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original Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945 reveals that the 
BDS movement’s formal boycott apparatus—a Palestinian Arab 
group with the goal of spreading propaganda against and fostering 
a boycott of Israel—was modeled after the Arab League Boycott. 
At the time of the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945, 
as is the case today, there was no internationally recognized state 
of Palestine, and there was no Arab League member state that 
purported to represent the Palestinian Arabs.  Consequently, 
when the 1945 Arab League Boycott declaration was made, 
several non-governmental Palestinian Arab representatives were 
designated to sit on the Arab League Council to facilitate the Arab 
League Boycott.69  In addition to the Palestinian Arab delegates, 
the Arab League explicitly determined that the boycott would 
have other non-governmental actors.70 
From its inception, the Arab League Boycott insisted on 
action not only by the “States of the League,” but also by all 
individuals and other entities that were not members of the Arab 
League or represented on the Arab League’s council.71  Though 
the language of the declaration is a bit archaic, it is also an 
irrefutable directive to create parallel state-level and “grassroots” 
non-state level apparatuses to coordinate and cooperate on the 
implementation of the boycott of Israel.72  While it did distinguish 
between state and non-state actors in terms of identifying the 
participating groups, the Arab League Boycott did not otherwise 
draw distinctions between those who were represented by a 
recognized state and those who were acting at a non-state level. 
The similarities between the BDS Movement’s “Palestinian 
BDS National Committee” and the Arab League’s “Higher Arab 
Executive Committee” (which consisted of Palestinian Arab 
delegates to the Arab Council for purposes of the Arab League 
 
 69.  KHALIL, supra note 19, at 161 (“The Council resolves that there 
should be one or more representatives of Palestine, provided that the number 
of the (members of) the Palestine delegation does not exceed three.  The 
delegation shall participate in all of the activities of the Council in accordance 
with the provisions of the Palestine Annex of the Pact of the League of Arab 
States.  It shall be understood that the participation of the Palestine 
delegation means that it shall have the right to vote on the Palestine 
question and on those (matters) which Palestine can be bound to 
implement.”).   
 70.  Id. at 163.   
 71.  Id. at 161. 
 72.  See id. at 163. 
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Boycott) are not coincidental.  In name, in function, in tasks, in 
methodology and in goals, they are one and the same, separated 
only by the passage of time.  What is today called the BDS 
Movement was always a recognized and required component of 
the Arab League Boycott.  Prior to 2005, the BDS Movement was 
disorganized and operated without a declared name, but its role in 
the Arab League Boycott had been established in 1945.  
Furthermore, the Arab League Boycott was also a secondary 
boycott and the role of the BDS Movement was specifically 
designed to foster this purpose.73 
3. The BDS Movement Today 
Perhaps the best source of information on the BDS Movement 
today is the manifesto published on its self-proclaimed official 
website, www.bdsmovement.net (BDS Manifesto).74  This 
unsigned document, which is attributed to an organization 
referred to as “Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall 
Campaign” (Wall Campaign) and titled “Towards a Global 
Movement:  A Framework for Today’s Anti-Apartheid Activism,” is 
a bit of a mystery in its origins.  The Wall Campaign website 
contains what appears to be the original draft of the BDS 
Manifesto,75 (Original BDS Manifesto) but that document is 
significantly less detailed than the BDS Manifesto and makes no 
attempt to hide the fact that the BDS Movement is the successor 
to the Arab League Boycott.76 
For example, the Original BDS Manifesto critiques the 
problems with the existing Arab League Boycott and suggests that 
greater participation by non-governmental organizations and a 
more refined media campaign would make the Arab League 
 
 73.  The primary boycott was the Arab League, its member states, and 
individuals in the Arab states refusing to engage in commerce with Israel.  
The secondary boycott was the collaboration to force the “institutions, 
organizations, merchants, commission agents, and individuals” to abide by 
the boycott.  Id. at 161.  In fact, by the wording of the declaration, it would 
appear that non-state actors were primarily tasked with working to spread 
the secondary boycott  i.e., “collaborate and co-operate . . . so that [the other 
businesses and entities] will refuse to deal in” Israeli goods.  Id.   
 74.  BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at ii. 
 75.  Towards a Global Movement: A Framework for Today’s Anti-
Apartheid Activism, STOP THE WALL 1 (June 2007), https://www.stop 
thewall.org/downloads/pdf/bds-s.pdf [hereinafter Original BDS Manifesto]. 
 76.  See id. at 6–8. 
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Boycott more successful.77  Far from disclaiming its affiliation 
with the Arab League Boycott, the Original BDS Manifesto 
acknowledges that the BDS Movement is an attempt to make the 
Arab League Boycott a more successful weapon against Israel’s 
existence.78 
Both the Original BDS Manifesto and the BDS Manifesto are 
dated June 2007, and both documents refer to 
www.bdsmovement.net as the coordinating body for the BDS 
Movement.79  The BDS Manifesto departs from the Original BDS 
Manifesto, however, by attempting to position the BDS Movement 
as a “grassroots” movement.80  Section 2.5 of the BDS Manifesto is 
even titled “The Boycott is Grassroots,”81 yet as is the case with 
any attempt to deny that which is obvious, this section of the BDS 
Manifesto trips over its own argument and shows that the BDS 
Movement is really nothing more than a rebranding and 
refocusing of the Arab League Boycott. 
For example, Section 2.5 of the BDS Manifesto tells the story 
of Bahrain, which officially ended its participation in the Arab 
League Boycott in September 2005.82  To purportedly show that 
the BDS Movement is grassroots, the BDS Manifesto presents the 
fact that shortly after Bahrain ended its participation in the Arab 
League Boycott, the BDS Movement forced the government of 
Bahrain to reinstate its participation in the boycott.83  While this 
may be a form of grassroots activism, the fact that the 
continuation of the Arab League Boycott, instead of the 
implementation of a unique BDS Movement objective, was the 
goal of the BDS Movement in Bahrain, indicates that the BDS 
Movement is simply a non-state enforcement arm of the Arab 
League Boycott apparatus, as was originally intended under the 
 
 77.  Id. at 8. 
 78.  Id. at 9 (Discussing the goals of various BDS Movement actors, the 
manifesto dismisses those who would accept a goal of coexisting with Israel 
by saying, “[t]his is clearly at odds with the Palestinian position in which the 
opposition to Zionism as an ideology forms the major impetus for the 
struggle.”  In other words, the very existence of Israel as a Jewish state is 
anathema to the BDS Movement’s Palestinian Arab core constituency.).   
 79.  Original BDS Manifesto, supra note 75 at 1; BDS Manifesto, supra 
note 59, at i, viii. 
 80.  See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 27–29 (providing examples of 
how local communities took action advancing the boycott). 
 81.  Id. at 27.   
 82.  Id. at 28. 
 83.  Id. 
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Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945.  Indeed, in many ways 
the BDS Manifesto was—and still is—a call for the re-
radicalization of the Arab League Boycott and a rejection of the 
normalization process between Arab states and Israel that was 
formalized in the 1993 Oslo Accords. 
a. The Ties that Bind: The Oslo Accords, Radical Rejectionism, 
and the BDS Movement 
The Oslo Accords were the result of intensive negotiations 
between Israeli and Palestinian Arab representatives.  Pursuant 
to the Oslo Accords, Israel recognized the Palestine Liberation 
Organization as the representative of the Palestinian Arab people, 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization, in turn, was to 
recognize the right of Israel to exist and renounce the use of 
terrorism against Israel.84  The ultimate objective of the Oslo 
Accords was to implement a “two-state” solution, wherein Israel 
would cede territory for the establishment of a new Palestinian 
Arab State.85  Upon the conclusion of the peace negotiations under 
the Oslo Accords, the newly created Palestinian Arab state was to 
coexist peacefully alongside the existing State of Israel.86 
While history has shown that the Oslo Accords did not fulfill 
their promise,87 the fact that Arabs, and in particular, Yasser 
Arafat—the man who was selected to use violence to carry out the 
Arab League Boycott’s mandate that “Palestine should remain an 
Arab country”88—were willing to renounce the use of terror and to 
accept the existence of Israel constituted an egregious betrayal of 
the foundational principles of the Arab League’s Palestinian Arab 
agenda and those it represented.89 
 
 84.  Orde F. Kittrie, More Process than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance 
and the Oslo Accords, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661, 1667 (2003). 
 85.  Id. at 1668. 
 86.  Id. at 1667–68. 
 87.  Id. at 1668 (concluding that “[t]he Oslo Accords were largely, if not 
entirely, a failure . . . . By mid-2003, the decade since the September 1993 
signing [of the Oslo Accords] had seen the renewal of the Palestinian terrorist 
campaign against Israel, hundreds of dead on both sides, the reoccupation of 
most of the West Bank, enormous damage to both the Israeli and Palestinian 
economies, and the missing of practically every Oslo deadline.”).   
 88.  KHALIL, supra note 19, at 558–59. 
 89.  SARA ROY, HAMAS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN GAZA: ENGAGING THE ISLAMIST 
SOCIAL SECTOR 33 (2011) (“Hamas (in alliance with ten other Palestinian 
factions based in Damascus) vehemently rejected and condemned the Oslo 
Accords because Hamas considered them a betrayal of Palestinian national 
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The BDS Manifesto’s position, in fact, mirrors the reaction of 
Hamas and other militant Arab groups at the time of the signing 
of the Oslo Accords: 
[T]he failure of Oslo to bring about any of the goals of the 
Palestinian liberation struggle catalyzed new forms of 
resistance.  Not all parties remained blind to the realities 
on the ground in which the ghettoization and expulsion of 
Palestinians from their lands today threatens a fresh 
catastrophe. Palestinians themselves confirmed the 
rejection of an illusionary peace process, notably in the 
second intifada and the recent elections in the [West 
Bank and Gaza Strip]. Furthermore, despite the euphoria 
of the Oslo Process and continual “peace” initiatives up 
until the Roadmap, normalization policies were not 
mirrored in the activities and calls from civil society and 
Palestinian solidarity movements in the Middle East. 
While governments shunned taking measures against 
Israel for its ongoing crimes—choosing to quietly reward 
the occupation with diplomatic ties, cooperation and 
trade—pressure groups pushed for reinvigorating the 
isolation of Israel in the understanding that the 
Palestinian struggle was hindered rather than aided by 
Oslo.90 
How can it be that a process whereby the Israeli and 
Palestinian Arab people were to formalize agreements that would 
result in their peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition could 
be considered a hindrance to the “Palestinian struggle”?  The 
unfortunate answer is the goal of that struggle is not peace; 
rather, it is, as the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945, 
Hamas, and the BDS Manifesto reiterate, the destruction of Israel 
and the creation of an Arab state on its ruins.91 
Even if the Oslo Accords did not represent a durable solution 
to the Palestinian Arab/Israeli issue, the Oslo Accords did 
 
and historic rights.”).   
 90.  BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 27 (emphasis added). 
 91.  KHALIL, supra note 19, at 159–61; see also BDS Manifesto, supra 
note 59, at 18 (“[T]he [Arab League] [B]oycott was deployed as a means to 
cripple the Zionist movement within Palestine and, immediately after 1948, 
to bring about Israel’s demise.”). 
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normalize Israel’s status in global markets.92  While the member-
states of the Arab League may have lost interest in actively 
participating in the Arab League Boycott (or perhaps it was 
politically expedient to allow a non-state actor to take over its 
boycott duties) the non-state actors within the Arab League and 
its affiliates wanted to unsheathe the boycott as a means of rolling 
back the post-Oslo integration of Israel’s role in the world 
economy.93 
If there were any doubts as to this conclusion, the BDS 
Manifesto repeatedly speaks clearly of its roots in, and intention 
to reinvigorate, the Arab League Boycott, for “boycott activities 
are not a new phenomenon, but operated in one form or another 
for many decades only to subside during the 1990s.”94  For 
example, the BDS Manifesto, in its introductory pages, indicates 
that “[r]eflections upon previous BDS strategies used to isolate 
Israel, from within and outside the Middle East, are explored . . . .  
An evaluation seeks to learn from past BDS experiences and the 
implications for Palestine campaign work today.”95  In addition, a 
“reinvigoration” is then mentioned: 
An analysis of the Arab League boycott highlights the 
strengths and drawbacks of strategies pursued by League 
states and promoted by what became increasingly 
authoritarian governments.  We compare this to the 
reinvigoration of the call to boycott Israel in the Middle 
East, driven from below in recent years, and coming at a 
time when the majority of states and leaders in the region 
pursue normalization with the occupation.96 
A similar point is made again later in the document: 
 
 92.  BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 24 (“[The Oslo Accords] triggered a 
chain of events, which brought about the integration of Israel into the global 
community . . . .”). 
 93.   See id. at 27–29. 
 94.  Id. at 13.   
 95.  Id. at ii (emphasis added).  References to “previous” BDS strategies 
can only mean the Arab League Boycott in the context of this statement.  See 
id. 
 96. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). As a logical matter, one cannot 
reinvigorate something that is new; therefore, the object of reinvigoration 
here is the Arab League Boycott. See id.  Furthermore, the distinction 
between state level action and action “driven from below” highlights the 
reversion to the NGO-focused strategy set out in the original Arab League 
Boycott declaration.  Id. 
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After the failure of Oslo and the “peace process[,]” BDS 
initiatives are often presented as an innovative and 
effective means to pressure Israel.  Yet, the isolation of 
Israel through a comprehensive boycott campaign is not a 
new concept.  It dates back to Israel’s creation from the 
destruction of over 450 towns and villages together with 
the forced exodus of more than 750,000 Palestinians from 
their lands.  Boycotts and sanctions characterized the 
relations of states across the Middle East with Israel from 
1948 until the Oslo Process, continuing today, albeit as 
weakened and largely ineffective mechanisms.  
Strengthening today’s BDS efforts and advocating 
strategies to take solidarity action forward requires 
exploration and understanding of previous boycott work. 
. . . . 
. . . [C]ampaigns outside [of] the ruling structures across 
the Middle East continue the tradition of the boycott as a 
means to support the Palestinian struggle.97 
But, perhaps the clearest reason the Arab League Boycott has 
been resurrected comes from non-governmental actors themselves: 
While boycott offices are still retained by many League 
countries, they are redundant institutions in the majority 
of cases.  Individual companies still request adherence to 
the boycott, at secondary and tertiary levels, including 
businesses from Bahrain, Bangladesh, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates 
and Yemen.  It is here, and within the grassroots 
movements, where BDS continues to work towards the 
isolation of Israel in the Middle East.98 
And even if active boycotters were merely “grassroots,” “[t]he 
 
 97.  Id. at 15–16 (emphasis added). The BDS Manifesto explicitly rejects 
that its call for a boycott of Israel is new and directly links its boycott to the 
Arab League Boycott.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 27 (emphasis added).  The key element of this passage is the 
reference to “it is here.”  Id.  The “here” is the secondary and tertiary boycotts 
promoted from within the various Arab countries as part of the overall Arab 
League Boycott apparatus.  Id. at 16–17.  The BDS Movement has thus 
explicitly acknowledged that it is an arm of the Arab League Boycott which 
promotes the secondary and tertiary boycotts specifically prohibited by the 
EAA Anti-Boycott Law. 
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setback to Israel’s trade and investment program was 
considerable until anti-boycott legislation and policies were 
adopted, specifically in the United States.”99  But even so, 
Israel’s economic boom can be viewed as far less resilient 
and strong than assumed by many commentators, 
providing hope that a reinvigorated BDS movement can 
have some impact. 
. . . . 
A BDS movement must be aware that the way in which 
the boycott is pursued can be more important than the 
attainment of specific goal[s] . . . .  It shows that 
governments and states cannot be relied upon to be the 
enforcers of a boycott, even though they may be a useful 
component in institutionalising it.  Moreover, it 
demonstrates that today’s boycott movement must clearly 
articulate its aims and goals and until what point the 
boycott is to be maintained.  Whereas the Arab League 
has highlighted a variety of motives for the boycott, lack 
of overall clarity and purpose has not won it sympathy in 
the rest of the world.100 
The only way to interpret the above-quoted passage is as a 
parsing of responsibilities: member-states of the Arab League 
institutionalize the boycott, while non-state actors such as the 
BDS Movement act to sanitize and propagandize the boycott, just 
as the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945 required.101 
The above-quoted passages are just a sample of the 
connections between the BDS Manifesto (and thus the BDS 
Movement as a whole) and the Arab League Boycott Declaration 
of 1945, not only in terms of goals and tactics but also in terms of 
 
 99.  Id. at 32 (reviewing the effectiveness of the Arab League Boycott by 
analyzing its economic impact on Israel).  For example, the BDS Manifesto 
describes how Barclays was pressured by Arab League states to liquidate its 
fifty percent holding in Barclays Discount Bank in Israel or face termination 
of its business in Egypt and several other League states.  Id.  Initially, 
Barclays ignored the threat but complied a year later after suffering 
outstanding losses.  Id.  
 100.  Id. at 37 (emphasis added).  Again, the reference to “reinvigoration” 
clearly connects the BDS Movement with the Arab League Boycott.  In order 
for something to be reinvigorated, the subject would have first needed to exist 
in a previous, related form. 
 101.  See KHALIL, supra note 19, at 162–63. 
28 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
the underlying raison d’être for each movement:  to isolate, 
weaken, and ultimately eliminate the Zionist presence in 
Palestine.102  Time after time, the BDS Manifesto positions itself 
as the “reinvigoration” of the Arab League Boycott, or the 
historical continuation of the Arab League Boycott.103  These 
words were carefully selected to remind participants that the BDS 
Movement is sanctioned by the Arab and Islamic world and has a 
long history of operations against Israel.  The BDS Manifesto 
makes this clear in its description of the Arab League Boycott: 
“the boycott was deployed as a means to cripple the Zionist 
movement within Palestine and, immediately after 1948, to bring 
about Israel’s demise.”104 
b. Is the BDS Movement a Grassroots Peace Movement or Another 
Face of Radical Islam? 
The BDS Movement claims that it is a grassroots movement 
that fights injustice, yet behind its revolutionary slogans and 
xenophobic105 rhetoric, its true objectives are laid bare.  We know 
that the BDS Movement, by its own words, is the reinvigoration of 
the Arab League Boycott.106  By its own guiding principles, the 
BDS Movement is a rejectionist organization that has repudiated 
the two-state solution’s peace process.107  Using sophisticated and 
decentralized management structures (to ensure the movement is 
not affiliated with other organizations and to make it more 
difficult to prosecute for its unlawful activities) and a slick 
propaganda campaign, the BDS Movement mimics other radical 
Islamic groups in claiming virtue while propagating hate and 
destruction. 
It is no coincidence that the BDS Movement ties its rise to the 
same period in which Hamas rose to political power in the region.  
Hamas, founded in the late 1980s as a military and political 
organization with the goal of eliminating Israel and replacing it 
 
 102.  See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 18.   
 103.  See id. at 2. 
 104.  Id. at 18. 
 105.  Although the BDS Manifesto claims to be a Palestinian-led 
movement for freedom, justice, and equality, it is primarily a xenophobic 
screed against Israel—the only sovereign minority constituency in the Arab-
dominated Middle East.   
 106.  See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 2. 
 107.  Id. at 27. 
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with an Islamic Palestinian Arab state, won a majority of seats in 
the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006,108 mere 
months after the BDS Movement’s July 9, 2005, call for the 
reinstitution of the Arab League Boycott.  Through this electoral 
victory, Hamas replaced Fatah109 as the seat of power for the 
Palestinian authority in Gaza.110  Like the BDS Movement, 
Hamas rejects the Oslo Accords entirely as well as the 
corresponding two-state peace process and normalization of 
relations with Israel.111  In fact, Hamas’ rise to power was widely 
seen as a repudiation of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s 
Fatah wing, which was Israel’s Palestinian Arab counterpart in 
the Oslo Accords.112 
Both Hamas and the BDS Movement call for the destruction 
of Israel as a Jewish state.113  However, Hamas, as a political and 
military organization, is nominally a separate entity.  At times 
there may be internecine disputes between the two affiliated 
organizations, especially when it comes to matters that swing the 
scales of power and influence between the two.  However, this is 
true of virtually all non-state actors in Palestinian Arab affairs 
(and the Islamic world generally).  That the two organizations 
may be at odds on occasion does not affect their underlying ties 
and affiliations, especially on the strategic goal of establishing a 
Palestinian Arab state atop the ruins of Israel.114 
 
 108.  JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41514, HAMAS: BACKGROUND 
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 43 (2010).  
 109.  Fatah is the dominant political arm within the Palestine Liberation 
Organization. While Fatah is nominally secular, its rival, Hamas, is 
unquestionably Islamic.  See id. at 3. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 14, 41. 
 112.  Id. at 3. 
 113.  See id. at 13–14; BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 162. 
 114.  See, e.g., Haidar Eid, Tough Questions for Hamas, ELEC. INTIFADA 
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://electronicintifada.net/content/tough-questions-hamas/ 
9095.  Eid, a policy advisor for the Palestinian Policy Network (an 
organization formed in connection with the BDS Movement) and an 
influential voice in the BDS Movement, took issue with Hamas’ choice to 
engage in the elimination of Israel in stages saying:  
[I]t is obvious that Hamas is unable to realize that the war on Gaza 
in 2009 has created a new political reality whereby Israel pulled the 
trigger on the racist two-state/two-prison solution.  Hamas insists on 
adopting this approach and claims it is a temporary tactic until the 
balance of power shifts, as the movement assumes it will within the 
truce period of ten or twenty years.  During this time, it plans to 
30 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
If we view the early to mid-2000s from a more global 
perspective, the BDS Movement’s place in the Islamic world 
becomes clear.  The 2001 call for the re-radicalization of the Arab 
League and its boycott against Israel at Durban I, as well as the 
globalization of radical Islamic terror operations under the al-
Qaeda and other brands (in particular, the September 11th terror 
attacks) unveiled a more aggressive and ideologically pure 
international Islamist movement.  Unlike the 1990s where the 
Oslo Accords appeared to signal the formalization of the 
Arab/Israeli peace movement that prominently began with 
normalization of ties between Egypt and Israel in the late 1970s, 
the 2000s witnessed a vengeful return to the pinnacle of Arab 
League radicalism and anti-Israel ideology.  Indeed, this period 
closely resembles the infamous Arab League’s 1967 “Three No’s” 
declaration of principles: no peace with Israel, no recognition of 
Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.115 
While the resurgence of Arab radicalism that began in the 
2000s closely resembles the ideology from earlier periods in Arab 
League history with regard to Zionism and Israel, there is a 
significant difference with the new radicalism.  Rather than being 
formalized at the state level, the new radicalism has taken root 
and spread at the non-state level.116  The member states of the 
Arab League, with the exception of several such as Libya and 
Syria, have largely continued the facial normalization process 
with Israel.117  Perhaps as a reaction to this “betrayal,” the non-
state members of the Arab League (and Islamic world as a whole) 
retrenched to the principles set out in the Arab League Boycott 
Declaration of 1945: a racist, rejectionist anti-Israel agenda.118 
 
build a state after its model in Gaza.  
Id.  The dispute between this voice of the BDS Movement and Hamas was not 
over whether Israel should be allowed to exist as part of the realization of a 
Palestinian Arab state; rather, Eid condemned Hamas’ deceitful 
consideration of a two-state solution as part of its overall strategy to weaken 
and then destroy Israel.  Id. 
 115.  In 1967, the Arab League met in Khartoum, Sudan, and issued a 
resolution at the conclusion of its summit.  The third point of the resolution is 
now known as the principle of the “Three No’s.”  Khartoum Resolution, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/world/khartoum-
resolution/p14841?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype
%3Dessential_document%26page%3D69.  
 116.  See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 27–29. 
 117.  See id. at 16, 26–27. 
 118.  See KHALIL, supra note 19, at 162–63.  
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Each of the anti-Israel actors today has a different structure 
and public persona.  Hamas is a formal political and military 
entity with a centralized governing body and a territory under its 
control; al-Qaeda and the Islamic State119 are primarily militant 
terror organizations with very little centralization or formal 
political apparatus; the BDS Movement is primarily a propaganda 
organization with a decentralized governing structure.  All of 
these organizations, however, strictly hew to the original Arab 
League “Three No’s” position that Zionism is incompatible with 
the Palestinian Arab identity and all strive to replace the Jewish 
state with a Palestinian Arab state. 
The important point in considering any and all of these 
groups is that they, and their individual members, tend to be 
fungible when it comes to the issue of Israel.  Groups may splinter 
from each other and operate under a different name with different 
strategies: one group may focus on violence while another may 
focus on propaganda.120 Nominally peaceful groups may have 
 
 119.  While al-Qaeda is widely known as an Islamic terror organization, 
the Islamic State is a relatively new iteration of radical Islamist ideology.  
The distinction is somewhat uncertain, but the landscape has been described 
as: 
[T]he post-9/11 jihadi movement . . . split into two major groups—al-
Qaeda and its declared affiliates, under the leadership of bin Laden 
and now Zawahiri—and everyone else, a motley collection of more or 
less like-minded insurgents and terrorists around the world who 
have maintained their independence, even though many were 
friendly or linked to al[-]Qaeda through shared resources or 
personnel.  
J.M. Berger, The Islamic State vs. al Qaeda, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Sept. 2, 
2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/02/islamic_state_vs_al_ 
qaeda_next_jihadi_super_power.  The Islamic State is one of the “motley 
collection” of other non-al-Qaeda radical Islamic groups.  Id.  Certainly, the 
anti-Israel, anti-Jewish agenda is not the only agenda for al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic State, but it serves as a prominent and binding role in each 
organization’s ideology and actions.  Id. 
 120.  The BDS Manifesto explicitly acknowledges this separation of tactics 
among the various anti-Israel groups, united by the overarching goal to 
destroy Israel:  
[C]haracterizing the struggle as a whole as “non-violent” does not 
necessarily equate with the values of the oppressed for whom BDS 
forms one part or mechanism of support for their struggle. This 
raises important questions over the right to resist . . . . [T]he 
Palestinian struggle has evolved over the decades as an expression of 
the Palestinians, who challenge the occupation and use the means 
available to a subjugated people to seek the attainment of their 
rights.  The Palestinian struggle cannot be so simply defined as 
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overlapping membership with groups committed to violence, but 
at their core, notwithstanding any moniker they adopt or flag they 
may fly, they are all part of the non-state apparatus that the Arab 
League Boycott Declaration of 1945 established: to eliminate 
Zionism. 
Furthermore, the BDS Movement is but one part of the 
ascension of non-state actors in the global Palestinian Arab 
nationalist movement.  As the importance of the Arab League121 
has declined over the decades, the void has been filled by any 
number of other non-state actors that populate the spectrum from 
purely humanitarian to resolutely militant.  While the names 
change, the group’s objective remains the same: the demonization, 
marginalization, and destruction of Israel.122 
The BDS Movement may claim that it is not a racist 
organization, but brushing aside its oft-repeated and empty claims 
to be fighting against “colonialism” and an “apartheid” state, one 
finds that the substance of the BDS Movement’s aims are rooted 
in racism, bigotry, and a desire to ethnically cleanse the only non-
Arab Middle Eastern state from the map.123  The BDS Movement, 
like its predecessors and affiliates, frames its goals as the 
 
violent or non-violent; it brings together a variety of strategies in its 
path of resistance to advance national goals.  
BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 11 (emphasis added).   
 121.  The Arab League is something of a hybrid organization.  As defined 
by the United Nations, the Arab League qualifies as a “non-governmental 
organization.” See James Hall, Economics of Non-governmental 
Organizations, BREAKING ALL THE RULES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www. 
batr.org/negotium/111313.html (“A non-governmental organization (NGO 
also often referred to as ‘civil society organization’ or CSO) is a not-for-profit 
group, principally independent from government, which is organized on a 
local, national or international level to address issues in support of the public 
good.”).  The Arab League can also be seen as a regional political organization 
or an intergovernmental organization.  Whatever the case is, neither the EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law nor the other laws discussed herein refer specifically to 
non-governmental organizations or grants them unique treatment.  
Furthermore, there is no definitive legal definition of the term “non-
governmental organization.”  To simplify the discussion on this non-
substantive point, I refer herein at times to the Arab League as a non-
governmental organization.   
 122.  See Gerald M. Steinberg, The Centrality of NGOs in Promoting Anti-
Israel Boycotts and Sanctions, 21 JEWISH POL. STUD. REV. 1, 18 (2009) 
(documenting the creation of hundreds of “human rights” NGOs devoted to 
anti-Israel advocacy). 
 123.  See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at viii. 
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“liberation of Palestine”124 and has abjectly rejected the principles 
of the Oslo Accords or any other bona fide peace process.  This can 
only mean that like Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and a 
long line of other Islamist non-state actors spawned by the Arab 
League, the BDS Movement is neither grassroots nor interested in 
coexistence with Israel as a Jewish state in any form.125 
Indeed, a co-founder of the BDS Movement, Omar Barghouti, 
was a signatory to a 2007 declaration titled “The One State 
Solution” that explicitly rejected the idea of a two-state solution 
and demanded the destruction of the State of Israel.126  Barghouti 
has also stated on record that most Palestinian Arabs support a 
one-state solution (i.e., Palestine replacing Israel) and that 
solution would logically mean the elimination of Israel as a 
functioning state: 
Two polls in 2007 showed two-thirds majority support for 
a single state solution in all flavors—some of them think 
of a purely Palestinian state without Israelis and so on—
in exile it’s even much higher because the main issue is 
that refugees in particular, and people fighting for 
refugee rights like I am, know that you cannot reconcile 
the right of return for refugees with a two state solution.  
That is the big white elephant in the room and people are 
ignoring it—a return for refugees would end Israel’s 
existence as a Jewish state.  The right of return is a basic 
right that cannot be given away; it’s inalienable.  [] A two-
 
 124.  Section 1.4 of the BDS Manifesto is titled “Strengths and 
Weaknesses of BDS in Support of the Palestinian Liberation Struggle,” and 
there are numerous references to the BDS Movement’s goal to liberate 
Palestine throughout the document.  See, e.g., BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, 
at 159. 
 125.  The two-state solution, which was the basis for the Oslo Accords and 
has been the resolution sought by the United States and most other 
international entities, would have the Israeli/Palestinian Arab dispute 
resolved through the creation of a Palestinian Arab state that coexists with 
the existing state of Israel. See Karl Ritter, New Swedish Government to 
Recognize Palestinian State, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.usnews. 
com/news/world/articles/2014/10/03/sweden-to-recognize-palestinian-state 
(“[W]e believe that the process is one that has to be worked out through the 
parties to agree on the terms of how they’ll live in the future of two states 
living side-by-side.”). 
 126.  See Ali Abunimah, et al., The One State Declaration, ELEC. INTIFADA 
(Nov. 29, 2007), http://electronicintifada.net/content/one-state-declaration/ 
793.   
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state solution was never moral and it’s no longer 
working—it’s impossible with all the Israeli settlements 
and so on.127 
Even Norman Finkelstein, a prominent academic critic of 
Israel,128 has deemed the BDS Movement to be a “cult” that seeks 
the destruction of Israel: 
“They don’t want Israel,” Finkelstein declared, “They 
think they’re being very clever.  They call it their three 
tiers . . . .  We want the end of the occupation, we want 
the right of return, and we want equal rights for Arabs in 
Israel.  And they think they are very clever, because they 
know the result of implementing all three is what?  
What’s the result?  You know and I know what’s the 
result: there’s no Israel.”129 
BDS Movement supporters go to great lengths denying the 
obvious intentions of their movement’s goals and claim that they 
would support the continued existence of Israel as a state within 
the pre-1967 war borders.130 BDS Movement supporters, however, 
put so many conditions on their “support of Israel”—such as the 
right of every Palestinian Arab to become a citizen of Israel and 
the elimination of Israel’s status as a Jewish state131—that these 
supporters endorse an Israel that is vastly different from the 
Jewish state approved by the United Nations pursuant to United 
Nations Resolution 181132 or the Jewish state recognized by the 
 
 127.  Ali Mustafa, “Boycotts Work”: An Interview with Omar Barghouti, 
ELEC. INTIFADA (May 31, 2009), http://electronicintifada.net/content/ boycotts-
work-interview-omar-barghouti/8263 (emphasis added). 
 128.  See, e.g., Matthew Abraham, The Case for Norman Finkelstein, 
GUARDIAN (June 14, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2007/jun/14/abattleforacademicfreedom.  
 129.  Ali Abunimah, Finkelstein, BDS and the Destruction of Israel, AL 
JAZEERA (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/ 
2012227111759385177.html. After extreme pressure from the BDS 
Movement and others, Finkelstein eased on his approach but did not 
repudiate its substance. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  See G.A. Res. 181 (II) I–A ¶ 3 (Nov. 29, 1947) (calling for a partition 
of the British Mandate of Palestine into two-states: a Jewish state and an 
Arab state).  This resolution was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on November 29, 1947, accepted by the putative representatives of 
the to-be-formed Jewish state, but rejected outright by the Arab states.  UN 
General Assembly Resolution 181, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
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United Nations in 1948.  Instead, clinging to the Arab League’s 
rejectionist and Arab supremacist positions from the earlier 
Zionist movement in Israel, the BDS Movement seeks to 
fundamentally transform Israel into a Palestinian Arab state that 
would also likely be Islamic. 
It should not be forgotten that the history of Arab and Islamic 
states demonstrates a dual class society consisting of—using the 
BDS Movement’s own terms—racism and apartheid.133  For 
example, in the relatively liberal Kingdom of Jordan, which has a 
large Palestinian Arab population, Islam is the sole state religion 
and individuals are not allowed to either promote any other 
religion or, if they are Muslim, convert to any other religion.134  
The conditions for non-Muslims in other Arab countries, such as 
Saudi Arabia, are even less hospitable.135  It is therefore easy to 
question the credibility of the BDS Movement’s stance that 
Israel’s actions as a Jewish state are racist and a form of 
 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/un%20general%20
assembly%20resolution%20181.aspx.  Seeing that there would be no Arab 
recognition of the Jewish state recommended by the United Nations, Israel 
declared its statehood shortly after the expiration of the British Mandate, 
which was followed by Arab states declaring war on the newly-constituted 
Jewish state.  See Establishment of Israel: Declaration, JEWISH VIRTUAL 
LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Dec_of_Indep.h 
tml. 
 133.  See, e.g., Karrie Kehoe, Factbox-Women’s Rights in the Arab World, 
THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.trust.org 
/item/20131111115632-hn9t2/?source=spotlight-writaw (documenting the 
rampant denial of basic human rights towards women in Arab states); see 
also Alan Dershowitz, Let’s Have a Real Apartheid Education Week, 
WORLDPOST (May 4, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-dershowitz 
/lets-have-a-real-aparthei_b_ 485399.html (last updated May 25, 2011) 
(documenting state sponsored religious, sexual, gender and racial 
discrimination throughout the Arab world).  
 134.  BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2007). 
 135.  BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2013) (“[In Saudi Arabia,] 
[f]reedom of religion is neither recognized nor protected under the law . . . . 
The public practice of any religion other than Islam is prohibited . . . .  Shia 
and other Muslims who did not adhere to the government’s interpretation of 
Islam faced political, economic, legal, social, and religious discrimination . . . .  
The government detained individuals on charges of insulting Islam, 
encouraging or facilitating conversion from Islam, ‘witchcraft and sorcery,’ 
and for engaging in private non-Muslim religious services . . . .  Mosques are 
the only public places of worship, and the construction of churches, 
synagogues, or other non-Muslim places of worship is not allowed.”). 
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apartheid when in reality most, if not all, Arab states exist as 
repressive Muslim states. 
What is more, the BDS Movement roots its anti-Israel creed 
in opposing alleged Israeli apartheid policies, yet the end result of 
the BDS Movement’s activities, if successful, would be eliminating 
the only liberal democracy in the region (one whose respect for 
women’s, minority and gay rights is inapposite to the neighboring 
Arab theocracies) and imposing an Islamic apartheid state in its 
stead.  This is exactly the same result called for by Islamist groups 
like al-Qaeda and Hamas who are ideologically aligned with the 
BDS Movement.  This comparison has also been made by Scholars 
for Peace in the Middle East, an international organization of 
scholars working for a peaceful resolution of the 
Israeli/Palestinian Arab dispute. In criticizing the BDS 
Movement’s affiliation with Hamas and other radical terror 
organizations, Scholars for Peace in the Middle East stated: 
A careful look at the BDS movement and its methodology 
shows not legitimate criticism but a movement that is 
racist and anti-Semitic . . . . 
. . . . 
Overall, the BDS campaign is contrary to the search for 
peace, since it represents a form of misguided economic 
warfare.  It is directly in opposition to decades of 
agreements between Israeli and Arab Palestinians, in 
which both sides pledged to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement and a commitment to a two-state solution . . . . 
. . . . 
Scholars for Peace in the Middle East (SPME) urges those 
committed to peace and justice for the people of a region 
which has had too much war and violence to join with us 
in rejecting the politics of hatred that the BDS movement 
represents . . . .136 
In this context, it must be noted that the two-state solution is 
a compromise for both Israel and the Palestinian Arabs.  Under 
the two-state solution, Israel’s territorial integrity would be 
 
 136.   Israel’s War with Hamas Reinvigorates BDS Movement, SCHOLARS 
FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://spme.org/spme-
statements/updated-statement-condemning-current-calls-boycott-divestment-
sanctions-bds-israel/18453/.  
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compromised and its available land would be significantly reduced 
(which, in fact, has already been compromised as a result of the 
Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005).  Naturally, this would 
have negative economic, social, and security ramifications on 
Israel.  A smaller Israel with an armed and historically hostile 
new neighbor would mean that the buffer zones currently in 
existence and which protect against mortar and rocket attacks 
and border incursions would disappear.137  As recent conflicts 
between Hamas and Israel have shown, the existing buffer zones 
provide a significant security benefit to Israel and allow Israel to 
defend its citizens against indiscriminate mortar and rocket fire 
directed at civilian populations.  Defensive anti-missile systems 
and warnings will only be effective so long as there is sufficient 
time between a threat’s detection and the projectile’s impact.  
Oftentimes, this time is under one minute, as was the case in the 
2014 war between Hamas and Israel.138  During times of war or 
terrorism, a larger territory brings better odds to prevent 
casualties and prepare a defense, so any territorial concessions by 
Israel will have a significant harmful effect on its security. 
Furthermore, the two-state solution represents Israel’s 
recognition of a unique Palestinian Arab identity and state, a 
political compromise of historic proportions, and an implicit 
compromise that jeopardizes Israel’s historic claims to the entirety 
of the land.139  Some of Israel’s proponents argue that the 
 
 137.  See, e.g., BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, A DURABLE PEACE: ISRAEL AND ITS 
PLACE AMONG THE NATIONS 261–285 (1993) (explaining the heightened 
importance of territory for Israel due to the small size of the country and the 
presence of hostile entities at its borders).  Mr. Netanyahu’s book, first 
published in 1993 shortly before the Oslo Accords, accurately warned that the 
military buffer provided by the West Bank and, to a lesser extent, Gaza, 
would become ever more important as Israel’s enemies acquired greater 
stores of short and long range missiles.  See id.  Mr. Netanyahu also opined 
that “[i]n the age of missiles territory counts more, not less.  Long-range 
missiles increase the need for mobilization time, and short range missiles can 
destroy strategic targets within their reach.  For both reasons, the control of 
a contiguous buffer area becomes more, not less, important.”  Id. at 278. 
 138.  See, e.g., Alessandra Ram, An Actually Useful Version of Yo is 
Warning Israelis of Rocket Strikes, WIRED (July 16, 2014, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/07/an-actually-useful-version-of-yo-is-warning-
israelis-of-rocket-strikes/ (discussing the Israeli Red Alert missile warning 
system: “[t]he user typically receives a warning via smartphone 15 to 90 
seconds before a rocket hits.”). 
 139.  See Dore Gold & Jeff Helmreich, An Answer to the New Anti-Zionists: 
The Rights of the Jewish People to a Sovereign State in Their Historic 
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Palestinian Arab compromise in the context of a two-state solution 
is illusory, since the Palestinian Arabs would give up no territory 
(no Palestinian Arab state currently exists) and there is ample 
documentation indicating that the Palestinian Arab strategy has 
always  been to destroy Israel with the only nuance being the use 
of “stages” to chip away at Israel’s security in preparation of a 
final battle.140  Dr. Michael Widlanski summarized the 
Palestinian Arab strategy in the following terms: 
From 1968 through 1974, Fatah/PLO made it clear that it 
wanted to replace Israel with a “democratic Palestine.”  
This was a euphemism for what former PLO leader 
Ahmad Shukeiry had declared: “ . . . destroying Israel and 
driving the Jews into the sea.”  Beginning in 1974, the 
PLO further “moderated” its tone, but not its real goal.  It 
adopted the “Strategy of Stages” and declared that it 
would try to gain parts of Palestine/Israel via peaceful 
means.  Thereafter it would employ arms for the final 
battle.  Arafat and Abbas refined this strategy further 
over the years.141   
The strategy of eliminating Israel in stages is one that has 
also been adopted by Hamas.142 
While it is undeniable that both sides to a two-state solution 
will make significant compromises, the existential threat to Israel 
must not be underestimated.  In this context, the fact that Israel 
has adopted the two-state solution as its objective in negotiations 
with the Palestinian Arabs carries great weight and should be 
viewed as evidence of Israel’s desire to achieve a peaceful 
coexistence with Palestinian Arabs in their own sovereign state.  
Hamas, al-Qaeda, many Arab states, and the BDS Movement, on 
 
Homeland, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (Nov. 16, 2003), 
http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp507.htm.  I present this point of view only to compare 
the mainstream Israeli diplomatic approach, which accepts as a political 
reality that historic claims to the entire land of Israel will be compromised if 
there is to be peace with the Palestinian Arabs, to the Palestinian Arab 
approach, which generally refuses to make such a compromise since they 
claim the lands are historically Palestinian Arab. 
 140.  Dr. Manfred Gerstenfeld, Deceitful Palestinian Statements as 
Strategic Weapons, ISRAEL NAT’L NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/13863#.VE6JOPnF_
nh (op-ed interview with Dr. Widlanski). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Eid, supra note 114. 
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the other hand, can make no such claim with regard to peaceful 
coexistence with a sovereign Israel.  Their position has always 
been that Israel, as a Jewish state, must be eliminated.  From this 
perspective, the extremist nature of the BDS Movement comes 
into focus and its place alongside the most virulent enemies of 
peace is incontrovertible. 
The Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945 called for a non-
state actor to represent Palestinian Arabs as part of the 
propaganda and economic campaign against Israel.  This is the 
BDS Movement.  The BDS Movement is also ideologically aligned 
with radical Islamist groups.  The BDS Movement is not a grass 
roots movement, nor is it a peace movement.  In charitable terms, 
the BDS Movement is simply the latest iteration of the 
longstanding Arab League mandate to eliminate the only non-
Arab state from the Middle East. In less charitable terms, the 
BDS Movement is the non-violent propaganda arm of the modern 
Islamist terror movement. 
II. THE BDS MOVEMENT UNDER UNITED STATES LAW 
A. Anti-Boycott Provisions of United States Laws 
As the Arab League Boycott matured and developed a 
sophisticated bureaucratic structure, the United States responded 
with a series of increasingly broad and powerful laws meant to 
blunt its impact and reach in the United States.  United States’ 
opposition to the Arab League Boycott was (and is) multi-faceted.  
First, the Arab League Boycott has had commercial ramifications 
in the United States.  Companies that violate the secondary and 
tertiary boycott are put on a “black list” maintained by the Arab 
League’s Office of Boycott Compliance.143  Those companies lose 
access to markets in member states of the Arab League and 
supporting states/entities.  Solely in economic terms, the Arab 
League Boycott has had negative financial consequences for the 
United States.144  Second, as a matter of policy under both 
 
 143.  SARNA, supra note 12, at 2. 
 144.  The House Boycott Report indicated that it was impossible to 
quantify the amount of commercial activity affected by the Arab League 
Boycott in the 1970s, but the report estimated that hundreds of millions of 
dollars in trade was lost as a result of the boycott and billions of dollars were 
likely affected.  H. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE H. 
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., REP. ON THE 
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domestic and international law, the interference of a foreign entity 
in the domestic affairs of a country is prohibited.145  By using 
United States individuals and companies to further the boycott of 
Israel, the Arab League Boycott impermissibly interferences in 
United States internal affairs.146 
In the early days of the Arab League Boycott, when it was 
focused on the primary boycott of Israel by Arab states, United 
States’ policy was one of non-partisan acceptance of the right of 
the Arab states to conduct their domestic affairs without third 
party interference.147  As the nature of the Arab League Boycott 
became better known, however, and allegations of its racist 
objectives spread, the United States Senate initially took action by 
means of a resolution condemning religious discrimination 
introduced into the United States by foreign entities.148 
 
ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, H.R. DOC. NO. 75–384, at 30–36 
(1976) [hereinafter HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT].  
 145.  See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter. . . .”).  This provision has been interpreted to prohibit any state from 
interfering in the domestic affairs of another state, including by use of 
economic coercion.  See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 181, ¶¶ 
210–11 (June 27) (“The Court then considers the question whether, if one 
State acts towards another in breach of the principle of non-intervention, a 
third State may lawfully take action by way of counter-measures which 
would amount to an intervention in the first State’s internal affairs.  This 
would be analogous to the right of self-defense in the case of armed attack, 
but the act giving rise to the reaction would be less grave, not amounting to 
armed attack.  In the view of the Court, under international law in force 
today, States do not have a right of ‘collective’ armed response to acts which 
do not constitute an ‘armed attack.’”); see also HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra 
note 144, at 11–12 (regarding American policy to prevent foreign interference 
with domestic commercial affairs). 
 146.  FEILER, supra note 15, at 68. 
 147.  Id. at 151. 
 148.  S. Res. 323, 84th Cong. (1956) (“Whereas it is a primary principle of 
our Nation that there shall be no distinction among United States citizens 
based on their individual religious affiliations and since any attempt by 
foreign nations to create such distinction among our citizens in the granting 
of personal or commercial access or any other rights otherwise available to 
United States citizens generally is inconsistent with our principles; Now, 
therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that it regards any 
such distinctions directed against United States citizens as incompatible with 
the relations that should exist among friendly nations, and that in all 
negotiations between the United States and any foreign state every 
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It was, in a point of historic irony,149 dockworkers that set in 
motion action by the Executive Branch of the United States 
Government to combat the secondary and tertiary effects of the 
Arab League Boycott.  In 1960, the Seafarer’s International Union 
and other dockworkers’ organizations handling Israeli cargo and 
ships voiced their concern that supporters of the Arab League 
Boycott were harassing dockworkers and interfering with 
international commerce, which had a direct economic impact on 
the dockworkers.150 
In response to the concerns of the dockworkers, the United 
States Department of State condemned the discriminatory Arab 
League Boycott and the United States Senate adopted a resolution 
that authorized the President of the United States to withhold aid 
and assistance to Arab states for as long as the Arab League 
Boycott interfered with shipping and cargo handling.151  While 
this authorization did not result in direct action against the 
boycott, it was a significant crystallization of United States’ policy 
that would lead to tangible anti-boycott legislation. 
By the mid-1960s, bills were introduced in the United States 
Congress to prohibit domestic compliance with the Arab League 
Boycott and, through an amendment to the then-existing Export 
Control Act, the first legislative response to the Arab League 
Boycott was enacted in 1965.152  The amendment, without 
prohibiting domestic compliance with the Arab League Boycott, 
stated that it was United States’ policy to oppose boycotts 
“fostered or imposed” by foreign countries against other countries 
that were friendly to the United States.153  While the amendment 
did not make compliance with foreign boycotts illegal, it did, for 
the first time ever, require anyone who had received a boycott 
request to report the same to the United States Department of 
Commerce.154 
Notwithstanding legislative policy statements, until the mid-
 
reasonable effort should be made to maintain this principle.”). 
 149.  See infra Part II.C for an overview of how dockworkers went from 
condemning boycotts of Israeli in the 1960s to being primary actors in the 
BDS Movement’s boycott propagation efforts in 2010–2014. 
 150.  FEILER, supra note 15, at 152. 
 151.  Id. at 152–53. 
 152.  Pub. L. No. 89–63, 79 Stat. 209 (1965); see also FEILER, supra note 
15, at 155–56. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  FEILER, supra note 15, at 156. 
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1970s the United States’ response to the Arab League Boycott was 
primarily disapprobation rather than affirmative action against 
the boycott.  In fact, a House of Representatives Committee report 
found that as late as 1975 the United States was not only not 
rolling back the Arab League Boycott, but “the Commerce 
Department actually served to encourage boycott practices 
implicitly by condoning activity declared against national policy or 
simply by looking the other way . . . .”155 
Were it not for the aggressive economic warfare embarked 
upon by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC)156 in 1973 there likely would have been no change in the 
United States’ “look the other way” response to the Arab League 
Boycott.  As the 1976 House Boycott Report acknowledged: 
The boycott’s impact has, however, changed substantially 
in recent years.  This change is a direct result of the 
fivefold increase in the price of oil which followed the 
Arab-Israeli war of October 1973.  Due to the normal time 
lags in oil payments, massive accumulation of oil 
revenues did not begin until 1974.  That year, the 
combined current account surpluses of the OPEC 
nations . . . was $62 billion.157 
1. The Legislative Tide Turns: Enactment of the EAA Anti-Boycott 
Law 
In the waning months of the Gerald Ford administration, the 
United States Congress commenced drafting and debating 
legislation to finally confront the pernicious Arab League Boycott.  
The Ford administration had signaled its opposition to anti-
boycott legislation, fearing that it would further antagonize the 
Arab League into punitive economic action against American 
 
 155.  See HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at viii.  The HOUSE 
BOYCOTT REPORT was a comprehensive study of the background and effects of 
the Arab League Boycott prepared in the wake of the OPEC oil crisis of 1973.  
This report was the primary source of information for Congressional 
consideration of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, which was enacted the year after 
the HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT was published.   
 156.  OPEC is a cartel focused on controlling the price of petroleum 
exports globally.  Though its membership is not exclusively Middle Eastern, 
its agenda is dominated by the oil producing states of the Middle East.  See 
About Us, OPEC, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm.  
 157.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 10. 
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companies.158  Nonetheless, the United States Congress saw the 
shocking increase in economic clout of Arab League states 
resulting from OPEC oil supply manipulation as the greater 
threat.  This was, perhaps, the tipping point in terms of action; 
there had been longstanding concerns in the United States that 
the boycott was an unacceptable and racist intervention in 
domestic affairs, but until the OPEC oil crisis the boycott had very 
little direct impact on American consumers.159 
In light of OPEC’s new and dramatic influence on the global 
economy, the United States considered the affiliated Arab League 
Boycott to be “an aspect of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict” that 
continued to have a “significant impact within the United States 
and [raised] fundamental issues concerning our commitment as a 
people to principles of free trade and freedom from religious 
discrimination.”160 
The legislative response with the first tangible enforcement 
provisions161 was an amendment to the 1976 Tax Reform Act.  
This legislation, known as the “Ribicoff Amendment,” was a fairly 
discrete policy implementation that denied tax benefits to 
companies that participated in the Arab League Boycott.162  
Because the Ribicoff Amendment did not prohibit companies from 
complying with the Arab League Boycott (that is, a company that 
felt that the loss of tax benefits was worth the additional revenue 
gained from working with Arab League members could simply lose 
the tax benefits and continue complying with the boycott), it is not 
a focus of this Article, even though the provisions of the Ribicoff 
Amendment are still in effect.163  As an indication of United 
 
 158.  SARNA, supra note 12, at 92 (“President Gerald Ford had been 
convinced by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the goodwill of Arab 
nations needed to be cultivated on behalf of U.S. efforts to facilitate a Middle 
East peace settlement.  This meant that new legislative measures against the 
Arab trade boycott would be opposed by the administration since it was 
feared they could provoke Arab hostility toward the U.S.”); see also FEILER, 
supra note 15, at 163. 
 159.  See generally HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144. 
 160.  Id. at vii.  
 161.  In late 1975, though President Ford prohibited compliance with 
certain boycott requests by exporters in the United States, this action 
(authorized under the Export Administration Act) had a limited effect and 
was not specific to the Arab League Boycott.  See SARNA, supra note 12, at 93.  
 162.  See id. 
 163.  See Enforcement–Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), BUREAU OF 
INDUS. AND SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://www.bis.doc.gov/ 
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States policy, though, the Ribicoff Amendment stands alongside 
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law as a resounding pronouncement that 
foreign boycotts imposed in the United States on friendly 
countries were contrary to United States’ interests and would not 
be tolerated. 
Though amendments to the Export Administration Act were 
also on the table in Congress at the time, the Ford 
administration’s desire to avoid political conflict with Arab 
countries on the eve of the 1976 presidential election ultimately 
resulted in the abandonment of any new anti-boycott 
legislation.164  At the same time, however, the economic impact of 
the Arab League Boycott was revealed to Congress.  In 1975, the 
House Boycott Report estimated that transactions with an 
aggregate value of over $4 billion (in 1975 dollars) had been 
subject to boycott requests in that year alone.165 
Moreover, while the quantifiable effects of the boycott were 
enormous, its disruptive impact on trade involving American 
companies was even more alarming.  The House Boycott Report 
examined the case of the Xerox Corporation, which had been 
placed on the Arab League Boycott’s blacklist simply because it 
had sponsored a television series about United Nations members, 
which included one episode on Israel.166  For this, the Arab 
League deemed Xerox to be “pro-Zionist” and Xerox was excluded 
from virtually all trade with Arab League states.167 
What this showed Congress was that the Arab League Boycott 
was far more than requests for certificates of origin or 
questionnaires regarding factory locations; it was a wide ranging 
attack on any American business or individual who was seen as 
being sympathetic to, or supportive of, Israel.  Indeed, the reach of 
the Arab League Boycott was so great that American entertainers 
with abstract ties to Israel (such as through the purchase of State 
of Israel bonds) were banned from entry to Arab League states 
and their works were boycotted.168  The Arab League Boycott of 
 
index.php/enforcement/oac for an overview of the Ribicoff Amendment and 
enforcement thereof; see also FEILER, supra note 15, at 162–63. 
 164.  See SARNA, supra note 12, at 98. 
 165.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144. 
 166.  Id. at 37.  
 167.  Id. at 37–38. 
 168.  SARNA, supra note 12, at 57–58.  The Arab League Boycott resulted 
in bans on the works of, among others, Elizabeth Taylor, Danny Kaye, Eartha 
Kitt, Edward G. Robinson, Harry Belafonte, Paul Newman, and Sophia 
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American entertainers continues to this day, with the BDS 
Movement claiming in 2014 that it coerced Elvis Costello and 
Carlos Santana to cancel scheduled performances in Israel;169 
other entertainers, such as the Rolling Stones, have defied the 
BDS Movement’s threats.170 
With an ailing economy in the United States and the Arab 
world aggressively using its new commercial strength to force 
foreign conflicts into American domestic affairs as a backdrop, the 
victory of Jimmy Carter in the 1976 presidential election ushered 
in a new push by business and political groups for comprehensive 
anti-boycott legislation.  Though in later years Jimmy Carter 
would become known for his vehement anti-Israel, pro-Arab views 
and policies,171 in the early days of his administration he 
welcomed the legislation already under consideration in Congress 
to curb the effects of the secondary and tertiary aspects of the 
Arab League Boycott.  In fact, during the 1976 presidential debate 
between Mr. Carter and President Ford, Mr. Carter attacked 
President Ford’s record on the boycott and declared: 
I believe that the boycott of American businesses by the 
Arab countries . . . is an absolute disgrace . . . .  This is 
the first time that I remember in the history of our 
country when we’ve let a foreign country circumvent or 
change our Bill of Rights . . . it’s a disgrace that so far Mr. 
Ford’s administration has blocked passage of legislation 
that would have revealed by law every instance of the 
boycott, and it would have prevented the boycott from 
 
Loren.  Even Walt Disney films were banned due to the inclusion of the 
Hebrew name “Samson” for a horse in Sleeping Beauty. 
 169.  Cultural Boycott, BDS MOVEMENT, https://bdsmovement.net/cultural-
boycott (last visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
 170.  BDS campaigners call on Rolling Stones to cancel Israel concert, 
HAARETZ (Mar. 26. 2014) http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense 
/1.582182.  
 171.  Professor Alan Dershowitz recently described Jimmy Carter as a 
“cheerleader for Hamas.”  Molly Wharton, Dershowitz: Jimmy Carter Is a 
‘Cheerleader’ for Hamas, NAT’L REV. THE CORNER (Aug. 8, 2014), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/384980/dershowitz-jimmy-carter-cheer 
leader-hamas-molly-wharton. See also Ethan Bronner, Jews, Arabs and 
Jimmy Carter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007 (In a review of Jimmy Carter’s book 
PALESTINE: PEACE, NOT APARTHEID, the deputy foreign editor of the New York 
Times, a newspaper that is generally considered to have an anti-Israel bias, 
describes Carter as offering “a narrative that is largely unsympathetic to 
Israel” and disputes Carter’s claim that Israel is an apartheid state.).  
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continuing.172 
With a willing executive branch in place, the legislative 
branch’s strong desire173 to take decisive action against the Arab 
League Boycott was reinvigorated and legislative efforts to 
resurrect the stillborn amendments to the Export Administration 
Act began almost immediately upon President Carter’s 
inauguration.174  Between January and June of 1977, the House of 
Representatives and Senate worked their way through the 
technical aspects of the nascent legislation, dealing with issues 
such as the duration of waivers and availability of exemptions,175 
and by late June a bill emerged from Congress ready for 
consideration by the President.176  On June 22, 1977, President 
Carter signed the bill into law.  In his public statement upon 
signing the EAA Anti-Boycott law, President Carter 
proclaimed:177 
For many months I’ve spoken strongly on the need for 
legislation to outlaw secondary and tertiary boycotts and 
discrimination against American businessmen on 
 
 172.  October 6, 1976 Presidential Debate, COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL 
DEBATES, http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-6-1976-debate-tran 
script.  
 173.  On the Ford administration’s reluctance to enact comprehensive 
anti-boycott legislation, then-Congressman Jonathan Bingham said, “I get a 
little bit tired of hearing the executive departments say that they are opposed 
to the boycott and the opposition does not translate itself into much action.” 
Discriminatory Arab Pressure on U.S. Business: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Int’l Trade and Commerce of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 
94th Cong. 110 (1975).  
 174.  SARNA, supra note 12, at 100–01 (“The 95th Congress lost no time in 
resuming consideration of the anti-boycott legislation.  In the space of one 
week from January 4 to 10, 1977, five such bills were introduced.”). 
 175.  Id. at 101–02.  
 176.  David Cain, International Business Communication and Free Speech: 
Briggs and Stratton v. Baldridge, 9 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 131, n.55 
(1986) (“The Senate Banking Currency and Housing Committee adopted the 
bill 90–1 (123 Cong. Rec. 13812 (May 5, 1977)), while the appropriate House 
Committee adopted the bill by a vote of 364–43 (123 Cong. Rec. 11450 (April 
20, 1977)).  The Conference Report was adopted by voice vote of the Senate 
(123 Cong. Rec. 17832 (June 7, 1977)) and by a vote of 306–41 in the House 
(123 Cong. Rec. 18382 (June 10, 1977)”).  See also Export Administration 
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977) (amending the 
Export Administration Act of 1969).  
 177.  Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Remarks on Signing 
H.R. 5840 Into Law (June 22, 1977), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
ws/index.php?pid=7704. 
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religious or national grounds . . . .  My concern about 
foreign boycotts stemmed, of course, from our special 
relationship with Israel, as well as from the economic, 
military and security needs of both our countries. But the 
issue also goes to the very heart of free trade among all 
nations.  I am, therefore, particularly pleased today to 
sign into law the 1977 amendments to the Export 
Administration Act, which will keep foreign boycott 
practices from intruding directly into American 
commerce.  The new law does not threaten or question 
the sovereign right of any nation to regulate its own 
commerce with other countries, nor is it directed toward 
any particular country. The bill seeks instead to end 
the divisive effects on American life of foreign 
boycotts aimed at Jewish members of our society.  
If we allow such a precedent to become established, we 
open the door to similar action against any ethnic, 
religious, or racial group in America.178 
President Carter’s admonition against bigoted foreign boycotts 
could easily be applied to the BDS Movement’s activities today. 
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law, as enacted,179 is among the most 
straightforward and comprehensible examples of federal 
legislation extant.  It is logically ordered with a minimum of 
internal or external cross references, fairly short in length, and 
unadorned by complicated or counterintuitive defined terms.180  
Though the EAA Anti-Boycott Law has statutorily lapsed by its 
own terms pursuant to its sunset provision, as the Congressional 
Research Service Report states, “its provisions are continued 
under the authorization granted to the President in the National 
Emergencies Act and the International Economic Emergency 
Powers Act, most recently under Executive Order 13222 signed 
August 17, 2001.”181  Under this authority, the provisions of the 
 
 178.  Id. (emphasis added).   
 179.  The EAA Anti-Boycott Law was subsequently reenacted without 
alteration in the Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96–72, 93 
Stat. 503 (1979) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 4601–4623 (Westlaw through Pub. 
L. No. 114–244)). 
 180.   Only eight terms were defined in the law: “person,” “United States 
person,” “good,” “technology,” “export,” “controlled country,” “United States,” 
and “Secretary.” 50 U.S.C.A. § 4618 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 181.  WEISS, supra note 18, at 5.  Executive Order 13222 was amended by 
48 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
EAA Anti-Boycott Law remain in effect as though its sunset 
provisions had not yet become effective. 
The law directed the President to issue regulations that would 
effectuate its provisions—to wit, the law first prohibits: 
[A]ny United States person, with respect to his activities 
in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United 
States, from taking or knowingly agreeing to take any [of 
the enumerated] actions with intent to comply with, 
further, or support any boycott fostered or imposed by a 
foreign country against a country which is friendly to the 
United States and which is not itself the object of any 
form of boycott pursuant to United States law or 
regulation.182 
The prohibited actions under the law include: 
 Refusing, or requiring any other person to refuse, 
to do business with or in the boycotted country, 
with any business concern organized under the 
laws of the boycotted country, with any national 
or resident of the boycotted country, or with any 
other person, pursuant to an agreement with, a 
requirement of, or a request from or on behalf of 
the boycotting country . . . . 
 Refusing, or requiring any other person to refuse, 
to employ or otherwise discriminating against any 
United States person on the basis of race, religion, 
sex, or national origin of that person or of any 
owner, officer, director, or employee of such 
person. 
 Furnishing information with respect to the race, 
religion, sex, or national origin of any United 
States person or of any owner, officer, director, or 
employee of such person. 
 Furnishing information about whether any person 
 
President Barack Obama on March 8, 2013 in Executive Order 13637.  Exec. 
Order No. 13637, 78 Fed. Reg. 49, 16129 (Mar. 13, 2013). The 2013 
amendments did not affect the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s operative provisions.  
For a further discussion on the current status of the law and its regulations 
see infra Part I.B. 
 182.  50 U.S.C.A. § 4607(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
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has, has had, or proposes to have any business 
relationship (including a relationship by way of 
sale, purchase, legal or commercial 
representation, shipping or other transport, 
insurance, investment, or supply) with or in the 
boycotted country, with any business concern 
organized under the laws of the boycotted country, 
with any national or resident of the boycotted 
country, or with any other person which is known 
or believed to be restricted from having any 
business relationship with or in the boycotting 
country. . . . 
 Furnishing information about whether any person 
is a member of, has made contributions to, or is 
otherwise associated with or involved in the 
activities of any charitable or fraternal 
organization which supports the boycotted 
country . . . .183 
There are a number of exceptions provided for in the law, but 
they are all of a non-substantive and technical nature and do not 
diminish the law’s general prohibition on United States entities 
and individuals from refusing to do business with a boycotted 
country that is protected by the law.184  Importantly, while the 
 
 183.  § 4607(a)(1)(A)–(F) (Westlaw). 
 184.  § 4607(a)(2)(A)–(F) (Westlaw) provides the following exceptions to 
the law:  
(A) complying or agreeing to comply with requirements (i) 
prohibiting the import of goods or services from the boycotted 
country or goods produced or services provided by any business 
concern organized under the laws of the boycotted country or by 
nationals or residents of the boycotted country, or (ii) prohibiting the 
shipment of goods to the boycotting country on a carrier of the 
boycotted country, or by a route other than that prescribed by the 
boycotting country or the recipient of the shipment; 
(B) complying or agreeing to comply with import and shipping 
document requirements with respect to the country of origin, the 
name of the carrier and route of shipment, the name of the supplier 
of the shipment or the name of the provider of other services, except 
that no information knowingly furnished or conveyed in response to 
such requirements may be stated in negative, blacklisting, or similar 
exclusionary terms, other than with respect to carriers or route of 
shipment as may be permitted by such regulations in order to 
comply with precautionary requirements protecting against war 
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EAA Anti-Boycott Law explicitly preempts state laws that purport 
to govern the same subject matter as the EAA Anti-Boycott 
Law,185 the law also explicitly states that it does not “supersede or 
limit the operation of the antitrust or civil rights laws of the 
United States.”186  This is an important proviso, as prior to the 
enactment of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law the United States had 
used antitrust laws against the Arab League Boycott and those 
laws, and others, may still be used to prosecute those who 
participate in the secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel.187  The 
EAA Anti-Boycott Law has survived a number of legal challenges, 
including claims that its application violates First and Fifth 
Amendment rights.188 
 
risks and confiscation; 
(C) complying or agreeing to comply in the normal course of business 
with the unilateral and specific selection by a boycotting country, or 
national or resident thereof, of carriers, insurers, suppliers of 
services to be performed within the boycotting country or specific 
goods which, in the normal course of business, are identifiable by 
source when imported into the boycotting country; 
(D) complying or agreeing to comply with export requirements of the 
boycotting country relating to shipments or transshipments of 
exports to the boycotted country, to any business concern of or 
organized under the laws of the boycotted country, or to any national 
or resident of the boycotted country; 
(E) compliance by an individual or agreement by an individual to 
comply with the immigration or passport requirements of any 
country with respect to such individual or any member of such 
individual’s family or with requests for information regarding 
requirements of employment of such individual within the boycotting 
country; and 
(F) compliance by a United States person resident in a foreign 
country or agreement by such person to comply with the laws of that 
country with respect to his activities exclusively therein, and such 
regulations may contain exceptions for such resident complying with 
the laws or regulations of that foreign country governing imports 
into such country of trademarked, trade named, or similarly 
specifically identifiable products, or components of products for his 
own use, including the performance of contractual services within 
that country, as may be defined by such regulations. 
 185.  § 4607(c) (Westlaw). 
 186.  § 4607(a)(4) (Westlaw). 
 187.  See FEILER, supra note 15, at 164 (describing the prosecution of the 
Bechtel Corporation in 1977, “which established the general principle that 
compliance with the tertiary boycott constituted a violation of US antitrust 
laws . . . .”).   
 188.  See, e.g., Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 782 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 
1984) (finding that boycott participation is not protected speech); Trane Co. v. 
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B. The BDS Movement Under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law 
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law was enacted in response to the 
Arab League Boycott, but its reach was significantly broader than 
just that boycott.  The EAA Anti-Boycott Law prohibits 
compliance with any boycott by a foreign country of a friendly 
country.189  But does that mean that the BDS Movement is 
subject to the law?  This section will examine that question. 
In discerning the meaning and permissible application of the 
provisions of a statute, the United States Supreme Court, in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,  
developed the following two-part test: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.190 
With the question of whether the EAA Anti-Boycott Law 
applies to the BDS Movement, we have a question as to the 
meaning of a statute where the responsible agency’s 
 
Baldridge, 552 F. Supp 1378 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (finding that the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law does not violate the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and, in 
particular, that the governmental interest in conducting foreign policy 
through legislation such as the EAA Anti-Boycott Law is substantial and the 
law directly advances the government’s interests). Note, however, that one 
court has found that there is no private right of action available for violations 
of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  See Israel Aircraft Indus. Ltd. v. Sanwa Bus. 
Credit Corp., 16 F.3d 198 (7th Cir. 1994).  Whether other circuit courts would 
follow this holding (and whether the Supreme Court would uphold the result) 
remains an open question.  See also Cain, supra note 176, at 140 (noting at 
n.79 that while there may be a private right of action exemption in the law 
for some purposes, that exemption may not exist for other types of claims). 
 189.  § 4607(a)(1) (Westlaw). 
 190.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984). 
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interpretation thereof is silent, which is a slightly different 
scenario than the typical Chevron case where an agency’s 
application of a law to certain parties is being challenged.  
Nonetheless, the core issue of statutory interpretation remains, so 
the two-part Chevron test should apply to such a question.191 
Only the first part of the Chevron test need be applied, since 
Congress has directly addressed the precise question of whom or 
what the boycott prohibition applies to: any unsanctioned boycott 
imposed or fostered by a foreign country against a country friendly 
to the United States.  Under the first prong of the Chevron test, 
the issue is how to properly define the operative statutory terms 
“impose,” “foster,” and “foreign country.”  Conveniently, Chevron 
provides the answer to that question: “[i]f a court, employing 
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that 
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that 
intention is the law and must be given effect.”192  The “traditional 
tools of statutory construction” include the “statute’s text, 
structure, purpose, and legislative history.”193 
A fundamental canon of legal interpretation, known as the 
“ordinary-meaning rule,” states that “the words of a statute are to 
be taken in their natural and ordinary signification and 
import . . . .”194  In looking at the ordinary meaning of words, one 
looks at “what the text says and fairly implies.”195  Applying this 
canon to the remarkably clear and concise text of the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law, one finds that the law prohibits any individual or 
entity in the United States from refusing to do business with an 
entity or individual from a friendly country that is the subject of a 
foreign boycott. 
The ordinary meaning of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law shows 
that if there is a boycott against a country that is friendly to the 
United States, and that boycott is foreign in origin, Americans 
may not participate in that boycott if one of two conditions is met: 
 
 191.  Some would argue that under Chevron, the Commerce Department 
not only can, but must, enforce the EAA Anti-Boycott Act against the BDS 
Movement. 
 192.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n.9. 
 193.  Ariz. Pub. Svc. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing 
Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984)). 
 194.  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012) (citing JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826)). 
 195.  Id. at 16. 
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either the boycott is “imposed” by a “foreign country” or it is 
“fostered” by a “foreign country.”196  Notwithstanding the fact that 
each of these three terms has a common meaning, in order to 
understand the scope of the prohibited activity under the EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law we must analyze each term as it is used in the 
context of the law so that we may see what the text “fairly 
implies.” 
This Article will first examine the two terms that have not 
been subject to conflicting definitions, “imposed” and “fostered,” 
and then it will examine the source of the conflicting definitions 
for the third term, “foreign country,” and present a reasoned 
definition of that term. 
1. The Meanings of “Imposed” and “Fostered” 
The EAA Anti-Boycott Act does not define either “imposed” or 
“fostered” and neither term is known to be a legal term of art,197 
so we must resort to the common dictionary definition of these 
terms.  The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “imposed” as “to 
cause (something, such as a tax, fine, rule, or punishment) to 
affect someone or something by using your authority.”198  Black’s 
Law Dictionary, an authoritative legal dictionary relied upon by 
federal courts in the United States, has a substantially similar 
definition.199 
 
 196.  50 U.S.C.A. § 4607(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 197.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 194, at 75 (discussing the need to 
consult law dictionaries to discern meaning of a word or phrase before 
resorting to a “nonscholarly dictionary.”)  In certain circumstances, the 
Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, defines ordinarily used terms in statutes, but the 
Dictionary Act does not define either of the terms discussed here.  Id. 
 198.  MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/imposed.   
 199.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter BLACK’S 9th 
ed.].  Shortly after the EAA Anti-Boycott Law was enacted in 1977 the 5th 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary was published.  Though the 5th edition is 
not authoritative at the time of the writing of this Article, because it was the 
current edition at the time that the EAA Anti-Boycott Law became effective I 
have compared definitions in the two editions when citing to Black’s herein.  
In no instance was there a substantive difference between any of the defined 
terms to the extent that it would have changed the conclusions reached 
herein, though there were, of course, stylistic and immaterial differences.  
For example, in the case of the word “impose,” BLACK’S 9th ed. defined the 
word as “[t]o levy or exact (a tax or duty)” while the 5th edition used the 
definition “[t]o levy or exact as by authority; to lay as a burden, tax, duty or 
charge.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 680 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter BLACK’S 5th 
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For a foreign country to be able to impose a boycott on 
someone or something, it would need to have authority over that 
person or thing.  By way of example, a foreign country could issue 
a decree that none of its citizens shall do business with XYZ 
Corporation, a company that has operations in Israel.  In this 
case, the foreign country has imposed a boycott.  If a citizen of the 
foreign country were to be resident in the United States, since 
that citizen is still subject to the jurisdiction and laws of his or her 
home country, the boycott would be imposed on that person.  That 
citizen, if he or she defied the decree of his or her country of 
citizenship and purchased the products of XYZ Corporation, could 
be subject to the penalties imposed by the foreign country, such as 
imprisonment or monetary fines.  But for any United States 
citizen or resident who owes no allegiance to that foreign country 
or otherwise is not subject to its jurisdiction, business dealings 
with XYZ Corporation have no consequence; the foreign country’s 
boycott could not be said to have been imposed on the United 
States person.200 
The word “fostered,” however, has a much broader meaning. 
Merriam Webster’s Dictionary defines foster as “to promote the 
growth or development of” and lists as synonyms “advance, 
cultivate, encourage, forward, further, incubate, nourish, nurse, 
nurture, [and] promote.”201  There is no Black’s Law Dictionary 
definition for “fostered.” The ordinary meaning of “fostered,” 
therefore, is to encourage or promote something, whether or not 
the foreign entity has authority to compel action by the 
individuals or entities that are the intended audience. 
Since the principle proponent for a restrictive reading of the 
EAA Anti-Boycott Law, the National Lawyers Guild,202 has been 
silent on the meaning of the term “fostered or imposed by,” there 
is no other known interpretation in the context of the EAA Anti-
 
ed.].  While there are stylistic differences between the two definitions, one 
definition does not contradict the other. 
 200.  Arguably, however, if the United States citizen sought to do business 
with the foreign country, the foreign country could prevent the business 
relationship from being consummated.  This would be an extraterritorial 
imposition of the boycott on a United States citizen.   
 201.  MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, supra note 198. 
 202.  See infra Part II.B.3 for a full discussion of the National Lawyers 
Guild legal memorandum, which is the primary source of the erroneous 
opinion that the EAA Anti-Boycott Law only applies to boycotts that are 
directly imposed by a foreign government.   
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Boycott Law that is contrary to the dictionary definitions of these 
words. Nonetheless, to ensure that there is a proper 
understanding of these prefatory words in the EAA Anti-Boycott 
Law, it is important to go beyond the obvious meaning of the 
words to determine whether a contrary meaning could have been 
intended. 
2. “Imposed” or “Fostered by” in the Context of the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law 
In the context of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, while the United 
States respected the autonomy of any foreign entity that desired 
to engage in a primary boycott of Israel (for example, the 
government of Syria refusing to buy wheat grown by Israeli 
farmers), it also sought to insulate American individuals and 
companies from any attempt to embroil them in the Arab world’s 
war against Israel.203 
a. Background: The Use of Similar Terms in Earlier 
Congressional Debates 
In the House Boycott Report, commissioned in late 1976 to 
examine the reach of the Arab League Boycott on United States’ 
interests, a subcommittee of the House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce concluded that 
the Arab League Boycott was having far reaching and harmful 
effects.  In response, the House Committee recommended that the 
existing anti-boycott law should be “amended to prohibit all 
agreements to refrain from doing business (a) with a foreign 
country friendly to the United States or (b) with a company or 
supplier boycotted by a foreign concern, thereby furthering a 
foreign imposed boycott or restrictive trade practice.”204 
Though the terms “foreign imposed” and “foreign concern” 
were not used in the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, an examination of 
how they were used in the House Boycott Report, the precursor to 
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, sheds important light on the objectives 
of the law.  The House Boycott Report presumably uses the terms 
 
 203.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 13 (“Major factors in this 
drive for anti-boycott legislation were concerns about religious discrimination 
and U.S. support for Israel as well as the concern that foreign concerns 
should not be allowed to dictate American business practices.”).  
 204.  Id.  
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“foreign concern” and “foreign imposed boycott” to refer to the 
same thing: the source of the boycotts. The term “foreign country,” 
however, clearly means the boycotted, rather than the boycotting, 
country.205 
The House Boycott Report’s identification of boycotts by a 
“foreign concern” and “foreign imposed boycott[s]” must be read in 
line with another canon of statutory interpretation, the 
“Presumption of Consistent Usage.”206  Under this canon, if there 
is a document that “has used one term in one place, and a 
materially different term in another, the presumption is that the 
different term denotes a different idea.  If it says land in one place 
and real estate later, the second provision presumably includes 
improvements as well as raw land.”207  Thus, the House Boycott 
Report’s use of “foreign concern” and “foreign imposed” in the text 
quoted above must be read in a way that each of the different 
formulations has its own specific meaning. 
The term “foreign concern” refers to the parties engaging in 
the boycott.  The drafters understood that boycotts that were the 
subject of the proposed anti-boycott law originated from and were 
enforced by more than just foreign governments.  The primary 
focus of the proposed legislation was the Arab League Boycott and 
Congress knew that neither the Arab League nor Palestine was a 
recognized state, yet both were instrumental in the boycott’s 
operations.  Congress also knew that the Arab League called upon 
a host of non-governmental actors to carry out its boycott of Israel.  
Consequently, a “foreign concern” should be read to mean any 
foreign source of support or promotion for the boycott of a friendly 
country. 
This interpretation also logically explains why “foreign 
imposed” boycott was used later in the sentence, as it was 
intended to encompass any foreign boycott that was enforced 
under authority, such as by a state.  By way of example, the BDS 
Movement’s boycott can be considered a boycott of a friendly 
foreign country (Israel) by a foreign concern (the BDS 
Movement) that furthers a foreign imposed boycott (the boycott 
imposed by states and other entities pursuant to the Arab League 
Boycott). 
 
 205.  For its meaning in the context of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, the 
term “foreign country” is examined in depth infra Part II.B.3.   
 206.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 194, at 170.  
 207.  Id. (emphasis added).  
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The foregoing is primarily an aside, since the House Boycott 
Report is not the controlling document for purposes of interpreting 
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  The House and Senate debates 
discussed infra provide legislative and world history that is closer 
in time to the enactment of the law.  Nonetheless, the House 
Boycott Report is helpful in understanding the missing context for 
the “fostered or imposed” language: Congress was concerned with 
boycotts originating outside of the United States, and even if one 
gives “foreign concern” and “foreign imposed” distinct meanings, 
neither limits the applicability of the law’s prohibition solely to 
boycotts initiated by a foreign government. 
b. The Policy Goal of Including “Imposed” or “Fostered” in the EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law 
The more important prong of the “imposed or fostered” 
predicate is clearly the “fostered” element.  While there are 
certainly cases where a foreign country would have the authority 
to impose its will on its subjects in the United States, the cases of 
this are relatively infrequent and, for the most part, were not the 
problem that Congress sought to address.  Rather, Congress 
focused on American citizens and businesses that would be 
targeted by foreign concerns that could only indirectly dictate 
compliance with a boycott through economic coercion. 
Furthermore, while individual Arab League countries 
promulgated rules and regulations to implement the Arab League 
Boycott, the boycott at a more conceptual level was not one that 
originated from any individual member country.  The individual 
countries were simply the political subdivisions within the Arab 
League that could “impose” the provisions of the Arab League 
Boycott on their respective citizens and companies.  The boycott as 
a weapon to be used against Israel, however, was conceived by and 
existed (and continues to exist) above the country level, at the 
Arab League itself.  Consequently, the boycott is implemented in 
non-Arab League entities through various Arab League affiliates, 
such as the BDS Movement, that “foster” the boycott’s secondary 
and tertiary elements.  This is why the term “fostered” was used 
in the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s description of the type of boycotts 
that were to be prohibited. 
The House Boycott Report also examined the non-state 
elements of the Arab League Boycott in considerable detail and 
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concluded that they were as much the target of the proposed anti-
boycott law as state actors were.  One area of focus in the House 
Boycott Report was the various United States-Arab chambers of 
commerce that were located in major United States cities.  While 
these organizations were described as being incorporated entities, 
each independent from the other and with no Arab League 
membership status, the House Boycott Report described them as 
raising “unique issues regarding the Arab boycott and its impact 
on U.S. laws and business practices.”208  In particular, the House 
Boycott Report found that the non-governmental organizations 
such as the chambers of commerce served “to carry out the 
interests and policies of foreign governments” in enforcing the 
Arab League Boycott and stated that their actions were “in 
contravention of expressed U.S. policy . . . .”209 
From this history it becomes clear that the entire apparatus 
of the boycott machine, not just the governments that had the 
legal power to impose penalties for noncompliance with the 
boycott, was the subject of the proposed legislation.  A non-state 
actor on its own can only sanction its own members for 
unauthorized activities, but when a non-state actor serves as a 
promoter of an activity, such as a boycott, and acts in coordination 
with facially independent governmental entities that have the 
legal authority as a sovereign to impose penalties and punishment 
on those who do not comply, the reach of the governmental 
entities is dramatically expanded. 
The only logical explanation for the use of the term “fostered 
by” in the Congressional reports and hearings prior to the 
enactment of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law is that Congress always 
meant to include both non-state entities, such as the Arab League, 
and subordinate non-governmental entities, such as chambers of 
commerce or organizations like the BDS Movement, as well as 
governments, within the scope of the law.  Excluding non-state 
actors, such as the Arab League, from the reach of the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law would have been utterly nonsensical and would have 
hindered, if not absolutely undermined, the efficacy of the law.  In 
addition, as discussed infra, this type of exclusion would clearly 
contradict the meaning of the term “foreign country” as it was 
ultimately included in the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. 
 
 208.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 43. 
 209.  Id. 
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Such a result would violate the canon of statutory 
interpretation known as the “Presumption against 
Ineffectiveness,” which states that there is a presumption that a 
textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than 
obstructs the document’s purpose should be favored.210  The EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law’s purpose is clear on its face.  It was enacted to 
prevent foreign concerns (which includes states as well as non-
state actors) from using United States individuals and businesses 
to further boycotts against countries that are friendly to the 
United States and, in particular, to counter the imposition of the 
secondary and tertiary aspects of the Arab League Boycott in the 
United States.  An interpretation of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law 
that exempts boycotts fostered by non-state actors would clearly 
obstruct the purpose of the law. 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia explained the 
Presumption against Ineffectiveness through a well-known 19th 
century case.211  In that case, a statute imposed a tax on private 
companies based on number of shares of the company’s capital 
stock above a certain numerical threshold.212  The company that 
was subject to the tax argued that the statute’s language referred 
to the number of shares of stock that it could issue, rather than 
the number that it had actually issued.213  The Court rejected this 
argument, pointing out that a company could evade taxation 
simply by authorizing an astronomically large number of shares 
without changing the number of shares that were actually 
issued.214  Justice Scalia concluded that such an absurd result, 
which undermined the clear purpose of the statute, violated the 
Presumption against Ineffectiveness.215  A claim that foreign foes 
of Israel could evade the reach of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law by 
simply interposing a non-state entity to promote the boycott would 
be an equally absurd result.  Yet, this is the exact claim that has 
been made by legal groups providing the BDS Movement with 
cover for its unlawful boycott activities. 
Notwithstanding the Presumption against Ineffectiveness and 
the House Boycott Report’s explicit language, in the next section 
 
 210.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 194, at 63–65. 
 211.  Id. at 64. 
 212.  Id.  
 213.  Id.  
 214.  Id. at 64–65. 
 215.  Id. at 63–65. 
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this Article will assume, hypothetically, that the term “fostered 
by” cannot be read to require that non-state actors must be 
included within the scope of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s 
provisions.  Even with the established understanding of the term 
“fostered by” so bastardized, a more persuasive argument in favor 
of reaching the conclusion that non-state actors are covered by the 
provisions of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law exists. 
3. What is a Foreign Country? Smoke, Mirrors, and the National 
Lawyers Guild’s Defense of the BDS Movement 
With two of the three definitional hurdles now resolved, the 
missing piece of the interpretative puzzle is the proper definition 
of the term “foreign country” within the context of the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law.  Before examining the meaning of the term “foreign 
country,” this Article will first explain why the interpretative 
question exists.  The National Lawyers Guild (NLG), a United 
States legal advocacy organization, has publicly disseminated a 
memorandum (NLG Opinion) supporting the BDS Movement’s 
legality under, inter alia, the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.216  At the 
time of the publication of this Article, no other legal organization 
or authority in the United States was known to have issued any 
such legal guidance on the topic of the BDS Movement’s status 
under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  Thus, to the extent those 
participating in the BDS Movement or complying with its boycott 
activities in the United States have relied on any publicly 
available guidance in support of their activities, the NLG Opinion 
is likely the source of that guidance.217 
The NLG Opinion provides no legislative background on the 
EAA Anti-Boycott Law nor does it examine the background of the 
Arab League Boycott or the BDS Movement (other than to 
erroneously state that the BDS Movement is not acting in “concert 
 
 216.  Impact of Federal Anti-Boycott and Other Laws on BDS Campaigns, 
NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD INT’L COMM. (Oct. 2009), http://www.nlginternational. 
org/report/NLG_BDS_legal_memo.pdf [hereinafter NLG Opinion].  
 217.  While the NLG Opinion states that it is a draft and individuals 
should seek the advice of an attorney if they want specific legal advice on 
boycott activities, it has been cited by a number of organizations that 
participate in the BDS Movement.  See, e.g., The Legality of Academic 
Boycott: Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. 3, https:// 
www.ccrjustice.org/files/FAQonLegalityofBoycott_1.10.14_FINAL_SH.pdf; see 
also NLG Opinion, supra note 216.  
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with the Arab League’s boycott of Israel . . . .”).218  Rather, it 
jumps to a conclusory observation that limits its reach solely to 
boycotts initiated by foreign governments: 
[BDS Movement activities are not prohibited under the 
EAA Anti-Boycott because the EAA Anti-Boycott Law] 
specifically defines an “unsanctioned” foreign boycott as 
one that is “fostered or imposed by a foreign country 
against a country which is friendly to the United States 
and which is not itself the object of any form of boycott 
pursuant to United States law or regulation.”  A boycott 
against the State of Israel or an Israeli company or 
concern would be prohibited under the EAA only if the 
boycott is specifically intended to support or comply with 
boycotts initiated by foreign countries. The phrase 
“foreign country” refers to the official government of the 
country and does not encompass NGOs.219 
The NLG Opinion contains a number of materially misleading 
statements.  First, neither the EAA Anti-Boycott Law nor 15 
C.F.R. part 760—the regulations that implement the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law—(Regulations)220 limit “foreign country” to mean 
only the official government of a country.221  Further, the NLG 
Opinion limits prohibited boycotts to those “initiated by foreign 
countries.”  The plain language of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and 
the Regulations, however, contains no such limitation.  While 
“initiated” may be a synonym for “imposed,” the NLG Opinion’s 
use of “initiated” effectively strips the term “fostered” out of the 
text of the law.  The EAA Anti-Boycott Law prohibits boycotts that 
are “fostered” by foreign countries.  This means any foreign 
boycott that is promoted, not just initiated, by a foreign 
country.222 
An example will demonstrate the significance of the NLG 
Opinion’s misdirection.  Assume for purposes of this hypothetical 
that the BDS Movement is not a foreign country under any legal 
standard.  Further, assume that the BDS Movement is the entity 
that has initiated a boycott of Israel and that boycott is being 
 
 218.  See NLG Opinion, supra note 216. 
 219.  Id. at 1.   
 220.  15 C.F.R. pt. 760 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Regulations]. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Supra Part I.B.1. 
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promoted in the United States by companies and officials from 
Syria, but Syria did not initiate the boycott. Under the NLG 
Opinion’s “initiated by foreign countries” standard, neither the 
BDS Movement’s boycott nor Syria’s boycott promotion would be 
subject to the EAA Anti-Boycott Law because the boycott was 
initiated by the BDS Movement, rather than Syria.  Given the 
text, history, and purpose of the law, this result would clearly be 
illogical, and, yet, it is the NLG Opinion’s conclusion. 
The NLG Opinion also deceptively states: 
[I]t is our opinion that the [EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s] anti-
boycott provisions cannot lawfully be enforced unless the 
EAA [Anti-Boycott Law] is reenacted by Congress. 
Presidential Executive Orders purport to continue the 
[EAA Anti-Boycott Law], but this is, in our opinion, 
dubious authority for imposing sanctions for violation of 
the anti-boycott provisions.223 
It is exceedingly unlikely that any court would rule that the 
continuation of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and the Regulations 
are without proper authority.  The continuation of the law was 
effected pursuant to a series of presidential executive orders 
(Executive Orders) explicitly provided for under congressional 
authorization contained in the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (IEEPA). 224  The IEEPA provides the President with 
discretionary authority to promulgate regulations covering a wide 
range of matters regarding commerce and foreign affairs, and it 
has been cited as authority under each Executive Order issued to 
continue the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and Regulations.225 
The NLG Opinion presents no challenge as to the 
enforceability of the IEEPA, and the Executive Orders that have 
continued the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s provisions have never been 
questioned as to form or effect.  The powers granted to and 
exercised by numerous presidents under the IEEPA are likely a 
political question226 that should be resolved by the legislative and 
 
 223.  NLG Opinion, supra note 216, at 2. 
 224.  Pub. L. No. 95–223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1701–1707 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244)). 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (holding that 
“[t]he Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of 
power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach 
a constitutional impasse.  Otherwise, we would encourage small groups, or 
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executive branches. The United States Supreme Court has ruled 
that “[w]here a statute . . . commits decision making to the 
discretion of the President, judicial review of the President’s 
decision is not available.”227  The IEEPA gives the President 
discretion to continue the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. 
The Executive Orders explicitly state that the provisions of 
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law shall continue in full force and effect.  
No court has ever taken any action or rendered any decision 
validating the NLG Opinion’s conclusion that there is no valid 
authority to enforce the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  As such, unless 
Congress enacts superseding provisions to the IEEPA that 
eliminate the President’s authority to continue laws that may 
have lapsed or acts to supersede the EAA Anti-Boycott Law itself, 
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law—with the terms and provisions that 
existed on its sunset date in 2001—should be considered fully 
effective. 
The question of which entities are subject to the EAA Anti-
 
even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues 
before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve the 
conflict.”).  Congress has chosen to not take any action in response to use of 
Presidential authority under the IEEPA by successive administrations to 
extend the effectiveness of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  If Congress had 
considered this use of the IEEPA to be an unauthorized expansion of the 
powers granted therein, Congress could have amended the IEEPA to 
explicitly limit that exercise of Executive authority.  No Congress has ever 
done so.  It would be extremely unusual for the Judiciary to step in to a 
matter that has been sanctioned by both other branches of government.  In 
fact, a 2001 report from the Ways and Means Committee of the House of 
Representatives detailed the many times that Presidential authority under 
the IEEPA has been used, generally, and with regard to the extension of the 
EAA Anti-Boycott Law specifically.  H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 
OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, 107TH CONG., WCMP 
107–4, at 210 (2001).  It would be anomalous for Congress to chronicle the use 
of the IEEPA over such an extended period of time without amending the 
law, were it to have disagreed with the Executive’s use of the law.  But cf. 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (finding that a 
statutory right to identify Jerusalem as part of Israel on a United States 
passport is not a political question). 
 227.  Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994); but c.f., Chamber of 
Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding a limit to the use 
of executive orders where there was an independent conflict between the 
exercise of grant of authority and another law).  In the case of the 
continuation of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, the IEEPA clearly grants the 
President discretion to provide for the continuation of this law, so Dalton 
would likely result in the court refusing to interfere with the President’s 
authority. 
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Boycott Law’s prohibitions is another area of obfuscation in the 
NLG Opinion.  The NLG Opinion only discusses official 
governments of a country (whose acts the NLG Opinion states are 
subject to the law) and non-governmental organizations (whose 
acts the NLG Opinion claims are not subject to the law).228  
Though the NLG Opinion is silent on why it did not include other 
types of entities, the likely reason that it only discussed official 
governments and non-governmental organizations is that the 
NLG Opinion was focusing on the legality of the BDS Movement, 
which is known as a non-governmental organization.  Yet, there is 
a wide gap between official governments, on the one hand, and 
non-governmental organizations, on the other hand. 
Non-state actors, which include non-governmental 
organizations as well as intergovernmental organizations,229 fill 
part of this gap. The Arab League, as an intergovernmental 
organization, is a prime example of the type of non-state actor230 
that was intended to be subject to the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  As 
the next section of this Article will demonstrate, contrary to the 
unfounded and patently absurd conclusion of the NLG Opinion, to 
the extent any non-state actor231 qualifies as a representative of a 
 
 228.  NLG Opinion, supra note 216. 
 229.  For an overview of the types of entities that are considered to be non-
state actors, see generally NON-STATE ACTORS AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL 
SYSTEM (Richard A. Higgott et al. eds., 2000). 
 230.  Professor Andrew Clapham, the first Director of the Geneva 
Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights and a 
former advisor to the United Nations, has defined non-state actors to include 
“any entity that is not actually a state, often used to refer to armed groups, 
terrorists, civil society, religious groups or corporations; the concept is 
occasionally used to encompass inter-governmental organizations . . . .  [A] 
non-state actor can be any actor on the international stage other than a 
sovereign state . . . .” ANDREW CLAPHAM, POSTCONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING: A 
LEXICON 200–12 (Vincent Chetail ed., Oxford University Press 2009). 
 231.  While I have included citations to scholars who have attempted to 
define the term “non-state actors,” the question is far from resolved.  For 
purposes of this Article, non-state actor should be understood under the 
Andrew Clapham definition: any entity other than a sovereign state.  While 
this may not be an appropriate definition for other purposes, such as the 
issue of the status of armed non-state actors under international law, it is 
appropriate to rebut the disjunctive approach of the NLG Opinion regarding 
the applicability of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law vis à vis “official governments” 
and all other entities/parties, a colloquial definition of “non-state actors” as 
“any entity that is not an official government” is appropriate.  See, e.g., Noelle 
Higgins, The Regulation of Armed Non-State Actors: Promoting the 
Application of the Laws of War to Conflicts Involving National Liberation 
Movements, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12–18 (2009).  
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foreign country, whether as a non-governmental organization, 
intergovernmental organization or other entity, it would be 
subject to the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. 
a. The Legal Meaning of “Foreign Country” 
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law does not define the term “foreign 
country,” nor does it include any provision that explicitly or 
implicitly excludes any type of non-state actors from its operation. 
While the Regulations contain the word “country” in over 700 
separate instances, not one of them has any language that refers 
to the official government of a country comprising that country, 
nor is there any mention of, nor exclusions for, non-state actors.232 
To arrive at its misleading and erroneous conclusion limiting 
the reach of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, the NLG Opinion inserted 
a word into the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and Regulations that does 
not exist in either document: the term “governments.”233  The 
operative term that is used in the law is “foreign countries,” which 
is very broad.234 The anti-boycott prohibitions never were 
intended to be limited to only boycotts that are imposed or 
fostered by foreign governments. 
There can be no serious debate over what the term “foreign” 
means in the context of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law: it is anything 
outside of the United States.  The term “country,” however, does 
not have such an obvious definition.  According to Black’s Law 
Dictionary, a country is “a nation or political state . . . the territory 
 
 232.  Even if the Regulations did state that foreign countries are 
specifically foreign governments and not non-state actors, they would likely 
be found to be overly narrow under, inter alia, Chevron, since the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law does not contain those limitations and the legislative history of 
the law clearly indicates that no such limitation was intended.  The 
Regulations actually use the phrases “foreign government” and “foreign 
country” as distinct and unique terms. See, e.g., Regulations, supra note 220, 
§ 760.3(d)(18), Examples of Suppliers of Services (iii) (“A, a U.S. construction 
company, is hired by C, an agency of the government of boycotting country Y, 
to build a power plant in Y.”) (emphasis added).  If a government is a country, 
the Regulations’ example would be redundant in referring to a government of 
a country.  If the Regulations sought to limit the term “country” to mean only 
its “government,” it would have provided an appropriate definition for 
“foreign country” to limit the meaning in such a manner. 
 233.  NLG Opinion, supra note 216. 
 234.  Likewise, neither the EAA Anti-Boycott Law nor the Regulations 
make any exceptions for NGOs. 
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of such a nation or state”.235  While a state is not synonymous 
with a government, a state is managed by its government236 and a 
fair reading of the word would require one to presume that a 
reference to a state is also a reference to that state’s 
government.237 
A “nation” on the other hand, has a different constituency 
according to Black’s Law Dictionary. Black’s defines a nation as 
“[a] large group of people having a common origin, language and 
tradition and usu. constituting a political entity.”238  While a 
nation may also be a state239 it does not have to be a state.  
Black’s notes that: 
[A] nation is a group of people bound by a common 
history, common sentiment and traditions and, usually by 
common heritage.  A state, on the other hand, is a society 
of men united under one government.  These two forms 
of society are not necessarily coincident.  A single 
nation may be divided into several states, and conversely, 
a single state may comprise several nations or parts of 
nations.240 
 
 235.  BLACK’S 9th ed., supra note 199, at 404.  BLACK’S 5th ed. defines a 
country as “[t]he territory occupied by an independent nation or people, or the 
inhabitants of such territory.  In the primary meaning, ‘country’ denotes the 
population, the nation, the state or the government, having possession and 
dominion over a territory.” BLACK’S 5th ed., supra note 199, at 316.  In this 
definition, there is a clear use of the disjunctive with regard to a government 
and the other types of aggregations that can constitute a country, such as a 
group of people without a government representing them.   
 236.  BLACK’S 9th ed., supra note 199, at 1537 (citing THEODORE D. 
WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 36, at 34 (5th 
ed. 1878)). 
 237.  BLACK’S 5th ed. explicitly defines a state as a people who exercise 
their sovereignty “through the medium of an organized government. . . .” 
BLACK’S 5th ed., supra note 199, at 1262. 
 238.  BLACK’S 9th ed., supra note 199, at 1121.  BLACK’S 5th ed. defines a 
nation, at its core, as having the same characteristics: “a people, or 
aggregation of men, existing in the form of an organized rural society, usually 
inhabiting a distinct portion of the earth, speaking the same language, using 
the same customs, possessing historic continuity, and . . . generally, but not 
necessarily, living under the same government and sovereignty.” (emphasis 
added). 
 239. BLACK’S 9th ed., supra note 199, at 1121 (defining a nation-state as a 
nation that is coincident with a state). 
 240.  Id. (emphasis added) (citing JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 136 
(Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947)). 
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b. The Term “Foreign Country” in Context 
The proper understanding of the EAA Anti-Boycott Act’s use 
of the term “foreign country” is that any boycott that is fostered or 
imposed by either (i) a foreign state (meaning a body of people 
acting through a sovereign government) or (ii) a foreign nation 
(meaning a body of people who share commonalities, but are not 
necessarily organized as a state or acting through a government) 
against a friendly country, is prohibited.  Since a foreign nation is 
any group of people having commonality but not necessarily acting 
through a government,241 the term “foreign country” may include 
non-state actors representing such people. 
This is a far broader definition than was used in the NLG 
Opinion and it clearly does not exclude non-state actors of any 
nature.242  A non-state actor, therefore, can be, and often is, a 
representative of a nation.243  The BDS Movement declared that it 
 
 241.  If a group of people is acting through a government, they are 
properly terms a state, under the Black’s Law Dictionary definition. A group 
of people not acting through a government but having commonality would 
thus be properly termed a nation under the Black’s Law Dictionary 
definition.  Without a government, a nation acts through its popular 
representatives, which is the case with the Palestinian Arabs and their 
representatives, which include the BDS Movement.  
 242.  See United Nations and the Rule of Law, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).  Coincidentally, the 
United Nations refers to non-governmental organizations as “civil society 
organizations.”  This is the same term that the BDS Movement uses in 
describing its Palestinian Arab origins. See About Us, BDS MOVEMENT, 
https://bdsmovement.net (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).  A civil society is 
generally understood to refer to the social compact between individuals that 
is distinct from the political apparatus that governs a society; that is, a civil 
society may be a nation that actions outside of the constraints of a political 
system.  A state, as Black’s Law Dictionary notes, is a political society, but it 
only governs to the extent that the civil society (i.e., the people who constitute 
a non-governmental nation) permits it to do so.  See BLACK’S 9th ed., supra 
note 199, at 1537. 
 243.  Obviously, not all non-state actors can be considered nations for 
purposes of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  To be a nation, there must be a 
commonality at the core of the organization.  Amnesty International and 
Wikimedia, two of the largest non-governmental organizations according to 
The Global Journal, would not properly be considered nations since they 
represent issue-oriented non-national causes.  See NGO ADVISOR, 
http://theglobaljournal.net/group/top-100-ngos/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).  
The BDS Movement, on the other hand, acknowledges that it is an 
aggregation of Palestinian Arabs working to further the goal of establishing a 
Palestinian Arab state in the future, which clearly meets the threshold 
criteria of having a common origin and tradition.  There is no Palestinian 
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was formed by and speaks for Palestinian Arab civil society.  In 
fact, the BDS Movement was founded upon the principle that it 
speaks for the entirety of the Palestinian Arab nation; to wit, the 
BDS Movement was formed by the agreement of the 
representatives constituting: 
[T]he three major components of the Palestinian people: 
the refugees in exile, Palestinians under occupation in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip and the discriminated 
Palestinian citizens of the Israeli state.244 
The BDS Movement has said that these three components are to 
represent the entire Palestinian Arab civil society, which in turn, 
would a fortiori constitute a legal entity known as the Palestinian 
Arab nation. 
Indeed, while other entities may claim to represent a portion 
 
Arab state at the current time.  The Palestinian Arab people, arguably a 
unique national identity, operate through non-state apparatuses that 
represent the Palestinian Arab nation.  The BDS Movement, like Hamas, is 
one of those apparatuses and serves as a mechanism for the Palestinian 
Arabs to assert a right to self-determination.  Non-state organizations are 
often, in fact, precursors to political states and the vehicle through which the 
political state is formed and founded.  See generally DEVELOPMENT, NGOS AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY (Deborah Eade ed., 1st ed. 2000).  The Palestinian Arab 
statehood journey is a case in point.  To deny the representative status of a 
non-state actor is to deny the peoples’ right to future political statehood.  The 
fact that there are non-Palestinian Arabs who support the BDS Movement 
has no bearing on its representative status; there are non-Palestinian Arabs 
who support Hamas and Fatah, yet those two political organizations are 
accepted as representatives of a Palestinian Arab nation.  The determinative 
factors are the origin of the organization (Palestinian Arab civil society) and 
its objectives (the establishment of a political state for the nation of 
Palestinian Arabs to supplant the political state of Israel for the nation of 
Jews).  The determination of whether other non-state organizations are 
nations (and thus foreign countries) would clearly have to be made on a case-
by-case basis for purposes of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  It is important to 
note that the treatment of the BDS Movement as a representative of a foreign 
country under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law would not represent an American 
acknowledgement of Palestinian Arab statehood. Such recognition relates 
solely to the recognition of a government and political system; the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law does not limit the definition of foreign countries to only those 
that are states.  50 U.S.C.A. § 4607 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 244.  Palestinian BDS National Committee, BDS MOVEMENT, 
https://bdsmovement.net/bnc (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).  The language in the 
2005 document calling for the initial formation of the BDS Movement states 
that “[t]he Palestinian political parties, unions, associations, coalitions and 
organizations [endorsing the document] represent the three integral parts of 
the people of Palestine: Palestinian refugees, Palestinians under occupation 
and Palestinian citizens of Israel.” 
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of Palestinian Arab political society, only the BDS Movement has 
claimed to represent all of the elements of the Palestinian Arab 
civil society, within Israel, in disputed territories and worldwide.  
Hamas may claim that it represents Palestinian Arabs in Gaza, 
and Fatah may claim that it represents Palestinian Arabs in the 
West Bank/Judea and Samaria, but those are mere fragments of 
the Palestinian Arab nation as a whole.  If there is any 
representative of the Palestinian Arab nation, which was 
Balkanized by Hamas, Fatah, and even the Palestine Liberation 
Organization in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, it is now the 
BDS Movement, which rests its legitimacy on the support of 
hundreds of smaller representatives of Palestinian Arab civil 
society.245  No other representative of the Palestinian Arabs 
makes a claim to such wide popular support.  This is all in the 
context of the Palestinian Arab claim to statehood, based on the 
assertion that the Palestinian Arab people are a unique people 
with a common tradition and history.246  This assertion coincides 
with the legal definition of a nation and only the BDS Movement 
claims support of the whole of that nation. 
Since a foreign country is, inter alia, any foreign nation, a 
foreign non-governmental organization like the BDS Movement 
that purports to represent the entirety of a distinct national 
identity would be considered the representative of that nation.  
For purposes of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law the BDS Movement, 
representing the Palestinian Arab nation, could therefore be a 
foreign country that imposes or fosters an illegal boycott. 
The only explanation for the NLG Opinion’s conclusion that 
 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  See Manuel Hassassian, Historical Dynamics Shaping Palestinian 
National Identity, 9 PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. OF POL., ECON. & CULTURE (2002).  
Hassassian, the Palestinian Authority’s current diplomatic representative to 
the United Kingdom, argues that there is a distinct Palestinian Arab 
identity, one that became more established concurrent with the 
establishment of the State of Israel.  See also PAPPE, supra note 11.  The 
official position of the United States, is less clear.  While the United States 
clearly considers the Palestinian Arabs to be a unique people, the United 
States neither recognizes a Palestinian Arab state nor supports the 
establishment of such a state at the present time.  See, e.g., Jen Psaki, 
Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 3, 2014), http:// 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/10/232550.htm (“We believe international 
recognition of a Palestinian state is premature. We certainly support 
Palestinian statehood, but it can only come through a negotiated outcome, a 
resolution of final status issues, and mutual recognition by both parties.”).  
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non-governmental organizations are not covered by the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law is that the National Lawyers Guild relied upon 
wishful thinking, rather than the legal analysis, in reviewing the 
text of the statute. In fact, though, neither the law, nor the 
implementation of regulations, nor the dictionary definition of the 
term “country” limits the term to an “official government.”  Nor 
can any of the foregoing be understood to do anything other than 
specifically include non-state actors within the scope of the anti-
boycott law.  While under some theories of statutory 
interpretation there would be no need for further review of the 
EAA Anti-Boycott Law (since the foregoing discussion settles any 
question as to the meaning of the statute’s text), other theories of 
statutory interpretation require that we review the reasons that 
the law was enacted and the intentions of those who drafted and 
debated it.247 
c. Understanding the Meaning of “Foreign Country” Through the 
Congressional Debates on the EAA Anti-Boycott Law 
Though the NLG Opinion does not discuss the legislative 
history of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, it does note that the 
Commerce Department, as the agency responsible for 
implementation of the Regulations, refers to the prohibited 
boycotts as those that are “foreign boycotts” generally, but then 
dismisses this more general term without explanation. 248  Far 
from being an isolated inconsistency, the term “foreign boycotts” 
appears 10 times in the Regulations.249  While the use of the term 
“foreign boycotts” may be inconvenient for the NLG Opinion’s 
conclusions, it is, in fact, critical to the understanding of the scope 
of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. 
The term “foreign boycott” reflects the Executive Branch’s 
rulemaking efforts to implement the Congressional goal of 
prohibiting any boycotts that originate from foreign sources, be 
they a state, a government or any other foreign entity that is 
 
 247.  Though outside the scope of this Article, the theory of textualism 
holds that the text of the statute, without regard to any external factors, 
governs the implementation of the law.  The theory of original intent, on the 
other hand, requires a review of the reason that a law was enacted to discern 
how to apply the law, which may result in an application of the law contrary 
to its plain language.  
 248.  NLG Opinion, supra note 216, at n.1. 
 249.  See 15 C.F.R. pt. 760 (Westlaw). 
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furthering the goals of a boycott against a country that is friendly 
to the United States.  This is in line with the definition of “foreign 
country” as described in the preceding section of this Article. 
The legal meaning of the term “foreign country” (as including 
non-governmental organizations), however, is not the only basis 
for concluding that the BDS Movement’s activities are subject to 
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  Since the text of the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law is the ultimate authority on the scope of its 
prohibitions250 and the law is broad on its face, the legislative 
history of the law can provide greater insight into any conflicts 
between the legal meaning of “foreign country” (as determined in 
the preceding section of this Article) and the intended scope of the 
law as it was enacted.  While the general political climate in the 
early 1970s was dealt with in the section of this Article discussing 
the meaning of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s “fostered or imposed” 
language,251 a more thorough examination of world events 
occurring at the time of the EAA Anti-Boycott Debates is 
necessary to understand the objectives of the law. 
d. The Globalization of the Arab/Israel Conflict: The 
Weaponization of Commerce as the Impetus for the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law 
Though anti-boycott legislation had been the subject of 
Congressional discussion for decades, a perfect storm of global 
political events occurring in the early 1970s intensified the effort 
 
 250.  In the federal system, Congress enacts legislation and an Executive 
Branch agency is responsible for implementing that law through regulations 
it writes to detail enforcement and other matters.  A regulation written by an 
Executive agency cannot change the controlling legislation enacted by 
Congress, so while regulations can be drafted at the discretion of the 
responsible agency, they have to comport with and are limited by the 
contours of the legislation.  As the Supreme Court recently stated, “[a]n 
agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by 
rewriting unambiguous statutory terms.  Agencies exercise discretion only in 
the interstices created by statutory silence or ambiguity; they must always 
‘give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” Util. Air 
Reg. Group v.  EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014). In order to determine 
whether regulations are within the scope of the law, courts often will review 
the legislative history of the law.  Thus, while the EAA Anti-Boycott Law has 
lapsed, it and the regulations that are in effect pursuant to the executive 
orders are best understood by reference to the legislative history of the EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law under which they were developed. 
 251.  Supra Part II.B.1.  
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to counteract what had become an economic and humanitarian 
crisis.  On October 6, 1973, a coalition of Arab League members, 
led by Egypt and Syria, launched a multi-front surprise attack on 
Israel.252  With the goal of destroying the State of Israel, precisely 
as first called for in the Arab League’s foundational documents 
from the 1940s and as later codified in the “Three No’s” Arab 
League policy from 1967,253 Arab League forces254 initially 
achieved overwhelming battlefield successes against Israel and 
were within days, if not hours, of accomplishing their goal of 
destroying Israel as a state.255  Israel was perilously close to 
depleting its remaining military supplies and issued repeated 
requests to the United States for immediate shipments of 
replacement materiel.  Though it had initially resisted Israel’s 
requests, the United States began a significant airlift of military 
equipment to Israel that, by the time it was completed on October 
14, 1973, had “played a decisive role in preventing the defeat of 
Israel.”256 
United States’ intervention in support of Israel was seen as a 
declaration of war against the Arab League.257  The PLO called 
for all Arab oil producing nations to suspend the production of oil 
that would be exported to the United States, and Iraq quickly 
 
 252.  Yom Kippur War, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/yom-
kippur-war (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).  
 253.  See Khartoum Resolution, supra note 115.  
 254.  In addition to Egypt and Syria, participants in the Arab League 
military coalition included Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.  
 255.  See, e.g., ABRAHAM RABINOVICH, THE YOM KIPPUR WAR: THE EPIC 
ENCOUNTER THAT CHANGED THE MIDDLE EAST 322 (2004) (describing Israeli 
ambassador to the United States being ordered by Israeli Prime Minister 
Golda Meir to urgently request arms shipments from the United States on 
the third day of the war with the admonition “Call Kissinger now.  Tomorrow 
may be too late.”).  Israeli General Moshe Dayan stated at approximately the 
same time “this is the end of the third temple,” a reference to the destruction 
of Israel, on the third day of the war.  Violent Week: The Politics of Death, 
TIME (Apr. 12, 1976). 
 256.  Chris J. Krisinger, Operation Nickel Grass: Airlift in Support of 
National Policy, AIRPOWER J. 11–16 (Spring 1989).  See also RABINOVICH, 
supra note 255, at 491 (discussing the military and psychological implications 
of the United States’ airlift of arms to Israel and concluding that the arms 
allowed Israel to move away from cautious tactics designed to preserve 
supplies). 
 257.  Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality 
Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT’L L. 591 (1974). 
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responded by nationalizing two American oil companies.258  On 
October 17, 1973, just a few days after the completion of the 
United States airlift of supplies to Israel, Arab oil ministers 
delivered their own economic counterattack against Israel and the 
United States.  They declared that oil production would be 
decreased by 5% per month until such time that Israel was forced 
to (i) withdraw to borders existing prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war and (ii) restore the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people”.259  Countries that had been sympathetic to Arab interests 
would not have their oil deliveries cut; the United States was 
specifically targeted for the most severe reductions in 
deliveries.260 
If these demands sound familiar, it is because they mirror the 
tenor of the calls of the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945 
and the BDS Manifesto today to use commerce as a weapon 
against Israel.  It is also worthy of note that the oil embargo, like 
the BDS Movement’s boycott, was instituted following the call for 
it by a Palestinian Arab non-state actor.  The effects of the Arab 
League oil embargo were dramatic and extensive.  Though the 
embargo was of a relatively short duration, by the time it ended in 
mid-1974 oil prices in the United States had quadrupled and the 
United States economy was thrust into a painful recession.261  In 
the short term, the United States’ response to the oil embargo was 
a series of quick-fix policy measures, primarily focused on energy 
conservation mandates.262  While the oil embargo was not 
permanent, it made such a strong impression on American 
policymakers that a number of long term legislative responses 
were initiated, including the study that led to the House Boycott 
Report.263 
 
 258.  Id. at 592. 
 259.  Id. at 593. 
 260.  Id.  
 261.  Michael L. Ross, How the 1973 Oil Embargo Saved the Planet, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 
140173/michael-l-ross/how-the-1973-oil-embargo-saved-the-planet.  
 262.  Id. (“The U.S. government’s response was bipartisan and far-
reaching.  Nixon pushed emergency conservation measures through 
Congress, including a nationwide 55-mile-per-hour speed limit.  President 
Gerald Ford signed legislation that established mandatory fuel economy 
standards.”). 
 263.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at vii (specifically referring 
to the Arab League oil embargo of 1973–1974 as its impetus).   
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Though the House Boycott Report provides valuable insight 
into anti-boycott considerations, it was prepared for the 94th 
Congress, whose term ended before the EAA Anti-Boycott Law 
was enacted.  As such, the Congressional debates of the 95th 
Congress, which enacted the law, are more relevant.  The 
Congressional debates on what became the EAA Anti-Boycott Law 
memorialize what Congress considered in drafting the law and 
what the law was intended to accomplish.  While the Arab oil 
embargo was the tipping point for the law’s enactment, oil was far 
from the only concern.  As an initial matter, Congress was 
concerned that the Arab League countries had amassed sufficient 
global economic influence to be capable of moving beyond the 
primary boycott of Israel.  With their enhanced economic clout, the 
Arab League was rapidly expanding their use of commerce as a 
weapon to further their agenda against Jews and Israel, among 
other things.264 
Congress paid particularly close attention to the bigoted 
foundation of the Arab League Boycott, noting that the boycott 
was, in addition to being an economic issue, a “discriminatory 
practice” that created “racial problems” in the United States.265  
This concern was shared by a large number of American business 
interests that testified before Congress at the EAA Anti-Boycott 
Law hearings; indeed, none other than the AFL-CIO, the then-
parent of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union,266 
testified that: 
[The boycott of Israel] attempts to impose upon the 
American people practices of racial and religious bigotry 
which violate American belief and law, and to make 
American firms the agents of hostile acts against a 
 
 264.  Many Arab League members were also within the Soviet Union’s 
sphere of influence, so the prospect that Soviet allies might possess a 
devastating economic weapon aimed at the United States was part of 
Congress’ calculus in considering the law.  
 265.  Extension of the Export Administration Act: Hearings and Markup 
Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 95th Cong. 111 (1977) [hereinafter 
House EAA Hearing Report] (testimony of Rep. Gilman).  
 266.  See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the International Longshore 
and Warehouse Union’s (ILWU) participation in the BDS Movement’s illegal 
boycott of Israel in 2010 and 2014.  Though the ILWU recently separated 
from the AFL-CIO, the irony that it was part of the union that so forcefully 
condemned the very same boycotts and urged Congress to enact the EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law which it now violates remains. 
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friendly nation.  This constitutes a repugnant intrusion 
into American domestic life, and an unacceptable effort to 
coerce American foreign policy.  The Executive Council [of 
the AFL-CIO] believes that the imposition of this boycott 
on Americans, American owned business, or on any 
transactions occurring on American territory must end 
now.267 
The use of secondary and tertiary boycotts, where the Arab 
League actively coerced and intimidated foreign companies and 
individuals against engaging in any commercial activities with 
Israel upon the penalty of being excluded from Arab markets, was 
now a potent threat to the United States economy.  On its own, 
this would have been a disturbing global phenomenon, but 
Congress had also just seen the American economy and American 
public targeted and hurt by the Arab oil embargo, which was 
directly rooted in the Arab League’s desire to push the Palestinian 
Arab issue onto the shores of the United States.  It was in this 
environment that the Congressional debates occurred. 
Far from being concerned solely with boycotts of Israel 
initiated by foreign governments, as the NLG Opinion deceptively 
purports, Congress was acting in response to the increasingly 
effective efforts of non-state actors (the Arab League, among 
others), acting through and in coordination with other non-state 
entities and even states, to draw American companies and 
consumers into the Palestinian Arab-aspect of the broader Arab-
Israeli dispute.268 
The intention to create a law with a broad enough reach to 
combat the secondary and tertiary boycotts’ economic coercion and 
intimidation of American interests is borne out through the 
voluminous testimony before both the House of Representatives 
and Senate.  The most succinct declaration of American policy and 
statement of the goals of the nascent EAA Anti-Boycott Law were 
made by the Secretary of the Department of Commerce, Juanita 
M. Kreps, during Senate hearings on the bill: 
I welcome the opportunity to appear before this 
committee to discuss what I believe is necessary 
 
 267.  House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 265, at 389 (testimony of 
AFL-CIO Executive Council on the Arab Boycott). 
 268.  House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 265, at 111 (testimony of 
Rep. Gilman). 
76 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
legislation to prohibit foreign boycott practices that go 
beyond commercial dealings and intrude into the lives 
and business decisions of U.S. citizens . . . [w]e are in full 
accord that the law should prohibit U.S. persons from 
generally refusing to do business with a boycotted 
country friendly to the United States, or the nationals of 
that country, in order to comply with a foreign boycott.  
For example, U.S. persons should not be permitted to 
refuse a licensing agreement or other general 
arrangement to do business with a friendly nation or its 
nationals on the basis of boycott considerations . . . . [W]e 
are in full agreement that no U.S. persons should be 
permitted generally to refuse to do business with another 
U.S. person in order to comply with foreign boycott 
requirements.  We should not permit foreign boycotts 
to cause American firms to boycott other American 
firms.269 
In the House of Representatives’ hearings on the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained the 
purpose and goal of the law in substantially identical terms: 
Refusals by American firms to deal with a friendly 
foreign country, demonstrably related to a foreign 
boycott, should be prohibited.  So, in general, should 
refusals to deal with other U.S. firms.  We believe that 
decisions as to what commerce U.S. firms may or may not 
have with other countries or with other U.S. firms should 
be made consonant with American policy, by Americans 
and only Americans.270 
In each of the preceding quoted statements from the 
Congressional hearings, the remarks were prepared in advance 
and carefully worded.  And in each of the statements, there was a 
clear decision to use the general term “foreign boycotts” rather 
than a term that would limit the targeted boycotts to those that 
 
 269.  Foreign Investment and Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearing on S. 69 
and S. 92 Before the S. Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous. and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 446–47 (1977) [hereinafter Senate EAA 
Hearing Report] (emphasis added to show that “foreign boycott” was used as 
a term without regard to the participation of a foreign country’s government).  
 270.  House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 265, at 5 (emphasis added).  
The same comments were made by Secretary Vance to the Senate.  Senate 
EAA Hearing Report, supra note 269, at 426. 
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originate from a foreign governmental entity.  The bold text in 
each passage shows the deliberate and repeated use of this 
convention.  For example, in Secretary Vance’s prepared remarks, 
he specifically referred to the boycotted entity as a country but 
used the general term “foreign boycott” to describe the subject of 
the legislation.  Secretary Kreps’ testimony was identical in this 
regard.271 
The legislative history of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law shows 
that lawmakers’ only substantive areas of concern with the 
proposed law were in discrete technical points relating to 
enforcement.  The overall goal of the law, however, was 
universally accepted and agreed upon.  For example, in the 
Senate, Senator Adlai Stevenson, the subcommittee chairman, 
described the imposition of a foreign boycott against Israel as a 
threat to national sovereignty: 
The Arab boycott intrudes upon American sovereignty.  It 
interferes with basic human rights and religious freedom.  
It impedes free competition in the marketplace and 
systematically enlists American citizens against their will 
in a war with Israel.  It excludes other Americans from 
economic opportunities.  Such behavior cannot be 
tolerated.272 
Senator William Proxmire’s comments not only supported those of 
Senator Stevenson, they expanded on the economic rationale for 
the law: 
The Arabs have not hesitated to use their clout to conduct 
an economic war against Israel.  In the prevailing 
circumstances in the Middle East, I do not question the 
authority of the Arab nations to refuse to do business 
with Israel, even though I believe that business 
relationships over time might help to defuse the 
situation.  But I do object to the Arab nations using their 
 
 271.  There were instances where the boycotts under consideration were 
referred to as those from foreign countries or states, such as in Secretary 
Vance’s introductory remarks. See House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 
265, at 6 for an example in the context of distinguishing primary boycotts 
from secondary and tertiary boycotts.  The use of these specific terms, 
however, was far outweighed in both House and Senate hearings by general 
references to “foreign boycotts.”  
 272.  Senate EAA Hearing Report, supra note 269, at 1. 
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power to dictate the terms of trade to American firms.  
Ours is a pluralistic society.  We believe that quality and 
price should be the ultimate arbiter in the marketplace 
both in our domestic and foreign commerce.  The Arab 
boycott is fundamentally destructive of these basic 
tenets . . . .  We cannot sit back and let the Arabs dictate 
a fragmentation of our own economic relations to serve 
their own selfish and destructive purposes.273 
And, in describing the nature and geographic scope of the threat 
posed by the anti-Israel boycott, Senator Harrison Williams noted: 
The reach and scope of the Arab boycott have been 
extended far beyond the Middle East.  It is no longer a 
direct and primary boycott of Israel.  It is now an 
unfocused and transnational assault on fundamental 
American freedoms and longstanding precepts of 
unimpeded international commerce . . . .  Against this 
background, new and effective antiboycott legislation 
must be enacted in order to accomplish several objectives.  
First, the basic Export Administration Act must be 
strengthened to make it illegal for American firms to 
engage in secondary or tertiary boycotts.274 
The undisputed goal of the law under debate was to prevent 
foreign boycotts from being introduced into American commerce.  
There was no argument or disagreement with this objective by 
members of either the House or the Senate.  Even the New York 
Times, known as being critical of Israel, voiced editorial support 
for this broad goal.275 
 
 273.  Id. at 2–3. 
 274.  Id. at 3. 
 275.  Id. at 266–67 (exhibit consisting of the editorial from the New York 
Times (Sept. 14, 1976) that took issue with the Ribicoff Amendment but 
wholeheartedly endorsed the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, with the conclusion that 
“Congress nevertheless should strengthen the Export Administration Act by 
making it illegal for American firms to engage in secondary or tertiary 
boycotts.  The threat of economic reprisal by the Arabs cannot be accepted as 
a basis for permitting American firms to submit to odious terms that violate 
the rights and interests of other Americans, or abridge this nation’s sovereign 
powers.”).  It is important to note, again, that the law was referred to as a 
general law that prohibited Americans from engaging the in the secondary or 
tertiary boycotts of Israel.  Nowhere is there any hint of a limitation that 
would make the law applicable only to boycotts that are from a foreign 
government. 
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Furthermore, the targeted boycott activity was described by 
the effect it had on the United States.  The focus was on the 
ideology behind the boycott, not the political status of the 
boycotting entity.  Whether or not the boycott originated in a 
foreign government was not germane for the law’s intended reach; 
rather, any foreign boycott that infringed upon the sovereignty 
and free will of America, its citizens, and its businesses in order to 
further the Arab war on Israel was to be subject to the law’s 
provisions. 
To the extent there were any areas of disagreement on the 
proposed law, however, they were specific to the following areas: 
 The extent to which the law should apply to the 
operations of foreign subsidiaries of United States 
companies. 
 Whether the law would pre-empt state laws on the 
topic of participation in foreign boycotts. 
 Whether there would be grace periods and 
grandfather provisions after the law became 
effective. 
 The scope of paperwork requirements for boycott 
reporting. 
 The permissibility of providing positive, as 
opposed to negative, certifications of origin.276 
Indeed, the issue of negative certifications (i.e., the requirement 
that American businesses affirmatively certify that their products 
did not include any Israeli components or rely upon Israeli labor 
or technology) versus positive certifications (i.e., a certification 
stating that the product was American) was the most frequently 
debated element of the proposed law.277 
What was not in dispute was the overall scope of the EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law’s provisions as they related to types of boycott 
activity affecting American business and individuals.  Secretary of 
State Vance explained that the functioning of the law in respect of 
 
 276.  House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 265, at 5–6. 
 277.  See, e.g., Senate EAA Hearing Report, supra note 269, at 223 
(testimony of Maxwell Greenberg) (describing the differences between 
positive certificates of origin, which were not unusual in international 
commerce, and negative certifications, which were primarily intended to have 
a discriminatory effect).   
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types of boycotts was black and white: “The main thrust of the 
principles which we have enunciated is that we should be dealing 
with secondary and tertiary boycotts and not the primary 
boycott.”278  This, and not whether the source of the boycott was a 
government, is the only area where the substantive reach of the 
law was intended to be limited. 
As to what was meant by a primary versus a secondary or 
tertiary boycott, one example was given by the Chairman of the 
Board of E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company during the Senate 
hearings: 
I think everyone agrees that every nation has a right to a 
primary boycott.  It has a right to control what happens 
within the four corners of its own territory.  If you start 
from that premise, you have a different set of rules in a 
sense for trade with that nation than you do for trade 
elsewhere.  Let me just take a couple of the specific cases 
to illustrate what I have in mind and to distinguish it 
from the trade that would be affected in other parts of the 
world . . . .  Suppose that Saudi Arabia, on its own 
volition, said we want to buy trucks, but we do not want 
DuPont tires on trucks that come into Saudi Arabia.  
Under the principles we have proposed, there would be no 
legal liability for an American shipper in respecting that 
request. 
On the other hand, if, because of this request by the 
Saudis, the American shipper changed his line of 
suppliers and stopped putting DuPont tires on trucks 
going elsewhere, then one would have a right to infer that 
he had associated himself with the boycott and a jury 
might very well conclude that there was an implicit 
agreement in violation of the law.279 
In this example, Saudi Arabia’s refusal to purchase trucks that 
contained DuPont components was deemed to be a permitted 
exercise of a primary boycott.  However, if Saudi Arabia demanded 
that the truck supplier cease using DuPont products on all of its 
trucks, even those sold to non-boycotting countries, it would be a 
 
 278.  House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 265, at 12. 
 279.  Senate EAA Hearing Report, supra note 269, at 481.   
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prohibited action.280 
The best explanation of what would constitute a secondary or 
tertiary boycott, however, was provided by Professor Irwin Cotler, 
who testified before the Senate subcommittee on Canada’s 
experience with anti-boycott laws: 
Canadian firms, as a condition of doing business with an 
Arab League government, company or national must 
agree to refrain from doing business with Israel or any 
Israeli company or national, otherwise known as the 
secondary boycott.  This, in effect, compels a Canadian 
boycott of a country with whom Canada has friendly 
relations and against whom Canada has not itself 
authorized a boycott. 
Canadian firms, as a condition of doing business with any 
Arab League government, company or national, must 
agree to refrain from doing business with any other 
Canadian firms that do business with Israel, otherwise 
known as the tertiary boycott.  This compels a restrictive 
trade practice with Canada and between Canadian 
firms.281 
Thus, under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, any American company 
or person who refuses to do business with Israeli companies or 
individuals pursuant to a foreign boycott of Israel would be in 
violation of the prohibition on secondary boycotts of Israel.  An 
American company or person who refused to do business with 
 
 280.  The applicability of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s prohibitions in the 
example given may not be as clear as the DuPont Chairman described. 50 
U.S.C. § 4607 provides an exception for “complying or agreeing to comply 
with requirements . . . prohibiting the import of goods or services from the 
boycotted country or goods produced or services provided by any business 
concern organized under the laws of the boycotted country or by nationals or 
residents of the boycotted country . . . .”  50 U.S.C.A. § 4607 (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 114–244).  Only if DuPont was an Israeli corporation or 
was using Israeli labor would the shipper be allowed to comply with the 
Saudi demand as it related to the shipment of trucks to Saudi Arabia.  Thus, 
if DuPont had a factory in Israel making truck tires, Saudi Arabia could 
lawfully require the shipper to not use DuPont tires on the trucks it was 
selling to Saudi Arabia.  In all other cases, the shipper could not lawfully 
comply with the Saudi demand.  In no event would the shipper be permitted 
to comply with the Saudi demand that it not use DuPont tires for any of the 
other trucks it sold (i.e., even those sold to non-boycotting customers). 
 281.  Senate EAA Hearing Report, supra note 269, at 518–19. 
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another American that did business with Israel would be in 
violation of the prohibition on tertiary boycotts of Israel. 
Importantly, the EAA Anti-Boycott Law does not limit its 
prohibitions to defined types of boycott participation, such as 
providing negative certifications of origin.  The law generally 
prohibits any refusal to do business that is based on compliance 
with a foreign boycott.  If, for instance, a Syrian company 
demanded that United States dockworkers refuse to unload cargo 
from a ship that was believed to be owned by Israelis, the 
dockworkers would be in violation of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law if 
they complied with the demand.  Certainly, providing a negative 
certificate of origin would violate the Regulations, but the actual 
scope of the law is far more encompassing than the specific 
prohibitions contained in the Regulations. 
While the EAA Anti-Boycott Law applies to any foreign 
boycott of a friendly country, Congress was responding to the Arab 
League Boycott when it debated and passed the EAA Anti-Boycott 
Law.  The Arab League Boycott is a boycott by a non-state actor 
(the Arab League).  The clear legislative intent of the law was to 
prevent American businesses and individuals from being used as 
commercial weapons against Israel (or any other friendly foreign 
country) by foreign boycotters.  Not only was there no intent to 
limit the application of the law to boycotts fostered or imposed 
only by foreign governments, there was an overriding intent to 
apply the prohibition against any and all attempts by any foreign 
source, in particular, non-governmental organizations, to impose 
secondary or tertiary boycotts of Israel on Americans. 
4. Conclusion: Any Non-State Actor Can be a Foreign Country 
Under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law 
Returning to the Chevron test and the principles of statutory 
construction that apply to understanding the EAA Anti-Boycott 
Law,282 the text of the law and its legislative history more than 
fairly imply that foreign non-governmental organizations and non-
state actors were intended to be included within the term “foreign 
country.” Furthermore, legislation that was enacted several 
months prior to the enactment of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law (and 
debated contemporaneously in the same Congress that produced 
 
 282.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984). 
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the House Boycott Report) showed that when Congress wanted to 
limit the application of a law to a foreign government and its 
subdivisions, it did so with elegant precision. 
In the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,283 signed into law 
in October 1976, Congress not only used the term “foreign state” 
to designate those entities that would be immune from suit in 
United States courts, it provided a comprehensive definition for 
that term: 
A “foreign state[,]” except as used in section 1608 of this 
title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or 
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined 
in subsection (b). 
(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” 
means any entity– 
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or 
otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political 
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other 
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political 
subdivision thereof, and 
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United 
States as defined in section 1332 (c) and (e) of this title, 
nor created under the laws of any third country.284 
This is the definition that the NLG Opinion seeks to 
incorporate into the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, yet no such limiting 
definition was ever considered in Congressional debates on the 
EAA Anti-Boycott Law nor was one included in the final text of 
the law or the Regulations promulgated thereunder.  Had 
Congress intended for the EAA Anti-Boycott Law to be limited to 
only foreign governments, it would have used the same language 
that it used in the contemporaneously enacted Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act.  It chose to not use that definition, which, taken 
together with the legislative history showing that the focus of the 
law was to be all foreign boycotts, not just those by a foreign 
government, must be understood as a rejection of any such 
 
 283.  Pub. L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 
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limitation on the term “foreign country.” 
 
C. Are the BDS Movement’s Boycott Activities Subject to the EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law? 
For the BDS Movement’s activities to be subject to the EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law, we would have to show that the boycotts 
promoted by the BDS Movement are imposed or fostered by a 
foreign country against a country that is friendly to the United 
States and not otherwise subject to a permitted boycott.  The only 
argument that has been made to exempt the BDS Movement from 
the provisions of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law is that the BDS 
Movement is a non-governmental organization and the law only 
applies to governments.  As this Article has documented, however, 
in order to support the interpretation favored by the NLG 
Opinion, one would have to textually revise the law, replacing 
“foreign country” with “foreign government,” and then rewrite the 
historical records of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and the Arab 
League Boycott. 
1. The BDS Movement as a Foreign Country: Is It Part of the Arab 
League Boycott or Does It Represent a Standalone Boycott? 
While the BDS Movement represents a foreign country for 
purposes of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, there is an open question 
as to the nature of its boycott activities.  To wit, is the BDS 
Movement’s boycott of Israel a continuation of the Arab League 
Boycott or is it an entirely new and different boycott?  Though the 
BDS Movement is not a member of the Arab League, it is precisely 
the type of non-state organization that was described and called 
for in the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945.  By this 
standard, the BDS Movement “fosters” the Arab League Boycott.  
It would be nonsensical for the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, which was 
enacted in response to a boycott initiated by a non-state actor (the 
Arab League),285 to not apply to a non-state actor that is both an 
entity called for by the original Arab League Boycott Declaration 
of 1945 and also a distillation of the most politically radical and 
commercially disruptive elements of the Arab League (the BDS 
Movement). 
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Furthermore, in its own manifesto, the BDS Movement 
acknowledges that it exists to be the non-violent arm of the 
Palestinian Arab “resistance” movement whose goal is to 
eliminate Israel as a Jewish state.  The BDS Movement, like the 
radical participants at Durban I, utterly rejects a two-state 
solution and hews to the original Arab League goal of Arab 
hegemony in Palestine.  This is at a time when even many 
members of the Arab League have accepted, at least nominally, a 
two-state solution. 
In many ways, the BDS Movement represents the re-
radicalization of the Arab League.  Where some of the Arab 
League states have found that the hard line anti-Zionist rhetoric 
of the past will not be tolerated by modern western nations, the 
BDS Movement is a veritable throwback to the origins of the Arab 
League and its unyielding resistance to any self-determination for 
Jews in their historic lands. 
All one has to do is compare the BDS Movement’s activities 
and manifesto to the founding declaration of the Arab League 
Boycott to see that the BDS Movement is nothing more than the 
latest iteration of this proclamation from 1945: “the boycott (of 
Zionist goods) should not be confined to governmental action only, 
but should also be (undertaken) through the people. Thus, 
necessary propaganda should be conducted in order to convince 
the Arab peoples of the necessity of boycotting Zionist goods.”286 
Therefore, even if the BDS Movement itself is not seen as a 
“foreign country” under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, because it can 
be seen as the non-governmental apparatus that has been part of 
the Arab League Boycott since its inception in 1945, its activities 
constitute an alter ego of the member states of the Arab League 
Boycott.  In other words, the BDS Movement is simply an organ 
interposed by foreign governments in an attempt to evade the 
reach of anti-boycott laws and it is the entity that “fosters” the 
Arab League Boycott today. 
Alternatively, though it would be difficult for a reasonable 
person to do, if the connections between the BDS Movement and 
the Arab League’s call for a non-governmental boycott apparatus 
are ignored, the BDS Movement, as a “grass roots” boycott of 
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Israel by “Palestinian civil society” still runs afoul of the letter and 
intent of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  The law simply does not 
contain an exception for non-governmental organizations and by 
the law’s unambiguous text its prohibitions are not limited to the 
Arab League Boycott.  Furthermore, any attempt to exclude non-
governmental organizations from the operation of the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law would violate the Presumption against 
Ineffectiveness, as states could simply run their boycott operations 
through non-governmental “astroturf”287 campaigns. 
2. Policy Reasons to Apply the EAA Anti-Boycott Law to the BDS 
Movement 
Ultimately, though, the BDS Movement should be seen as a 
hybrid of the Arab League Boycott and a separate and unique 
Palestinian Arab boycott with roots in current Islamist radicalism.  
This distinction is especially important in viewing the illegality of 
the BDS Movement’s boycott through the prism of the factors that 
gave rise to the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and the law’s policy 
objectives.  On the one hand, Congress was concerned with the 
boycott’s economic impact of foreign interference in domestic 
American affairs. On the other hand, Congress was also concerned 
with the racist motivations and effects of the Arab League Boycott 
and sought to prevent Americans from being used to further a 
racist war against Jews and Israel.  The House Boycott Report 
explicitly referenced the racist nature of Arab boycotts of Israel as 
an impetus for the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. 
Despite emphatic Arab statements that the boycott is not 
directed against Jews, in practice the boycott is directed against 
supporters of Israel, including those living in the United States, 
many of whom are also members of the Jewish faith.  The belief 
that the boycott is based on religious discrimination tends to 
generate a profound American reaction because it strikes closely 
at U.S. ideals.288 
The BDS Movement, and the groups with which it aligns its 
goals, makes similar claims as to their non-racist nature.  No 
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amount of double talk and obfuscation, however, can hide the fact 
that the BDS Movement rejects the two-state solution, calls for 
the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state and has deep and 
disturbing ties to radical Islamist groups.  At the NGO Durban 
Conference, which is widely understood to be the birthplace of the 
BDS Movement and which spawned the framework for the BDS 
Manifesto, the conference declaration could easily be mistaken for 
an al-Qaeda or Hamas screed: 
We declare Israel as a racist, apartheid state in which 
Israels [sic] brand of apartheid as a crime against 
humanity has been characterized by separation and 
segregation, dispossession, restricted land access, 
denationalization, ¨bantustanization¨ and inhumane 
acts . . . . 
[The NGO Durban Conference calls for] the reinstitution 
of UN resolution 3379 determining the practices of 
Zionism as racist practices which propagate the racial 
domination of one group over another through the 
implementation of all measures designed to drive out 
other indigenous groups, including through colonial 
expansionism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (in 
the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, including Jerusalem), and 
through the application of discriminatory laws of return 
and citizenship, to obliterate their national identity and 
to maintain the exclusive nature of the State of Israel as 
a Jewish state to the exclusion of all other groups. Also 
call for the repeal of all discriminatory laws within the 
state of Israel, including those of return and citizenship, 
which are part of the institutionalized racism and 
Apartheid regime in Israel.289 
The most blatant connection to radical Islam is the BDS 
Movement’s ideological coordination and affiliation with Hamas.  
Prior to the introduction of the BDS Movement as a standalone 
propaganda arm, Hamas rejected the Oslo Accords’ two-state 
solution and declared its goal of eliminating Israel as a Jewish 
state.290  This is the exact position that the BDS Movement has 
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taken vis à vis any potential two-state solution.  The ties between 
Hamas and the BDS Movement run much deeper than ideology, of 
course.  As one recent news report found: 
Much BDS and pro-Palestinian NGO activity in Europe 
and the United States is connected to radical Islamic 
groups and Palestinian terror organizations such as 
Hamas. 
Hamas and its parent Muslim Brotherhood organization 
fuel and direct international BDS and anti-Israel political 
activities on hundreds of university campuses across the 
United States via the Muslim Students Association. 
Many of the MSA’s 600 chapters in North America have 
been branded “extensions of the Muslim Brotherhood,” as 
the MB itself stated in its operational plan, captured in 
the FBI’s raid on the Holy Land foundation—a Hamas 
charity, in 2001. 
. . . Scores of other Pro-Palestinian BDS groups that are 
active in Israel Apartheid Week, such as American 
Muslims for Palestine and Students for Justice in 
Palestine, have funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in donations to Hamas. The Investigative Project revealed 
material support the American Muslims for Palestine 
provided to Hamas. 
Hamas’s Gaza leadership has also endorsed international 
BDS activities against Israel. According to the Middle 
East Monitor, Hamas issued a statement on February 14, 
2014, saying, “We in Hamas appreciate and welcome 
these economic boycotts against the Zionist occupation 
and we consider it a step in the right direction toward 
pressuring the occupation to stop its settlement activities 
and its Judaization of the Palestinian land.” 
. . . Hamas’ role in BDS activities in London may be even 
less ambiguous. 
Non-government organizations such as the British 
Muslim Initiative, the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (an 
umbrella group for pro-Palestinian groups and Stop the 
War Coalition, and action Palestine have twinned British 
and Gaza universities and stage university “occupations” 
of university offices until their BDS demands are met. 
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Mohammed Sawalha, Hamas’ fugitive commander in 
Judea Samaria/West Bank, who fled in the early 1990s 
and became a British national, founded the British 
Muslim Initiative and is deeply involved leading the 
Palestine Solidarity Campaign. 
Another leader of the London BDS Movement, and a 
Hamas insider in London, is Azzam Tamimi, a professor 
of political thought and a leader of the Palestine 
Solidarity Campaign. 
. . . The international Israel Apartheid Week and its 
accompanying BDS campaign is far from being a peaceful 
grass roots movement to bring “justice, equality and 
peace to Palestine.”  Rather, it is largely a Muslim 
Brotherhood—and Hamas—fueled network that supports 
the same radical Islamic agenda of destroying Israel.  
NGOs involved in Israeli Apartheid Week and BDS 
should be placed under the legal and media spotlights for 
direct and indirect ties to and support for hybrid Islamic 
terror groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah that use BDS 
as a soft terror strategy to complement their “hard” terror 
campaigns.291 
The BDS Movement has been linked to other global Islamist 
terror organizations as well.  For example, in 2010 the 
Humanitarian Relief Foundation (HRF), an Islamist group aligned 
with Hamas violently engaged Israeli military forces off of the 
coast of Gaza.292  Immediately after the HRF incident, the BDS 
Movement issued an international call for, among other things, 
dockworkers in the United States to refuse to offload Israeli 
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cargo,293 and BDS Movement supporters around the world 
organized protests against Israel in support of the HRF.  Not only 
is the HRF a Hamas affiliate, one of its prominent members and a 
participant in the 2010 incident reportedly joined forces with the 
Islamic State terror organization and was killed in combat by 
American forces.294 
The HRF has also been linked to al-Qaeda.295  It should also 
be noted that Hamas, like Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic 
State, has been designated a foreign terror organization by the 
United States.296  One need only examine al-Qaeda’s historical 
statements regarding Israel and the Palestinian Arab issue to see 
that al-Qaeda, Hamas and the BDS Movement are ideological 
triplets on the subject.  The following are selected statements from 
al-Qaeda leaders regarding Israel and Palestine: 
Osama bin Laden, [Former] Al-Qaeda Leader 
“We will continue, God permitting, the fight against the 
Israelis and their allies . . . and will not give up a single 
inch of Palestine as long as there is one true Muslim on 
earth.” – May 2008 
“The Palestinian cause is the major issue. . . . It was an 
important element in fueling me from the beginning and 
the 19 others with a great motive to fight for those 
subjected to injustice and the oppressed.” – May 2008 
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“In closing I would like to say that Palestine will not 
return to us through negotiations of the surrendered 
rulers and their conferences, nor by protests of the sitting 
scholars and their elections, as these are two faces to the 
same problem. Palestine will return to us by the 
permission of Allah if we wake from our ignorance and 
holdfast to our religion and sacrifice for it our money and 
lives.” – March 2008 
“We will not recognize a state for the Jews, not even one 
inch of the land of Palestine. . . . Our jihad is to liberate 
Palestine—the whole of Palestine, from the river to the 
sea if Allah wills it. . . . Blood for blood, destruction for 
destruction.” – December 2007 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s [Leader] 
“Muslims everywhere, fight against the Zionist-Christian 
campaign, and strike its interests wherever you 
encounter them.” – January 2009 
“As for the Mujahideen of HAMAS and the rest of the 
Mujahideen in Palestine, I supported them and continue 
to support them, and I call on the Ummah to aid them, 
especially the tribes of the Sinai.” – April 2008 
“ . . . we endorse every operation against Jewish 
interests.” – April 2008 
Adam Gadahn, American Al-Qaeda Spokesman 
“End all support, moral, military, economic, political, or 
otherwise, to the bastard state of Israel, and ban your 
citizens, Zionist Jews, Zionist Christians, and the rest 
from traveling to occupied Palestine or settling there. 
Even one penny of aid will be considered sufficient 
justification to continue the fight.” – May 2007 297 
These quotes demonstrate that, like the BDS Movement, al-Qaeda 
has a history of rejecting Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, 
aligning itself ideologically with Hamas and calling for attacks on 
Israel’s economic interests.  So, while in certain tangible ways the 
BDS Movement is an arm of the Arab League Boycott, in 
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ideological ways it is more closely affiliated with the likes of 
Hamas, al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State. 
The BDS Movement’s rejection of the two-state solution and 
its call for the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state is 
Islamic/Arabic supremacy on blood-soaked steroids.  As such, the 
war that Congress did not want Americans to be dragged into 
through any foreign boycott of Israel is now a genocidal campaign 
that directly threatens not only Israel, a friendly nation, but also 
the United States.  The long line of Islamist attacks on American 
interests, most notably the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda terror 
attacks that claimed nearly 3,000 American lives,298 are of the 
same origin as the BDS Movement’s radical ideology. 
Coerced American participation in the BDS Movement’s 
actions against Israel, which occurs when, for example, BDS 
Movement activists picket at United States ports and cause dock 
workers to refuse to unload cargo from Israeli-affiliated ships,299 
must be seen as a form of material support for both the BDS 
Movement and BDS Movement affiliates like Hamas and other 
Islamist groups as well. 
Coordination between the BDS Movement and American 
dockworkers has serious implications on American commerce and 
national security.  For example, one local of the dockworkers 
union in California has been very active in supporting BDS 
Movement activities against commerce tied to Israel.300  In 2014, 
the dockworkers union operating in the Port of Oakland, 
California, ILWU Local 10, heeded the BDS Movement’s call to 
interfere with the docking and offloading of cargo from a ship with 
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alleged ties to Israel.301  Union officials claimed that they were 
not participating in the BDS Movement’s activities but were, 
instead, refusing to put workers in the middle of a potentially 
violent conflict between BDS protesters and police.302 
The truth, however, comes directly from influential ILWU 
organizers and members.  These individuals not only openly 
support the BDS Movement’s activities against Israel,303 they 
openly acknowledge that the union coordinated with the BDS 
Movement to ensure that the Israeli cargo ship would not be 
unloaded.304  The 2014 Port of Oakland BDS Movement action 
was described in detail by one of the union-affiliated participants: 
International calls for workers protest actions were made 
by the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions 
(PGFTU), the International Transport Workers 
Federation and the International Dock workers Council 
(IDC), as well as an urgent call for action by the 
Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) 
National Committee. Messages of support for labor action 
were sent to the International Longshore and Warehouse 
Union (ILWU) Local 10 . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he anti-Zim protest on the morning of September 
27 [didn’t] require a picket line at the [stevedores 
association] terminal gate because longshore gangs didn’t 
show up to work the Zim Shanghai.  An announcement 
was made at the hiring hall about the picketing. Only one 
union member took a dispatch slip to work Zim. This was 
longshore workers solidarity in action . . . . 
. . . A deal was sealed between the union and [the 
stevedores association].  All the jobs were filled on the 
evening dispatch and the police were removed by [the 
stevedores association] from the vicinity of the terminal.  
Longshoremen informed the pickets about the 
union/[stevedores association] deal, assuring them that 
Local 10 would honor the line.  With no police to violate 
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free speech rights, picketers blocked the main gate with 
cars and pickets.  Longshoremen saw the picket line, 
drove to another terminal and stood by with their union 
official. With no longshore workers the Zim Shanghai 
couldn’t be worked.  Not one container was moved after 
two full shifts. Zim sent her down to LA.  Irate Zionists 
were calling for the arrest of the protesters but to no 
avail . . . .305 
Such close coordination between foreign organizations tied to 
terrorism and American unions that are, in effect, monopolistic 
gatekeepers for international commerce clearly implicates the 
provisions of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. 
The unfortunate reality is that while Arab and Islamist hate 
groups have changed their names, areas of operation and public 
personas over the decades, they have steadily expanded their 
focus from solely Israel to the western world as a whole.  The 
Islamic Front became al-Qaeda, which became the Al-Nusra 
Front, but the ideology remained the same and their targets 
remained the same.  Islamic Front affiliates bombed the World 
Trade Center in New York in the early 1990s and their successors 
in al-Qaeda finished the job less than 10 years later.306  Similarly, 
the Arab League’s economic boycott became the BDS Movement, 
and tomorrow the BDS Movement may change its name and 
façade in an attempt to claim that it is yet another “grassroots” 
Palestinian Arab movement, but the core ideology will remain the 
same. 
Enforcing the EAA Anti-Boycott Law against the boycott 
activities of the BDS Movement would not be without precedent.  
Federal laws and regulations aimed at combating the extremist 
anti-peace agenda originating from radical Arab/Islamist groups 
such as Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda (and now, the BDS 
Movement) by depriving those groups of support from Americans 
or American businesses have been enacted and upheld by federal 
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courts. 
For example, in the wake of the Oslo Accords and subsequent 
efforts by Hamas and other Palestinian Arab groups opposed to 
peace and a two-state solution to undermine the peace process, 
President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12947 on January 
25, 1995.307  This executive order deemed a number of radical 
Palestinian Arab groups to be threats to the Middle East peace 
process and the interests of the United States and prohibited 
financial transactions with any of those groups and individuals 
deemed to be threats (the list was subsequently expanded through 
Executive Order 13099 on August 20, 1998 to include, among 
others, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda).308 
After the September 11th Islamist terror attacks, President 
George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13224 on September 23, 
2001.309  This executive order expanded the general strategy for 
disrupting the operations of Islamist groups by prohibiting 
Americans from providing material support to them.310  
Palestinian Arab affiliated groups opposed to a two-state solution 
constitute an overwhelming majority of the named entities subject 
to the prohibitions.  These executive orders were signed pursuant 
to the authority of the President granted under the IEEPA, the 
same authority under which the EAA Anti-Boycott Law has been 
extended. 
In litigation that followed the implementation of Executive 
Order 13224, the United States Supreme Court upheld a federal 
law311 that prohibits Americans from providing material support 
to, inter alia, Islamic terror organizations and in so doing found 
that prohibitions on providing support to terror groups did not 
violate the First or Fifth Amendment rights of those who sought to 
provide such support.312  In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
the Supreme Court found that a prohibition on providing support 
that was in the nature of humanitarian or advocacy activities to a 
terror organization was a valid exercise of the government’s power 
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to protect the country from terrorism.313  In particular, the Court 
found that the prohibition on speech and/or conduct in support of 
even demonstrably non-terrorist activities of a terror group was 
permissible under the First Amendment due to the fact that 
humanitarian or advocacy actions in support of a terror group 
work to legitimize and further the terror activities of the group.314 
In fact, the Humanitarian Law Project Court used facially 
benign support for Hamas’s charitable work as an example of how 
any support for a terror group promotes its terror activities and 
differentiated that prohibited type of support from individuals 
engaging in “independent advocacy or expression of any kind,” 
which is outside of the scope of the prohibition.315  Those who 
engage in truly independent advocacy are free to “say anything 
they wish on any topic.  They may speak and write freely about 
the [terror groups], the governments of [the terror groups’ 
targets], human rights, and international law.  They may advocate 
before the United Nations.”316 
Similarly, even under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law Americans 
can protest against Israel or engage in independent advocacy 
before international organizations in support of Palestinian Arabs.  
What the EAA Anti-Boycott Law prohibits is the type of 
coordination with foreign groups in support of an illegal boycott of 
a United States ally that occurs in BDS Movement boycott 
activities, turning American citizens and businesses into pawns in 
a foreign dispute.  Whether one sees the BDS Movement as a 
continuation of the Arab League Boycott or an altogether new 
anti-Israel boycott organization that is aligned with radical hate 
groups, the EAA Anti-Boycott Law is applicable to such boycott 
activities. 
While Congress was concerned about Arab world 
discrimination against American Jews when it enacted the EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law in the 1970s, the scope of discrimination and the 
existential threats to the United States and its interests posed by 
radical Islamist groups has metastasized.  As a result, the United 
States has been engaged in global military action to confront the 
radical Islamist threat, which is now in its second decade.  The 
 
 313.  See id. at 5; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the material support 
statute as a RICO predicate offense).  
 314.  Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 25. 
 315.  Id. at 26. 
 316.  Id. at 25–26.  
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BDS Movement’s historical basis in the Arab League Boycott and 
its current ideological alignment with radical Islamist groups pose 
precisely the threat to vital United States’ interests that were the 
impetus for the enactment of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.  As a 
matter of policy, enforcement of the law against the BDS 
Movement’s activities is within the letter and the spirit of the 
EAA Anti-Boycott Law.317 
III. BEYOND THE EAA ANTI-BOYCOTT LAW:  
THE BDS MOVEMENT, ANTI-TRUST LAWS, AND RICO 
Though the EAA Anti-Boycott Law provides a comprehensive 
tool for the government to use against disruptive foreign boycotts, 
it is not the only federal law implicated by the BDS Movement’s 
activities.  Additional federal laws that were believed to be 
applicable to foreign boycotts were discussed in the 1976 House 
Boycott Report (the analytical foundation for the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law) and the potential uses of these laws were discussed 
in detail by a Department of Justice attorney who would later 
become a Supreme Court Justice (House Legal Analysis).318 
Antonin Scalia, the late Supreme Court Justice who worked 
as an assistant attorney general at the Department of Justice at 
the time of the report, concluded that the Arab League Boycott 
violated anti-trust laws and anti-discrimination provisions of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 11246.319  
 
 317.  This is not to say that Americans cannot be critical of or protest 
against Israel, including by way of a primary boycott of Israeli goods.  
However, there is a long and established history in the United States of 
prohibiting support for organizations and ideology that are declared to be 
contrary to United States’ interests.  Just as a person in the United States 
can independently march in the street to protest American treatment of 
Muslims overseas, that conduct becomes unlawful under anti-terrorism laws 
if it is coordinated to provide material support for al-Qaeda’s activities.  The 
goal of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law was to prevent the American public and 
businesses from being drawn into, and used as weapons in, a war by radical 
elements against a friendly country.  Nothing in this Article prevents 
Americans from protesting against Israel or engaging in individual primary 
boycotts of Israeli goods.   
 318.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 47–55. 
 319.  Id. at 48. Executive Order 11246 prohibits federal contractors, 
subcontractors and federally-assisted construction contractors that generally 
have contracts that exceed $10,000 from discriminating in employment 
decisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It also 
requires covered contractors to take affirmative action to ensure that equal 
opportunity is provided in all aspects of their employment. See Exec. Order 
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In addition, there was a discussion of whether federal securities 
laws were violated by publicly traded companies that participated 
in the Arab League Boycott, though no definitive answer was 
reached on that question.320  Though providing an analysis of the 
potential anti-trust claims that is as exhaustive as was provided 
for the EAA Anti-Boycott Law is outside the scope of this Article, 
any discussion of the BDS Movement’s activities and applicable 
federal laws would be incomplete without a general description of 
the framework for potential violations of such laws. 
A. Anti-Trust Laws and the BDS Movement 
The primary focus of the House Legal Analysis was the 
applicability of federal anti-trust laws (in particular, the Sherman 
Act,321 a federal anti-trust statute applicable to boycotts and other 
anti-competitive activities) to anti-Israel boycotts that affected 
United States businesses.  Justice Scalia noted that the tertiary 
boycott of Israel was the most likely candidate to be the basis for 
anti-trust prosecution by the government and explained the 
general principal that: 
If two or more U.S. firms were to combine for the purpose 
either of not dealing with some other firm(s), or of 
preventing some neutral third-party firms from dealing 
with the object of the U.S. boycotter’s activities, the 
combination could be termed a true “boycott” in the sense 
that that term has traditionally been employed in 
antitrust law.322 
Justice Scalia’s analysis continued to compare “horizontal 
boycotts (those involving the combination of firms at the same 
level of production, and generally in competition, with each other 
 
No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. pts. 60–1, 60–2, 60–4, 60–50 (2014). 
 320.  See HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 49. 
 321.  Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–7 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 
No. 114–244).  See Kenneth Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section 
1 of the Sherman Act, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2002) for an overview of Sherman 
Act principles, especially as they relate to group boycotts. 
 322.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 50.  Justice Scalia’s 
analysis acknowledged that a “concerted refusal to deal” was distinct from a 
boycott in some ways, but for purposes of anti-trust law it was equivalent to a 
boycott, other than to the extent that with a case predicated upon an 
allegation of a concerted refusal to deal, the government would have to 
distinguish between unilateral action, which is permissible, and 
conspiratorial action, which is not permissible.  Id. 
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but for the combination),” which, according to Justice Scalia, “are 
generally considered to be so pernicious that they constitute per se 
antitrust offenses”323 (that is, once it is established that there is a 
horizontal boycott in effect, no further inquiry is necessary) with 
“vertical boycotts (those involving restraints imposed by a firm at 
one level in the marketing chain upon the dealings of one or more 
firms at a lower level in the chain),” which require a review of “the 
context of the entire transaction.”324  In other words, if there is 
not a basis for finding a per se violation of the anti-trust laws, a 
court would have to employ a test to determine whether the 
subject boycott “poses such a pernicious effect on competition”325 
that it constitutes a violation of the law (also known as the “rule of 
reason”).326 
Notwithstanding the differences in proof required for 
establishing a Sherman Act case dealing with horizontal as 
compared to vertical boycotts, Justice Scalia’s analysis pointed to 
the objectives of the Sherman Act as the reason for the law’s 
applicability to the boycott of Israel.  The Sherman Act was 
enacted to “vindicate public interest in a free market,”327 and case 
law has created a presumption that “any concerted refusal to deal 
is per se unlawful.”328  The House Legal Analysis also noted that a 
“concerted refusal to deal” (that is, a collaboration between firms 
to refuse to deal with a targeted entity) is “virtually 
indistinguishable from a boycott” and further noted that many 
instances of compliance with the Arab League Boycott in the 
United States were of the “concerted refusal to deal” variety. 329 
What the government was most concerned with was a 
scenario where, due to pressure from the Arab League, one United 
States entity would refuse to deal with another entity that was 
being targeted by the Arab League for having relations with 
Israel.  Such a refusal to deal would not only have damaging 
effects on United States commerce and competition, it would, in 
 
 323.  Id.  
 324.  Id.  
 325.  Id. at 51. 
 326.  For a summary of the “rule of reason” in anti-trust law, see Michael 
Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009).  
 327.  See HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 51. 
 328.  Id. at 52.   
 329.  Id. at 50 (alteration in original). 
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essence, be a private usurpation of the federal government’s 
exclusive authority to regulate commerce.  In the House Legal 
Analysis, Justice Scalia cited to Fashion Originators Guild of 
America v. F.T.C (Fashion Guild)330 in support of his argument 
that such boycotts are prima facie illegal and must be justified by 
those engaging in them to survive court scrutiny.331  That case, 
involved a trade guild’s imposition of a boycott to prevent non-
guild sales from occurring, included important dicta.332  The Court 
concluded that the boycott was a violation of the Sherman Act 
because the boycott had potential for infringing upon commerce as 
well as competition.  The Court, though, also noted that by 
interfering with commerce, the guild “[was an] extra-
governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation 
and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial 
tribunals for determination and punishment of violations, and 
thus ‘trenches upon the power of the national legislature and 
violates the statute.’”333  In the same way, the BDS Movement’s 
activities put the regulation of commerce into private, indeed 
hostile, foreign hands. 
In fact, at the time of the House Boycott Report, the United 
States Department of Justice was in the early stages of 
prosecuting the Bechtel Corporation for Sherman Act violations.  
The Department of Justice alleged that Bechtel had conspired 
with a number of other unnamed entities or individuals as part of 
the Arab League Boycott.  The acts that were the principle focus of 
the claim were Bechtel’s agreement to not do business with any 
entity that was on the Arab League Boycott’s blacklist.  The case 
against Bechtel was settled pursuant to a consent decree that 
“established the general principle that compliance with the 
tertiary boycott constituted a violation of US antitrust 
laws . . . .”334 
Though the case against Bechtel was not fully litigated, what 
is interesting about the prosecution is that the Department of 
Justice apparently found that the conspirators consisted of 
Bechtel, on the one hand, and Arab companies or individuals who 
 
 330.  312 U.S. 457, 475 (1941). 
 331.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 50. 
 332.  Fashion Originators Guild, 312 U.S. at 465. 
 333.  Id. 
 334.  FEILER, supra note 15, at 164. 
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were not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, on the other hand.335  
Analogizing to other antitrust prosecutions where parties that are 
exempt from prosecution under the applicable provisions of 
antitrust laws (such as unions) could be combined with non-
exempt parties in order to find that there is the requisite 
combination of parties or a conspiracy among parties, the House 
Legal Analysis hinted at potential future anti-trust prosecutions 
aimed at a single non-exempt United States company or 
individual who conspired with exempt foreign boycott 
promoters.336 
In other words, a boycott prohibited by the Sherman Act, 
which usually requires at least two participating entities, can be 
found even in a situation where only one domestic entity is 
involved in the boycott.  In practical terms, this would mean that 
any United States company or individual cooperating with the 
BDS Movement could be part of an illegal boycott under the 
Sherman Act, and would be subject to the monetary and criminal 
penalties that may be imposed for such violations.  The need to 
determine whether the boycott is horizontal, resulting in per se 
illegality, or vertical, requiring an inquiry into the objectives of 
the boycotting parties and the effect on United States Commerce 
as a threshold issue, would complicate the prosecution but would 
not vitiate potential liability for participation in the BDS 
Movement’s activities. 
1. Sherman Act Liability for Dockworkers’ Collaboration With the 
BDS Movement 
One entity that has taken part in BDS Movement activities in 
the United States is the dockworkers union.  Though unions are 
generally exempt from the provisions of the Sherman Act, as the 
court held in USS-POSCO Industries v. Contra Costa County 
Building & Construction Trades Council, when a union acts in 
concert with a non-union entity to further an illegitimate 
objective, it loses its Sherman Act immunity.337  Furthermore, 
 
 335.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 52–53.  
 336.  Id. at 54–55. 
 337.  31 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 1994) (restating the analysis to determine 
whether union activities are exempt from anti-trust laws as announced in 
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) as a two-prong test: “(1) Did 
the union combine with a non-labor group? [and] (2) Did the union act in its 
legitimate self-interest?”). 
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while it has been argued that anti-trust laws do not apply to 
“protest” boycotts, foreign boycotts of Israel are not considered to 
be “protest” boycotts and are, instead, better understood to be 
horizontal boycotts.338 
Consequently, where a union such as ILWU Local 10 
cooperates with the BDS Movement as part of a scheme to inflict 
economic injury on third parties, such as shipping companies 
affiliated with Israeli investors, Sherman Act immunity for ILWU 
Local 10 would not exist and the union may be prosecuted for 
criminal and civil penalties under the Sherman Act.  The case 
against the union would be based on the fact that participation in 
the BDS Movement boycott has a negative effect on United States 
markets and competition (which the BDS Movement 
acknowledges as one of the goals of the boycott) and is not part of 
any collective bargaining or other permitted labor organizing 
activity.339 
This is, of course, a simplified analysis of the case that would 
be made for the union’s Sherman Act liability in connection with 
 
 338.  Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PENN L. REV. 1131, 
1134 (1980) (“[A] consumer boycott protesting high prices would be a protest 
boycott, but the Arab League’s secondary boycott of foreign companies 
trading with Israel would not, despite its political motivations.  Under the 
terms of the Arab boycott, companies wishing to deal with Israel or with Arab 
nations are prohibited from dealing with Israel or with any firm having 
commercial relations with Israel.  This horizontal agreement is aimed not 
only at Israeli businesses but also at “Zionist sympathizers,” who may be 
competitors of the complying companies.  Thus, firms participating in the 
Arab boycott cannot be said to lack a significant business interest in the 
boycott’s success.” (citing The Arab Boycott: The Antitrust Challenge of 
United States v. Bechtel in Light of the Export Administration Amendments 
of 1977, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1440, 1446 (1979)).  
 339.  Henry K. Lee, Ship Hit by Protest Unloads, Leaves Oakland, SF 
GATE (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Protest-hobbled-
ship-is-partially-unloaded-sails-5700706.php (“‘Zim has undoubtedly suffered 
significant economic losses, and we have set a powerful precedent for what 
international solidarity with Palestine, through boycott, divestment and 
sanctions, can look like,’ said Reem Assil of the Arab Resource and 
Organizing Center.”); Renee Lewis, Seattle protesters aim to block Israeli 
cargo ship over Gaza siege, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/25/seattle-israel-boat.html 
(Organizers said the action is part of a wider Boycott, Divest and Sanction 
(BDS) movement, modeled after a similar effort targeting South Africa under 
apartheid. In a press release, they describe the actions as economic sanctions 
imposed in response to the current siege of the Gaza Strip and the occupation 
of the Palestinian territories.) (emphasis added to highlight the affiliation 
between the local “Block the Boat” actions and the BDS Movement). 
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supporting the BDS Movement boycott.  However, comparing the 
potential case against dockworkers to the Bechtel litigation, there 
are strong similarities.  The United States dockworker’s union, 
like Bechtel before it, can be seen as collaborating with foreign co-
conspirators (the BDS Movement and the Arab League) to harm 
United States markets and competition.  Of course, there would 
have to be a determination made as to the legitimacy of the 
union’s boycott support, which would hinge on a facts and 
circumstances analysis.  As the court in USS-POSCO Industries 
noted: 
What, then, does it mean for a union to pursue an 
illegitimate purpose?  In the broadest sense, everything a 
union does serves its self-interest.  But Hutcheson 
requires that it act in pursuit of its legitimate self-
interest.  Whether the interest in question is legitimate 
depends on whether the ends to be achieved are among 
the traditional objectives of labor organizations.  Thus, if 
a union forces employers to funnel money into a 
commercial enterprise from which the union derives 
profits; or if it forces the employer to hire the union 
president’s spouse; or if a union is involved in illegal 
activities unrelated to its mission, such as dealing drugs 
or gambling, those would not be objectives falling within 
the union’s legitimate interest. In such cases, the unions 
“cease to act as labor groups.”340 
Unions often engage in boycotts that are exempt from the 
anti-trust laws, but those boycotts are in support of “traditional 
objectives” of labor organizing, such as is the case when a union 
boycott is launched against a non-union employer in order to 
coerce that employer into hiring union workers.341  Supporting a 
foreign boycott aimed at weakening and ultimately destroying a 
friendly foreign country is many things, but one cannot reasonably 
describe it as a traditional objective of American labor unions. 
 
 340.  31 F.3d at 808 (quoting Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982)); see also Allied Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456 U.S. 212 (1982). 
 341.  Id. at 809 (observing that the traditional tactics used by the unions, 
like handbilling, picketing, and encouragement of work stoppages at the 
project site, were protected because unions are entitled to encourage use of 
unionized labor). 
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The text and history of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law amply 
demonstrates that preventing foreign interference in American 
commerce and foreign policy was, and is, a paramount concern of 
the federal government.  As a result, application of the anti-trust 
laws to either the BDS Movement or its supporters (including, but 
not limited to, unions) would be in keeping with the Claiborne 
Court’s pronouncement that  “the strong governmental interest in 
certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation 
may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and 
association.”342 It would also be consistent with Justice Scalia’s 
positions in the House Legal Analysis regarding the applicability 
of anti-trust laws to foreign boycotts of Israel affecting United 
States commerce. 
Because the EAA Anti-Boycott Law explicitly provides that it 
does not supersede anti-trust laws, any individual, company, or 
union that participates in the BDS Movement’s activities may be 
subject to civil and criminal prosecution and suits may be brought 
by the government as well as by private parties who are affected 
by the boycott participation.343  Justice Scalia’s concluding remark 
in the House Legal Analysis noted that the preferred approach to 
combating the effects of anti-Israel boycotts would be legislative or 
through an executive order (due to the fact that using then-
existing anti-trust laws might have had unpredictable outcomes 
as a result of novel theories that would have to be employed in the 
prosecutions),344 but the potential use of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, in particular, has been established by Congress and the legal 
analysis of a late United States Supreme Court Justice.  
Furthermore, since the House Boycott Report was published the 
underlying threat posed by anti-Israel boycotts has grown from 
one of a primarily commercial and competitive nature to one that 
directly implicates national security and foreign policy.  The need 
for a multi-faceted response, encompassing combined legislative, 
 
 342.  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982).  Since 
individuals and organizations would still be free to protest against Israel 
independently, the prohibition on BDS Movement boycotts would not infringe 
upon core First Amendment rights.  See infra Part III.B for a discussion of 
the Humanitarian Law Project case. 
 343.  See generally Charles Koob & Peter Kazanoff, Private Antitrust 
Remedies Under US Law, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, http://www. 
stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existing-content/publiations/pub 
484.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last visited July 8, 2016).  
 344.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 54. 
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executive and existing statutory resources, is greater today than it 
was in 1976. 
B. RICO and the BDS Movement 
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law and anti-trust laws are powerful 
and effective tools that may be used in response to those who 
participate in the BDS Movement’s unlawful boycotts.  But 
prosecuting those who participate in boycotts contrary to 
American policy is only half of the answer.  The source of the 
boycotts must also be addressed, and one law in particular is 
especially well suited for this task—the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act345 (RICO). 
RICO had its origins in the government’s need for a tool to 
fight organized crime, especially in respect of organized crime’s 
involvement in labor movements, where the leaders of criminal 
organizations were generally immune from prosecution due to the 
attenuated connection they had to the criminal acts that were 
committed on their behalf and at their direction.346  Though a 
primary impetus for the creation of the RICO statute347 was 
organized crime, the true reach of the statute was intended to be 
any enterprise engaging in a pattern of unlawful behavior, 
whether organized crime or not, especially where the top level 
participants were not directly engaging in the criminal 
activities.348  In a RICO prosecution, once a pattern of criminal 
activity is connected to an organization, liability attaches to the 
members of the organization, even if the ringleaders have 
otherwise isolated themselves from being connected to individual 
criminal acts.  RICO has been successfully used to prosecute 
everything from racketeering in professional sports to investment 
fraud.  In the aftermath of the September 11th terror attacks, 
RICO was amended to broaden its scope significantly and to 
provide the government with a wide-ranging weapon to be used 
 
 345.  Pub. L. No. 91–452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1961–1968 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244)). 
 346.  See, e.g., Donald Rebovich, Kenneth Coyle & John Schaaf, Local 
Prosecution of Organized Crime: The Use of State RICO Statutes, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE (Oct. 1993), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/143502N 
CJRS.pdf. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Id. 
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against global terrorist organizations.349 
1. The Elements of a RICO Prosecution 
A simplified overview of a RICO case shows that it is 
comprised of three basic elements: (1) a pattern of racketeering 
activity, (2) by or involving an “enterprise,” and (3) that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce.350  The first step in establishing a 
RICO case is establishing a pattern of racketeering activity (two 
or more offenses will generally suffice to prove that a pattern 
exists).  The RICO statute specifies the activities that are 
racketeering “predicates” for RICO prosecution.  These predicate 
offenses can be put into three general categories: (1) any act or 
threat that is chargeable as one or more of certain enumerated 
felonies under state law, (2) any act that is indictable under 
certain enumerated federal statutes, and (3) any offense involving 
three enumerated categories of federal law.  Unless there is a 
predicate offense from the foregoing list, there can be no RICO 
claim.351 
If a racketing predicate offense is found to exist, the next step 
is to determine whether it is connected to certain prohibited 
conduct.  Professor Pamela Pierson provided a concise overview of 
this step in her recent article RICO Trends: From Gangsters to 
Class Actions: 
The RICO statute is complex.  It applies to a wide range 
of conduct and contains abstract terms not easily 
correlated with everyday experience.  There are four 
types of conduct prohibited by RICO: (1) investing 
 
 349.  Frank Marine, et al., Criminal RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968; A 
Manual for Federal Prosecutors, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 8–9 (5th ed. Oct. 
2009), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/2009rico-manual.pdf 
[hereinafter DOJ RICO Manual]. 
 350.  Civil and criminal RICO cases are quite complicated and hinge on a 
number of determinations that are much more involved than the basic three 
steps outlined above.  This Article is not intended to be a guide to preparing a 
RICO case.  See Koob & Kazanoff, supra note 343, and the DOJ RICO 
Manual, supra note 349 for detailed guidelines on the preparation of private 
and government RICO cases, respectively. 
 351.  See DOJ RICO Manual, supra note 349, at 20–49, for a 
comprehensive listing of the predicate offenses and citations to cases for each 
type of offense.  Naturally, the predicate offense can be prosecuted on its own, 
but the penalties and reach of the RICO statute broadens the efficacy of a 
prosecution that involves a somewhat amorphous group, such as the BDS 
Movement or organized crime. 
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proceeds from a pattern of racketeering activity in an 
enterprise, (2) acquiring or maintaining control over an 
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) 
conducting or participating in the affairs of an enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activity, and (4) 
conspiring to do any of these types of conduct.  Because 
RICO is both a crime and a civil cause of action, it may be 
prosecuted by United States Department of Justice 
prosecutors, criminally or civilly, or it may be brought as 
a civil suit by private individuals who have suffered 
damage to their business or property.  Those convicted of 
RICO crimes face stiff penalties: a possible prison term of 
twenty years, forfeiture of property acquired or 
maintained in violation of RICO, and fines of $250,000 
per offense ($500,000 per offense if the defendant is an 
organization).  Those found civilly liable also face 
significant consequences: treble damages, and payment of 
attorneys’ fees and costs. 
RICO’s civil cause of action, which is available to “[a]ny 
person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation” of RICO requires RICO plaintiffs to prove that 
the defendants committed crimes.  Thus, in addition to 
proving “RICO elements” (“pattern” and “enterprise”) 
private plaintiffs in civil RICO actions must prove the 
elements of the crimes they allege as “racketeering 
activity.”352 
As Professor Pierson notes, a RICO claim can be either civil or 
criminal.353  A civil claim can be brought by either the government 
or a private party who has been harmed by the RICO activity.354  
The basic elements of civil and criminal RICO claims are 
substantially similar, though for a civil claim there need not be a 
showing of criminal intent and the burden of proof is also lower.355  
 
 352.  Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO Trends: From Gangsters to Class 
Actions, 65 S.C. L. REV. 213 (2013) (citations omitted), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179211.   
 353.  Id. at 5. 
 354.  Id. at 4. 
 355.  In a civil RICO proceeding brought by a private party, the potential 
remedy is treble damages; in such a proceeding brought by the government, 
the potential remedies include equitable relief, such as injunctions, 
dissolution of an entity and government supervision of the offending party.  
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If a pattern of racketeering that affects commerce has been found, 
the final step is to determine whether the conduct is part of an 
“enterprise.”  The RICO statute defines an enterprise to include 
“any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other 
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in 
fact although not a legal entity.”356  The statutory list is 
representative, rather than exclusive, and courts have shown 
great latitude in finding that an association is an “enterprise.”357 
In addition, 
it is not necessary to prove “that every member of the 
enterprise participated in or knew about all its activities.”  
Rather, “it is sufficient that the defendant know the 
general nature of the enterprise and know that the 
enterprise extends beyond his individual role.”  Nor is it 
necessary to prove that the enterprise or its members 
acted with criminal intent.358 
A more thorough summary of the elements of RICO claims 
and the standards that have applied in deciding these cases359 is 
outside the scope of this Article and is not necessary to 
understand how RICO can apply to the BDS Movement.  Rather, a 
line of Supreme Court cases arising from abortion clinic protests 
prosecuted under RICO are illustrative of how RICO would be 
used against the BDS Movement’s activities in the United 
States.360 
To set the stage, though, in a RICO prosecution against the 
BDS Movement the two predicate offenses that this Article will 
focus on are violations of the Hobbs Act 361 and violations of 
 
These remedies are mutually exclusive to the respective party bringing suit 
(i.e., the government cannot seek treble damages and the private party may 
not seek equitable relief).  See Frank Marine & Patrice Mulkern, Civil RICO: 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968: A Manual for Federal Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE 26–33 (Oct. 2007), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading 
_room/usam/title9/civrico.pdf [hereinafter DOJ Civil RICO Manual]. 
 356.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 357.  DOJ RICO Manual, supra note 349, at 70–74. 
 358.  Id. at 82–83 (citation omitted). 
 359.  See JED RAKOFF & HOWARD GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
LAW AND STRATEGY (Law Journal Press 2014) for what is arguably the 
definitive guide to RICO.  See also DOJ RICO Manual, supra note 349 and 
DOJ Civil RICO Manual, supra note 355.   
 360.  See NOW I, NOW II, and NOW III, infra note 363. 
 361.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1951 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). The 
Hobbs Act is a federal law that criminalizes extortion and robbery.  The 
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federal laws dealing with providing material support to 
terrorists.362  The category of prohibited conduct that would form 
the basis for a RICO case would be “conducting or participating in 
the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 
activity.”  The BDS Movement’s status as a RICO enterprise 
would be established by showing coordination among the various 
BDS Movement affiliates and with outside organizations. 
2. The NOW Cases and the Hobbs Act 
In the NOW cases,363 abortion providers filed suit against 
individuals and organizations (Activists) who engaged in 
disruptive acts at or near abortion clinics.364  The Activists’ 
objectives included preventing women from having abortions and, 
ultimately, forcing the clinics to shut down.365  RICO was among 
the laws implicated in the attempt to stop the Activists. 
The NOW cases proceeded through various stages of litigation 
for 20 years, resulting in three United States Supreme Court 
decisions that defined the contours of RICO in the context of 
protest activity.  In NOW I, decided in 1994, the United States 
Supreme Court examined the claim that by disrupting the 
operations of abortion clinics the Activists had engaged in an act 
of extortion under the Hobbs Act,366 a predicate racketing offense 
under RICO.367  The applicable provision of the Hobbs Act368 
prohibits, inter alia, any conduct that “obstructs, delays, or affects 
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in 
commerce, by robbery or extortion  
. . . .”369  Extortion is defined as “obtaining of property from 
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or 
 
history and provisions of the Hobbs Act are discussed in detail in NOW I and 
NOW II, infra note 363.   
 362.  18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2339A, 2339B (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–
244).  
 363.  Nat’l Org. of Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) (NOW I); 
Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. of Women, 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (NOW II); Scheidler v. 
Nat’l Org. of Women, 547 U.S. 9 (2006) (NOW III). 
 364.  NOW I, 510 U.S at 249. 
 365.  See generally NOW I, 510 U.S. 249; NOW II, 537 U.S. 393; NOW III, 
547 U.S. 9. 
 366.  NOW I, 510 U.S at 253.  
 367.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 368.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1951 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 369.  § 1951(a) (Westlaw). 
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threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official 
right.”370 
What made the NOW cases unique is the efforts the plaintiffs 
went through to convince the Court that abortion clinic jobs and 
abortion services were a property right that could be extorted by a 
group that did not seek to obtain an economic benefit from such 
rights.371  The Activists did not want to use the extorted property 
for their own purposes, nor did they seek to replace their targets 
as the provider of abortion services.372  The Activists simply 
sought to reduce the availability of abortion services.373 
The NOW I Court first explained that when considering the 
enterprise vehicle through which the extortion is performed, that 
enterprise need not have “an economic motive for engaging in 
illegal activity; it need only be an association in fact that engages 
in a pattern of racketeering activity.”374  The Court continued its 
analysis of the economic element of extortion to find that the effect 
of the extortion on the economy and businesses, rather than a 
financial benefit accruing to the protesters, is what brings the 
activity into the scope of the Hobbs Act.375 
The NOW I defendants argued that their activities were 
political, not economic, and deserved a blanket protection under 
the First Amendment.376  In their concurrence, Justices Kennedy 
and Souter reiterated the principle that being a “protest 
organization” does not shield defendants from RICO liability 
under an extortion predicate and a First Amendment defense 
could certainly be raised, but it could not be said that the 
application of RICO to protest organizations is a per se First 
Amendment violation.377  NOW I established that so long as 
 
 370.  § 1951(b)(2) (Westlaw). 
 371.  NOW II, 537 U.S. 393, 401 (2003). 
 372.  Id. at 405–06. 
 373.  Id. at 406 
 374.  NOW I, 510 U.S. 249, 259 (1994). 
 375.  Id. at 260 (responding to the lower courts’ logic that there was a need 
to prove that the protesters had a self interested economic motive: 
“Respondents and the two Courts of Appeals, we think, overlook the fact that 
predicate acts, such as the alleged extortion, may not benefit the protesters 
financially but still may drain money from the economy by harming 
businesses such as the clinics which are petitioners in this case.”). 
 376.  Id. at 254. 
 377.  Id. at 263–65.  The practical effect of this is that a case brought 
against a protest organization would have to proceed on the merits, thus 
requiring a time consuming and expensive trial.   
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property was obtained, “RICO contains no economic motive 
requirement.”378  The question of whether the deprivation of 
property rights by the Activists constituted the requisite 
“obtaining” of property for purposes of the RICO predicates would 
not be definitely answered until nine years later.379 
The NOW I Court remanded the case to the district court for 
further proceedings in 1994.  On remand, the district court, and 
then the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals answered the question 
of whether the Activists had obtained property.  Both courts found 
that the Activists had obtained the subject property (abortion 
services) and thus had committed extortion under the Hobbs Act 
based upon the following conclusions: (i) the intangible rights to 
obtain and perform abortion services were property for purposes of 
the Hobbs Act and (ii) even if the Activists did not receive “money 
or anything else . . . [a] loss to, or interference with the rights of, 
the victim is all that is required” to constitute obtaining property 
from the victim.380 
In 2003, the case once again returned to the United States 
Supreme Court.  The NOW II Court took issue with the lower 
courts’ determinations and ruled that the Activists had not 
engaged in Hobbs Act extortion since they did not “obtain” the 
property that they were interfering with.381  After acknowledging 
that the purpose of the Hobbs Act was to “use all the 
constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with 
interstate commerce” and to further that purpose the court was 
not to restrictively interpret the law,382 the NOW II Court 
purported to distinguish the law of extortion from that of coercion.  
Deciding that what the Activists had done was more like coercion 
than extortion, the NOW II Court found no Hobbs Act violation in 
the case (since coercion, unlike extortion, is not prohibited under 
the Hobbs Act) and thus no predicate for RICO prosecution.383  
The NOW II Court explained that there must be an acquisition of 
the subject property (which did not occur under its coercion 
theory), as well as a deprivation of it.384 
 
 378.  Id. at 262. 
 379.  NOW II, 537 U.S. 393, 397 (2003).  
 380.  Id. at 399–400. 
 381.  See id. at 402. 
 382.  Id. at 408 (citing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960)). 
 383.  Id. at 409. 
 384.  Id. at 405. 
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In making that argument, the NOW II Court created a 
conflict with precedent as well as the established purpose of the 
Hobbs Act.  Some believe that the NOW II Court’s determination 
that the protests were not a form of extortion under the Hobbs Act 
was sui generis to Supreme Court abortion protest cases;385 
Justice Stevens’ dissent in NOW II clearly indicates as much.386  
Citing a long line of cases that applied Hobbs Act extortion 
provisions to other instances where property rights were 
infringed, though not necessarily acquired, by the extorting party, 
Justice Stevens pointed in particular to lower court cases that 
found Hobbs Act extortion liability to apply to abortion clinic 
protest activity under the theory that an extortionist’s 
interference with property rights constituted “obtaining” property 
under the Hobbs Act.387 
Justice Stevens summed up his disagreement with the 
majority in three points.  First, he believed that if Congress 
disagreed with the Court’s longstanding definition of extortion 
under the Hobbs Act it was up to Congress, and not the courts, to 
amend the law accordingly.388  Second, Congress intended for the 
Hobbs Act to have a broad reach and it was not for the courts to 
artificially restrict that reach.389  Third, and most importantly, 
Justice Stevens, as did Justice Ginsburg, noted that intervening 
1994 enactment of a federal law imposing significant restrictions 
on abortion clinic protests390 had a de facto effect of rendering the 
RICO claim moot and the majority chose to create an extremely 
narrow, fact based distinction (that the case involved coercion and 
not extortion) rather than acknowledge that the claim was 
moot.391  This choice, Justice Stevens argued, would have a 
 
 385.  Emily Elman, Defining the Scope of Extortion Liability After 
Scheidler v. NOW, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 231 (2011) (citing United 
States. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) and United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 
199 (6th Cir. 1991) as examples of sui generis extortion definitions under the 
Hobbs Act and stating that NOW II should be read as sui generis to abortion 
protest cases). 
 386.  See NOW II, 537 U.S. at 415. 
 387.  Id. at 414–15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Arena, 
180 F.3d 380 (2d. Cir. 1999)). 
 388.  See id. at 415. 
 389.  Id. at 416–17. 
 390.  See Freedom of Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–259, 
108 Stat. 694 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 
No. 114–244)) [hereinafter the “FACE Act”]. 
 391.  NOW II, 537 U.S. at 416–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
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chilling effect on legitimate RICO prosecutions.392 
The notion that the NOW II limitation on extortion-based 
RICO prosecutions is sui generis to Supreme Court abortion cases 
is one that has also been endorsed by other federal courts.  Shortly 
after NOW II was decided, in a separate RICO case the Second 
Circuit reverted to precedent that extortion did not require the 
extortionist to acquire the property interest that it had deprived 
its victim of and explicitly stated that, “Supreme Court 
jurisprudence about abortion is sui generis . . . .”393 
This conclusion is supported by the NOW II majority’s 
affirmation that they did not reject “lower court decisions such as 
United States v. Tropiano . . . .”394  In Tropiano, the Second 
Circuit found Hobbs Act extortion liability where a group forced a 
disposal company to give up its right to conduct business.395  As 
Justice Stevens noted in his NOW II dissent, Tropiano held that 
under the Hobbs Act, obtaining property “does not depend upon a 
 
 392.  Id. at 416–17.  Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, in their concurrence, 
stated that the FACE Act provided the legislative response to abortion 
protest issues and feared that if the court were to also find that RICO applied 
it could create an unintentional expansion of RICO’s scope.  In other words, 
the NOW II majority was simply leaving the question of RICO extortion 
applicability for another day under circumstances where another statute did 
not already provided victims with a remedy.  See, e.g., Elman, supra note 385, 
at 238–39.   
 393.  United States v. Porcelli, 404 F.3d 157, 162 (2d. Cir. 2005).  Though 
this RICO case was based on a predicate act of statutory mail fraud, a 
predicate crime distinct from Hobbs Act extortion, the appeal was based on 
the NOW II Hobbs Act interpretation of the element of obtaining money or 
property.  Both the mail fraud statute and the Hobbs Act require that money 
or property be obtained, but the Porcelli Court stated “[u]nder this Court’s 
analysis, the defendant does not need to literally ‘obtain’ money or property 
to violate the statute. The fact that the Hobbs Act and the mail and wire 
fraud statutes contain the word ‘obtain’ does not necessitate imposing 
Scheidler’s construction of a wholly separate statute onto this Court’s pre-
existing construction of the mail fraud statute.” Id.  This conclusory 
explanation followed the Porcelli Court’s statement that Supreme Court 
abortion cases are sui generis, so it logically follows that the decision to limit 
the NOW II Court’s definition of “obtain” solely to abortion cases was in 
keeping with what the Second Circuit understood Supreme Court precedent 
on the matter to be.  As such, the more expansive definition of “obtain” 
(requiring only the deprivation of a property right, rather than a disposition 
of that right as well) from existing precedent should be applied in all cases 
other than Supreme Court cases relating to abortion. 
 394.   NOW II, 537 U.S. at 402 n.6 (citing United States v. Tropiano, 418 
F.2d 1069, 1076 (1969)).  
 395.  Tropiano, 418 F.2d at 1071, 1082–83. 
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direct benefit being conferred on the person who obtains the 
property.”396  Importantly, in Tropiano, it did not matter whether 
or not the extortionist was the entity that directly received the 
financial benefits from the extortion.397 
To the extent that NOW II is sui generis to Supreme Court 
abortion cases, that distinction relates solely to the application of 
extortion principles to abortion clinic protests.  The principle that 
protest activity can be subject to extensive government regulation 
is not within the purportedly sui generis nature of NOW II, and 
the federal law that severely restricts protest activity at abortion 
clinics, the FACE Act, has survived all challenges brought against 
it.398 Since the NOW II Court did not reject Tropiano, the NOW II 
holding must be seen as exceedingly narrow for Hobbs Act 
purposes, limited to the facts of the NOW cases.  A RICO 
prosecution against the BDS Movement with a Hobbs Act 
extortion predicate, therefore, would be properly decided under 
Tropiano with regard to the definition of “obtaining of property” 
under the Hobbs Act.  Several years after NOW II was decided the 
final NOW case came before the Supreme Court.  Because NOW 
III was a case relating to the very narrow question of whether 
violence unrelated to extortion could be a RICO predicate, it is not 
substantively relevant to this Article.399 
a. Reconciling NOW I and NOW II 
How are we to resolve the Supreme Court’s apparent about-
face between NOW I and NOW II?  While it may be true that 
Supreme Court abortion cases are sui generis in some aspects, the 
better explanation is that two months after the Court decided 
NOW I Congress provided a specific remedy to abortion clinic 
 
 396.  Id. at 414–15 (citing United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956)) 
(Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 397.  There were a number of individuals and companies involved in the 
extortion, some of whom did in fact obtain the direct financial benefits from 
the extortion and others who did not.  The court did not distinguish between 
the two in finding a violation of the Hobbs Act, as it focused on the fact that 
the property rights were being deprived.   
 398.  See United States v. Bird, 279 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2003), 
rev’d, 401 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2005) (upholding the constitutionality of the 
FACE Act). 
 399.  The NOW III Court found that violence not related to extortion 
would not be a Hobbs Act violation that could function as a RICO predicate.  
NOW III, 547 U.S. 9, 23 (2006). 
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protests in the form of the FACE Act.  The Supreme Court is well 
known for deciding cases on the narrowest of grounds.  The 
enactment of the FACE Act allowed the Court to avoid a potential 
expansion of RICO while still upholding the principle in NOW I 
that protected abortion clinics from disruptive protests and 
leaving in place Tropiano extortion precedent. 
As the NOW II Court stated, “[w]hatever the outer boundaries 
[of extortion liability under the Hobbs Act] may be, the effort to 
characterize [the Activists’] actions here as an ‘obtaining of 
property from’ [abortion providers and those seeking abortions] is 
well beyond them.”400  The Court left open the possibility that 
under other circumstances there could indeed be Hobbs Act 
extortion liability “based on obtaining something as intangible as 
another’s right to exercise exclusive control over the use of a 
party’s business assets.”401  Since the BDS Movement’s activities 
are directed at disrupting interstate and international commerce 
and depriving a target of its property rights to conduct business, 
they are comfortably within these “outer boundaries” of RICO 
predicates, including the Hobbs Act. 
3. After NOW: RICO Predicates and the BDS Movement 
The NOW cases demonstrate there can be no question that 
RICO may apply to what is otherwise seen as political or protest 
activity.  In ultimately finding that the Activists were not liable 
under RICO for their abortion clinic protest activity, the United 
States Supreme Court decided the case on the merits.402  This is 
critically important, as the Court did not find that political or 
protest speech was absolutely immune from RICO prosecution.403  
In fact, in NOW I, Justices Souter and Kennedy acknowledged 
that First Amendment concerns could only be raised as a defense 
in particular cases.404 
The import of this should not be overlooked.  A RICO case can 
 
 400.  NOW II, 537 U.S. at 402. 
 401.  Id. 
 402.  In other words, the Court did not decide the case on procedural 
grounds, so the legal principle that regulation of abortion clinic protests does 
not violate First Amendment protections is precedential.  Had the Court 
decided the case on other grounds, such as a finding that a party did not have 
standing, the precedential value of the case would have been nil. 
 403.  NOW II, 537 U.S. at 402. 
 404.  NOW I, 510 U.S. 249, 264–65 (1994). 
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be brought against the BDS Movement and it will be up to the 
courts to determine whether the underlying activity is protected 
speech.  By way of example, if the BDS Movement were simply to 
march in public holding signs critical of American support for 
Israel, such action, absent any other factors (such as violence 
emanating from the protesters) would likely be protected and the 
RICO prosecution would fail.  But the BDS Movement’s typical 
activities are not focused on protected First Amendment speech; 
rather, they are geared at promoting secondary and tertiary 
boycotts to inflict economic harm on Israel and its supporters 
while providing support to Israel’s foes.  This objective was 
originally announced as part of the Arab League Boycott 
Declaration of 1945, reiterated at the NGO Durban Conference 
and memorialized in the BDS Manifesto.405 
The BDS Manifesto first bemoans the rise of Israel’s economy 
in the post-Oslo period, noting that, “Israel benefited considerably 
[post-Oslo], particularly in diplomatic and economic terms. 
Financially, it resulted in a six-fold increase in direct foreign 
investment, a jump from $686 million to about $3.6 billion.  In 
1994, Israel’s GDP grew by 6.8% and its exports by 12.6%.”406  
The BDS Manifesto next devotes fifteen pages to a detailed 
analysis of each major sector of Israel’s economy, from agriculture 
to technology to military to tourism,407 and concludes with a 
directed call for a global attack on Israel’s commercial interests: 
The effectiveness of any programme of sanctions aimed at 
a country’s foreign trade will depend upon the degree of 
dependence of its economy on trade with the rest of the 
world. Israel . . . has a vulnerable and volatile economy 
that could feel the impact of coordinated BDS 
campaigns.408 
One need only look at recent BDS Movement activities at 
American ports to see that they are primarily focused on 
interfering with commerce and depriving Israel of its property 
rights in foreign trade.  After preventing a cargo ship with partial 
Israeli ownership from unloading cargo at American ports, local 
affiliates of the BDS Movement proudly hailed the financial harm 
 
 405.  BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 22. 
 406.  Id. 
 407.  Id. at 138–53. 
 408.  Id. at 161. 
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they had inflicted upon Israel: “the Zim boat was delayed from 
coming to port in Tacoma, costing the company approximately 
$500,000.  Blocking the boat puts a dent in the profits being sent 
to power Israel.”409  In fact, a leader in the dockworker’s union 
that facilitated the BDS Movement’s interference with Israeli 
trade in the United States justified the union’s participation by 
stating: “[a]s a longshoreman, I know how critical 
international trade is to the economy . . . I think it is an 
appropriate action against those who have prevented the self-
determination of the Palestinian people and to show solidarity 
with the people of Gaza.”410  There can be no question that the 
goal of the BDS Movement is interference with commerce, the 
very thing that the Hobbs Act and RICO were enacted to combat. 
The NOW plaintiffs had to trace an attenuated logical path to 
establish that abortion protests impermissibly interfered with 
commerce, yet the Supreme Court found the linkage to be 
sufficient.  The NOW plaintiffs alleged that the protest activity 
deprived the abortion clinic workers and clients of their property 
rights to perform or obtain abortion services.  The Activists stated 
that their primary goal was to prevent the abortions from being 
performed.411  There was no evidence adduced that the Activists 
sought to otherwise interfere with the property rights of either the 
service providers or recipients.  The NOW I Court found that an 
economic motive was not necessary to find a Hobbs Act violation 
since the purpose of the Hobbs Act (to prevent interference with 
interstate commerce) was to prevent any interference with 
commerce (and in particular, property rights). 
The BDS Movement, on the other hand, is first and foremost a 
 
 409.  Jill Mangaliman & Katrina Pestaño, Why block the boat? Resistance 
from Ferguson to Palestine to the Philippines, THE SEATTLE GLOBALIST (Aug. 
25, 2014), http://www.seattleglobalist.com/2014/08/25/block-the-boat-pales 
tine-philippines-bds-israel-tacoma/28647. See also Charlotte Silver, 
Protestors block and delay Israeli ships up and down US West Coast, ELEC. 
INTIFADA (Aug. 28, 2014), http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/charlotte-
silver/protestors-block-and-delay-israeli-ships-and-down-us-west-coast (“The 
action originated in Oakland, California, which set a high bar for others to 
follow. Protestors there successfully prevented the unloading of the Zim 
Piraeus container ship for nearly four full days. But other cities’ more modest 
demonstrations were nevertheless successful in temporarily delaying the Zim 
ships from unloading, costing the company hundreds of thousands of 
dollars . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 410.  Mangaliman & Pestaño, supra note 409.   
 411.  NOW II, 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003). 
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movement that seeks to interfere with all commerce that involves 
its target (Israel) through acts that directly and significantly 
interfere with American and international commerce.  Economic 
motive and interference with commerce in the United States are 
at the heart of the BDS Movement’s existence.  Consequently, a 
Hobbs Act claim against the BDS Movement under RICO would 
be colorable (if BDS Movement activities are not seen as a prima 
facie violation of the Hobbs Act) and, under the NOW cases and 
other RICO principles, should easily survive attempts to dismiss 
the claims at a preliminary stage. 
Additionally, the property rights that the BDS Movement 
obtains from Israel provide a benefit to the BDS Movement in two 
distinct ways.  First, since the BDS Movement’s goal is to harm 
Israel in any way possible, the deprivation of revenue and 
commercial markets available to Israel provides the BDS 
Movement with a direct realization of its objectives, which leads to 
more success in recruiting supporters and raising funds, especially 
among more radical constituencies.412  Furthermore, the public 
relations benefit of using American unions and individuals, rather 
than foreign provocateurs, to interfere with commerce involving 
Israel helps the BDS Movement to grow in mainstream influence 
and, therefore, enhances its ability to raise funds globally.  BDS 
Movement fundraising is estimated to be in excess of tens of 
millions of dollars annually.413  At the same time, Israel’s public 
 
 412.  Ahmad Moussalli, a professor at the American University of Beirut 
who specializes in the dynamics of Islamist groups, found that there is a 
tangible benefit from Islamist groups’ extreme actions.  Professor Moussalli 
stated that exceeding societal norms to attack perceived enemies of the 
Islamist movement “gets [the Islamist groups] money, support and recruits 
from around the world.”  Yaroslav Trofimov, Taliban Attack Reflects 
Barbarity Competition Among Jihadists, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2014), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-attack-reflects-barbarity-competition-among-
jihadists-1418841416. 
 413.  See, e.g., Silver, supra note 299 (“Elia says that while organizers are 
content with the victory they set out to achieve, they hope to build their 
coalition: ‘At this point what we want to work on is getting labor on board– 
getting the union to realize this is an issue of social and global justice.’ 
Meanwhile, down the coast in Southern California’s Long Beach port, 
organizers were moved to mobilize an action in the span of only two and a 
half days after witnessing Oakland’s action. ‘Oakland was so amazingly 
successful and it really inspired a lot of people,’ Garrick Ruiz of BDS-Los 
Angeles told The Electronic Intifada. ‘We in Los Angeles wanted to do 
something along the same lines and that’s when the larger coalition came 
together.’”).  In the absence of the collaboration between the BDS Movement, 
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standing is wrongfully harmed and its opportunities in 
commercial, academic, scientific and other endeavors are 
negatively impacted. 
Second, in the eyes of the BDS Movement there are two types 
of commercial enterprises extant: those that support Israel and 
those that oppose (either directly or implicitly) Israel.  By 
depriving Israeli businesses or businesses supportive of Israel of 
commercial opportunities, the BDS Movement rewards other 
businesses with an opening to obtain those newly available 
commercial opportunities.  By doing so, the BDS Movement 
expands its reach and reputation and treats business 
opportunities as a currency that can be showered upon those who 
abide by its anti-Israel agenda.  Unlike the Activists in the NOW 
cases, the BDS Movement both deprives its target of a property 
right and acquires those property rights.414  This type of activity 
 
its United States affiliates and dockworkers’ unions, the costs to the BDS 
Movement of itself creating such levels of interference with Israeli cargo 
handling would have been significant.  The BDS Movement’s funding is 
veiled in secrecy, but it is clear that the more notoriety they achieve and the 
more supporters they gather, the more funding they’ll receive.  See, e.g., 
Edwin Black, Financing Mideast Flames–Confronting BDS and the New 
Israel Fund, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.huffington 
post.com/edwin-black/financing-mideast-flamescb_487 4795.html; NGOs and 
the BDS Movement: Background and Funding, NGO MONITOR (Dec. 16, 2009), 
http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/ngos_and_the_bds_movement_backgroun 
d_funding_and_strategic_options; Gerald Steinberg, Confronting European 
funding for BDS, SCHOLARS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://spme.org/boycotts-divestments-sanctions-bds/confronting-european-fun 
ding-bds/16783/ (“NGO Monitor research has exposed tens of millions of 
Euros provided annually to NGOs via the EU and European governments.  
For more than ten years, this highly politicized NGO funding has been 
allocated for discriminatory anti-Israel warfare through secret processes 
under frameworks for humanitarian aid, democracy and human rights, and 
other universal moral principles.  This money enables the network of 
ostensibly “non-political” organizations to flood the media, universities, 
parliaments and other platforms with a steady flow of anti-Israel 
demonization.”).  Each “successful” BDS Movement activity thus results in 
further funding for the group’s activities. 
 414.  The NOW II Court used a two-part test to determine whether 
property had been obtained. First, there must be a deprivation. Next, there 
must be an acquisition of the property.  NOW II, 537 U.S. 393, 405 (2003).  In 
the NOW cases, there was no question that the Activists had deprived the 
medical staff and the patients of a property right, but since the Activists did 
not exercise any form of control over the property other than to deprive the 
targets of it (in fact, the Activists’ goal was to ensure that no one utilized the 
targeted property rights), the Court saw the activity as more akin to coercion 
than extortion.  In the case of the BDS Movement, however, the property 
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is squarely within the parameters of Tropiano’s Hobbs Act 
extortion calculus and clearly differentiates the BDS Movement’s 
activities from those of abortion clinic protesters under the NOW 
cases.  While the viability of a RICO case with a Hobbs Act 
predicate415 is obvious and strong based on, inter alia, the NOW 
cases, there is another RICO predicate that could be asserted 
against the BDS Movement’s activities: providing material 
support to terrorists in contravention of federal law.416 
4. Material Support to Terrorists as a BDS Movement RICO 
Predicate Offense 
In the mid-1990s, after a deadly increase in the frequency and 
magnitude of terrorist acts, Congress enacted two laws in an 
attempt to interrupt terror support coming from within the United 
States.  These laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B (Material 
Support Laws), were subsequently strengthened after the 
September 11th terror attacks to enhance the penalties for 
violations of the laws and to make enforcement of the laws more 
effective.  In their current formulation, the Material Support Laws 
make it a federal offense to “provide material support or 
resources” in support of terrorist activities or to specific terrorist 
groups.417  As a congressional report succinctly explains: 
 
rights are intrinsically commercial and under any recognized theory of 
commercial markets, eliminating one participant from a market necessarily 
allows for another participant to either enter the market or expand its 
existing share of the market.  In Tropiano, defendant Pellegrino was found 
liable of Hobbs Act extortion even though his activities were for the benefit of 
separate businesses, not his own.  In the same way, the BDS Movement can 
be seen as engaging in extortion from Israeli companies and their supporters 
for the benefit of BDS Movement supporters.   
 415.  See United States v. Porcelli, 404 F.3d 157 (2d. Cir. 2005).  In 
addition to the potential for a RICO prosecution based on a Hobbs Act 
extortion predicate, the Porcelli case shows that, to the extent the BDS 
Movement uses communications via mail, a RICO prosecution could be 
brought based on a predicate crime involving mail fraud.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1341 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).  Since the Porcelli court 
disclaimed the NOW II Court’s more restrictive formulation of “obtaining 
property,” a mail fraud predicate would likely result in a more certain 
prosecution of the BDS Movement’s activities.  See id.  
 416.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(G) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).  
Section 1961(1)(G) incorporates the “material support to terrorists” 
prohibitions of § 2332b(g)(5)(b)(i) as a predicate racketeering act.  The two 
material supports to terrorist prohibitions are contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2339A, 2339B. 
 417.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A prohibits material support for terror activities, 
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The precise scope of the term “material support or 
resources” for purposes of Section 2339B has been a 
source of controversy almost from the beginning. The 
section uses the definition found in Section 2339A(b) and 
thus covers “any property, tangible or intangible, or 
service,” 18 U.S.C. 2339B(g)(4).  The term excludes 
medicine and religious materials, but includes currency 
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial 
services, lodging, training (i.e., instruction  or teaching 
designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general 
knowledge), expert advice or  assistance (i.e., advice or 
assistance derived from scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge), safehouses, false documentation 
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (one or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and 
transportation. 
Section 2339B also has a more explicit description of 
personnel covered by its proscription, which confines the 
term to those provided to a foreign terrorist organization 
to direct its activities or to work under its direction or 
control.418 
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court was called upon to 
examine the constitutionality of one of the Material Support Laws 
in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.419  This case was a pre-
enforcement challenge to the Material Support Laws filed on 
behalf of a group of individuals and institutions (HLP Plaintiffs) 
that sought to provide humanitarian aid to two separate foreign 
groups that had been designated as “foreign terrorist 
organizations” (Named HLP Groups) under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.420 
 
while § 2339B prohibits material support to terror groups.  As a 
congressional research service report explains, “[w]here Section 2339B 
outlaws support of terrorist organizations, Section 2339A outlaws support for 
the crimes a terrorist has or may be planning to commit.  Section 2339B 
designates terrorist organizations; Section 2339A designates terrorist 
crimes.”  CHARLES DOYLE,  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41334,  TERRORIST 
MATERIAL SUPPORT: A SKETCH OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B 1–2 (2010), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41334.pdf.  
 418.  Id. at 1–2. 
 419.  See generally 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 420.  The two groups were “the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (also known as 
the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan or PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
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The HLP Plaintiffs sought to provide the Named HLP Groups 
with monetary and other tangible aid (presumably, materials and 
equipment), legal training, and political advocacy.  In particular, 
the HLP Plaintiffs intended to provide the following support: (1) 
“train[ing] members of [the] PKK on how to use humanitarian and 
international law to peacefully resolve disputes”; (2) “engag[ing] in 
political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in Turkey”; and (3) 
“teach[ing] PKK members how to petition various representative 
bodies such as the United Nations for relief.”  With respect to the 
other plaintiffs, those activities are: (1) “train[ing] members of 
[the] LTTE to present claims for tsunami-related aid to mediators 
and international bodies”; (2) “offer[ing] their legal expertise in 
negotiating peace agreements between the LTTE and the Sri 
Lankan government”; and (3) “engag[ing] in political advocacy on 
behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.”421 
The HLP Plaintiffs alleged that the Material Support Laws 
infringed, inter alia, their First Amendment rights to speech and 
association.  In upholding the Material Support Laws, the United 
States Supreme Court first noted that the law prohibits activity in 
support of an organization that a person knows is a terror 
organization.422  It is not relevant whether the person intended to 
provide support to that organization’s terror activities.  In 
practical terms, this means that as long as a person knows that an 
organization is a terror organization, any material support that 
the person provides to any part of that organization will subject 
him or her to prosecution, even if the support was intended to help 
the organization’s non-terror activities.423  Just as providing 
advocacy and other support to the non-terror arm of the PKK 
subjected the HLP Plaintiffs to prosecution under the Material 
Support Laws, providing those types of support to Hamas’ non-
terror arm (the BDS Movement) would subject BDS Movement 
supporters to the same type of prosecution. 
 
Eelam (LTTE).  The PKK is an organization founded in 1974 with the aim of 
establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.  The 
LTTE is an organization founded in 1976 for the purpose of creating an 
independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka.” Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
at 3 (citation omitted).  This case dealt specifically with 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.  
The same principles should apply to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, but the Court did not 
explicitly rule on that section of the law. 
 421.  Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 9 (citations omitted). 
 422.  Id. at 6. 
 423.  Id. at 11. 
2017] THE BDS MOVEMENT 123 
The Humanitarian Law Project court was careful to 
differentiate permissible activities in relation to terror groups 
from impermissible activities.  Citing to the statute, the Court 
noted that independent advocacy was not implicated by the 
Material Support Laws: “Individuals who act entirely 
independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its 
goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the 
foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.”424  The 
Court reached a similar conclusion with regard to the prohibition 
on provision of “services” under the Material Support Laws:  
The other types of material support listed in the statute, 
including “lodging,” “weapons,” “explosives,” and 
“transportation,” § 2339A(b)(1), are not forms of support 
that could be provided independently of a foreign terrorist 
organization.  We interpret “service” along the same lines.  
Thus, any independent advocacy in which plaintiffs wish 
to engage is not prohibited by § 2339B.  On the other 
hand, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand 
the term “service” to cover advocacy performed in 
coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign 
terrorist organization.425 
Thus, to the extent a service is provided without coordination or 
without benefit to the terror group, it would be outside of Material 
Support Law’s restrictions.  On the First Amendment free speech 
claims overall, the Court dismissed the HLP Plaintiff’s allegations 
and concluded: 
Under the material-support statute, plaintiffs may say 
anything they wish on any topic.  They may speak and 
write freely about the PKK and LTTE, the governments 
of Turkey and Sri Lanka, human rights, and 
international law.  They may advocate before the United 
Nations.  As the Government states: “The statute does 
not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any 
kind.”  Section 2339B also “does not prevent [plaintiffs] 
from becoming members of the PKK and LTTE or impose 
any sanction on them for doing so.”  Congress has not, 
therefore, sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the 
 
 424.  Id. at 18. 
 425.  Id. at 19. 
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form of “pure political speech.”  Rather, Congress has 
prohibited “material support,” which most often does not 
take the form of speech at all.  And when it does, the 
statute is carefully drawn to cover only a narrow category 
of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination 
with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist 
organizations.426 
Moving on to the issue of support for humanitarian activities 
of designated terror groups, the Court concluded that Congress 
had a legitimate reason to not make a distinction in the Material 
Support Laws on this point.  Congress found that “[f]oreign 
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by 
their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an 
organization facilitates that conduct.”427  In particular, the Court 
reasoned: 
Material support meant to “promot[e] peaceable, lawful 
conduct,” can further terrorism by foreign groups in 
multiple ways.  “Material support” is a valuable resource 
by definition.  Such support frees up other resources 
within the organization that may be put to violent ends.  
It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign 
terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for those 
groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—
all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.  “Terrorist 
organizations do not maintain organizational ‘firewalls’ 
that would prevent or deter . . . sharing and commingling 
of support and benefits.”428 
Using the BDS Movement’s affiliate and benefactor, Hamas, 
as an example of how non-terror related support cannot be 
separated from terror-related support,429 the Humanitarian Law 
 
 426.  Id. at 20–21 (citations omitted).   
 427.  Id. at 24 (citing the Congressional Findings and Purpose of the 
Material Support Laws). 
 428.  Id. at 25 (emphasis added to show that Congress intended to prevent 
terror groups from doing public relations outreach in the United States) 
(citations omitted). 
 429.  See id. at 26. The United States Supreme Court was prescient in 
examining how support for Hamas’ non-terror work constituted materially 
supporting terrorism.  Even though Hamas had nothing to do with the 
Humanitarian Law Project case, the Court’s use of Hamas as an example sets 
important guideposts for applying of the Material Support Laws to Hamas 
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Project Court went on to explain: 
Investigators have revealed how terrorist groups 
systematically conceal their activities behind charitable, 
social, and political fronts.  Indeed, some designated 
foreign terrorist organizations use social and political 
components to recruit personnel to carry out terrorist 
operations, and to provide support to criminal terrorists 
and their families in aid of such operations.  Muddying 
the waters between its political activism, good works, and 
terrorist attacks, Hamas is able to use its overt political 
and charitable organizations as a financial and logistical 
support network for its terrorist operations.430 
The Material Support Laws were enacted with a dual 
purpose.  First, they were designed to deny terror groups the 
tangible and intangible support that is needed to carry out terror 
attacks.  Second, and just as important, the laws were enacted for 
policy and diplomatic reasons.  American support for foreign 
terror groups provides those groups with a public relations coup 
and stymies American efforts to coordinate with foreign nations 
who are also fighting against terror.  The Humanitarian Law 
Project Court explained: 
Providing foreign terrorist groups with material support 
in any form also furthers terrorism by straining the 
United States relationships with its allies and 
undermining cooperative efforts between nations to 
prevent terrorist attacks.  We see no reason to question 
Congress’s finding that “international cooperation is 
required for an effective response to terrorism . . . .”  The 
material-support statute furthers this international effort 
by prohibiting aid for foreign terrorist groups that harm 
the United States partners abroad: “A number of 
designated foreign terrorist organizations have attacked 
moderate governments with which the United States has 
vigorously endeavored to maintain close and friendly 
relations,” and those attacks “threaten [the] social, 
economic and political stability” of such governments.431 
 
and other Islamic terror organizations.   
 430.  Id. at 25–26 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 431.  Id. at 27. 
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In enacting the Material Support Laws, as well as the EAA 
Anti-Boycott Law, the United States clearly set out a dividing line 
between the rights of Americans to speak freely on their own 
accord and the right of the United States government to be the 
sole determinant of the country’s foreign policy objectives and 
commercial relations.  This type of reservation of powers to the 
sovereign is one of the foundations of any democratic government. 
a. Do BDS Movement Activities Violate the Material Support 
Laws? 
The BDS Manifesto acknowledges that the BDS Movement 
does not disclaim terrorism against Israel.432  Rather, the BDS 
Manifesto proclaims that the BDS Movement is simply one arm of 
the Palestinian Arab “resistance” and it is but one part of the 
overall “resistance” strategy employed against Israel.433  Hamas, 
an organization named under the Material Support Laws as a 
foreign terrorist organization, is reportedly connected to the 
establishment of the BDS Movement, shares numerous objectives 
and philosophies with the BDS Movement and is properly seen as 
coordinating and affiliating with the BDS Movement.434  Whether 
or not there are formal operational and financial ties between 
Hamas (or other named foreign terrorist organizations) and the 
BDS Movement is something that can only be determined through 
 
 432.  BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 14 (“BDS movements, no matter 
how powerful, cannot and should not look to replace the resistance and 
struggle of those people they are trying to support.”).  Resistance is a 
synonym for violence, as the BDS Manifesto implicitly acknowledges that, 
“the Palestinian struggle has evolved over the decades as an expression of the 
Palestinians, who challenge the occupation and use the means available to a 
subjugated people to seek the attainment of their rights.  The Palestinian 
struggle cannot be so simply defined as violent or non-violent; it brings 
together a variety of strategies in its path of resistance.” Id. at 11.  In fact, 
the name “Hamas” is an acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement” and 
Hamas itself has become a synonym for terrorism directed at Jews and 
Israel. 
 433.  See id. at 11. 
 434.  See Dan Diker, Unmasking BDS: Radical Roots, Extremist Ends, 
JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS, http://jcpa.org/unmasking-bds/ (last visited 
July 6, 2016); see also Israel Imperiled: Threats to the Jewish State, Joint 
Hearing Before H. Foreign Affairs Comm., H. Subcomm. on Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, and Trade, and H. Subcomm. on the Middle East and 
North Africa, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Jonathan Schanzer, Vice 
President, Research Foundation for Defense of Democracies, detailing ties 
between supporters of Hamas and supporters of the BDS Movement). 
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the legal discovery process, as neither organization is forthcoming 
about their respective inner workings, but the threshold 
connections between the two are manifest and support the 
presumption that the two organizations coordinate with each 
other for purposes of the Material Support Laws.435 
Indeed, there is precedent for both the government and 
private parties filing suit against Hamas front organizations that 
are purportedly focused solely on humanitarian or charitable 
objectives.  In a series of cases brought by the United States and 
individuals who were harmed by Hamas’s terrorist acts, a Hamas 
front organization was permanently disbanded, monetary fines 
were imposed and the responsible individuals were sentenced to 
long prison terms.436  Though this case was brought under a 
 
 435.  In addition to the explicit Hamas endorsement of the BDS 
Movement’s activities, the website of Hamas’s armed faction (Ezzedeen Al-
Qassam Brigades) has published frequent calls to support the boycott of 
Israel. See, e.g., Khudari calls for activating international boycott of Israel, 
AL-QASSAM (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.qassam.ps/news-8037-Khudari_ 
calls_for_activating_international_boycott_of_Israel.html; Resheq: Expand 
the boycott of Israeli goods campaign, AL-QASSAM (May 1, 2012), http://www. 
qassam.ps/news-5655-Resheq_Expand_the_boycott_of_Israeli_goods_campai 
gn.html (“Member of Political Bureau Hamas, Ezzat Resheq called to expand 
the boycott Zionist products campaign . . . .”); Hamas urges states to boycott 
Israel, end siege, AL-QASSAM (June 1, 2010), http://www.qassam.ps/news-
2918-Hamas_urges_states_to_boycott_Israel_end_siege.html; Boycotting 
Israeli and American Goods, AL-QASSAM (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.qassam. 
ps/news-17-Boycotting_Israeli_and_American_ Goods.html (issuing a fatwa 
to “organize cells to build a boycott” against Israel and the United States). 
 436.  In what are known as the “Holy Land Foundation” cases, the United 
States first designated a Hamas front group named the Holy Land 
Foundation as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” froze its assets and 
ultimately obtained criminal convictions against its principals, resulting in 
decades-long prison sentences. Holy Land Found for Relief & Dev. v. 
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (relating to the asset freeze).  See 
generally United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011) (relating 
to the criminal prosecution of individuals).  See also Federal Judge Hands 
Downs Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 
27, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-judge-hands-downs-sentences 
-holy-land-foundation-case (two of the Holy Land Foundation principals each 
received sentences of 65 years).  After the government’s action commenced, 
American citizens who were harmed by Hamas’s terrorist activities filed suit 
against certain Hamas front organizations in the United States, including the 
Holy Land Foundation, under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (providing a civil cause of 
action for American victims of global terrorism), alleging that the front 
groups aided and abetted Hamas through their charitable and humanitarian 
activities in the United States.  The plaintiffs were awarded damages of 
$156,000,000.  Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (N.D. 
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different anti-terrorism law, the precedent of finding a front group 
liable for aiding and abetting the parent terrorist group’s 
activities, especially a Hamas front group operating in the United 
States, should not be overlooked. 
Under the Material Support Laws, material support is defined 
as the provision of “any property, tangible or intangible, or 
service . . . except medicine or religious materials.”437  The BDS 
Movement’s activities are easily classified as a service to Hamas, 
as Hamas has called for a boycott of Israel and the BDS 
Movement coordinates with Hamas for the implementation of that 
boycott.  By providing this service to Hamas, the BDS Movement 
frees Hamas’s assets from being used for boycott promotion, 
allowing them to be used for its terror activities instead, in exactly 
the way that the Humanitarian Law Project Court described the 
HLP Plaintiffs providing advocacy and other services material 
support to the two named terror groups allowed those terrorist 
organizations to free up resources for violent acts. 
Moreover, since the BDS Movement’s terror affiliations have 
not yet become known to the public in the United States, there is 
likely greater public acceptance of the boycott under the BDS 
Movement name than would be possible if a direct tie to Hamas 
were known.  Providing an untainted cover for Hamas’ activities 
and enrolling new supporters for Hamas’ anti-Israel propaganda 
campaign are properly characterized as services to Hamas.  Put 
another way, if Hamas were to hire public relations and lobbying 
firms to do exactly what the BDS Movement does with regard to 
anti-Israel advocacy in the United States, there is no question 
that the firms’ activities would be considered a service to Hamas. 
Furthermore, since the BDS Movement’s activities result in a 
deprivation of property rights from Israeli companies and their 
supporters, the corresponding shift in commercial activity438 to 
 
Ill. 2004), vacated sub nom. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 
F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009).  See generally Laura B. Rowe, Ending 
Terrorism with Civil Remedies: Boim v. Holy Land Foundation and the 
Proper Framework of Liability, 4 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 372 (2009) (providing 
more information on the Holy Land Foundation civil cases); Adam N. 
Schupack, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Civil Litigation Against Terrorism, 
60 DUKE L.J. 207 (2010) (also providing more information on the Holy Land 
Foundation civil cases). 
 437.  18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 438.  See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 105–07 (discussing the 
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non-Israeli companies or companies that support the boycott is a 
transfer of property rights.  In this way, those who participate in 
the boycott create commercial rewards for companies that are 
either sympathetic to anti-Israel terrorism or that are favored by 
such terror groups.  Thus, it can also be said that the BDS 
Movement is providing property in support of Hamas. 
Because Hamas is a designated foreign terrorist 
organization,439 the foregoing analysis of the types of material 
support the BDS Movement provides to Hamas demonstrates that 
there is a colorable case to be made that the BDS Movement’s 
activities are in violation of § 2339B of the Material Support Laws.  
It is also likely that the BDS Movement’s formative connection to 
Iran440 (and Iran’s terrorism proxy in Lebanon, Hezballah, which 
is also a designated foreign terrorist organization) and other 
designated foreign terrorist organizations would provide the basis 
for prosecution under § 2339B. 
While it is clear that the inspiration for the BDS Movement 
originated in Iran,441 the ongoing ties between Iran and the BDS 
Movement have been obfuscated by the parties.  Indeed, the ties 
between Iran and the BDS Movement are likely much deeper than 
the fact that the BDS Movement originated at the Tehran regional 
meeting as part of Durban I.  In November 2014, Iran’s Supreme 
Leader,442 Ayatollah Ali Khameni, published a document that was 
 
financial impact of the boycott). 
 439.  Hamas was added to the foreign terrorist organization list in 1997.  
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov 
/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.   
 440.  See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 105. 
 441.  The BDS Manifesto does acknowledge that the BDS Movement 
originated at Durban I.  BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 40 (“The first 
important move from global civil society came in August–September 2001, 
during the NGO Forum of the UN World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination and Related Intolerances in Durban, South Africa.  Tens of 
thousands of people converged for the meeting, with Palestine one of the most 
prominent causes.  A resolution was passed pressing for the isolation of Israel 
and denouncing its racist nature and policies.”).  Durban I’s anti-Israel 
agenda is documented to have been devised at the regional meeting held in 
Iran prior to Durban I.  See Durban III Conference Opens in New York Amid 
Allegations of anti-Israel Bias, HAARETZ (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.haaretz. 
com/israel-news/durban-iii-conference-opens-in-new-york-amid-allegations-of-
anti-israel-bias-1.386116.   
 442.  The “Supreme Leader” is the most powerful religious and political 
office in the Republic of Iran and is responsible for appointing the leaders of 
the military, judiciary and civil government.   
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unsettlingly similar to the BDS Manifesto’s core principles.  The 
document was titled “9 Key Questions About Elimination of 
Israel” (sic) and was posted on Khameni’s government website.443  
Though Khameni’s position paper was significantly less verbose 
than the BDS Manifesto, the essence of his call to action is the 
same as the BDS Manifesto’s.  Khameni first brands Israel as a 
criminal regime, then asserts that any Jewish state is illegitimate 
and must be eliminated and replaced by a state that is controlled 
by the “original people of Palestine.”444  Just like the BDS 
Manifesto, Khameni’s paper proclaims that Jews who were in the 
diaspora prior to the founding of the modern state of Israel should 
be ethnically cleansed from the new Palestinian Arab state that 
will replace Israel, with such Jews to be “return[ed] to their home 
countries.”445  Until such time that Israel can be eliminated as a 
 
 443.  The document was also posted to Khameni’s twitter account on 
November 9, 2014. Why should & how can #Israel be eliminated? Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s answer to 9 key questions, TWITTER (Nov. 9, 2014), 
https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/531366667377717248 [hereinafter 
Khameni Manifesto].  See also Antonia Molloy, Iran’s supreme leader 
Ayatollah Khamenei outlines plan to ‘eliminate’ Israel, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 10, 
2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/irans-supreme-
leader-ayatollah-khamenei-outlines-plan-to-eliminate-israel-9850472.html.  
 444.  Khameni Manifesto, supra note 443, at point 3. 
 445.  Id. at point 4.  The desire to ethnically cleanse Israel of all Jews is 
made clear by Khameni’s description of who the “original people of Palestine” 
are.  The modern state of Israel exists on a portion of what was historically 
the “Land of Israel” as described in the Bible.  Over the course of centuries, 
the Jewish residents of that land were either massacred or forcibly dispersed 
across the globe into what was known as the Jewish Diaspora (i.e., Jews from 
the Land of Israel who were relocated to other countries or regions).  
Khameni lists the original people of Palestine to include “Muslims, 
Christians[,] and Jews,” but he then excludes any Jew who emigrated to 
Palestine.  Id. at point 3.  Since Christianity was founded in approximately 
33 A.D. and Islam was founded in approximately 622 A.D., the original 
people of Palestine, as between the three peoples listed, must be Jews, since 
Judaism predates both other religions (having been founded in approximately 
1300 B.C., roughly 2,000 years earlier than Islam).  Yet Khameni allows for 
Muslims who lived outside of modern Israel to be considered an original 
people of Palestine, yet excludes Jews who lived outside of Palestine.  A 
review of historical demographic data of the land that is now modern Israel 
explains why Khameni cherry picks in this way.  Prior to the founding of 
Christianity, the estimated population of the land that is modern Israel was 
between 1 million and 2.5 million, with a vast majority of the inhabitants 
being Jewish and none being Christian or Muslim.  Only after the founding of 
Christianity, and then Islam, and the corresponding purges of Jews from the 
land, did Jewish populations represent less than a majority.  See Sergio 
DellaPergola, Demographic Trends in Israel and Palestine: Prospects and 
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Jewish state, Khameni calls for “powerful confrontation” and 
“resolute” resistance.446  Like the BDS Movement, Khameni 
refuses to accept a two-state solution, insists upon a Muslim state 
replacing Israel447 and embraces both violent and non-violent 
“resistance” to undermine and weaken Israel.  The BDS 
Manifesto’s objectives parallel those of not just Iran but of 
virtually every other radical Islamist organization.  The 
coordinated agendas of these organizations and countries cannot 
be mere coincidence. 
Again, only a thorough legal discovery process can definitively 
conclude whether the BDS Movement is a front for these illegal 
terrorist organizations and their sponsors, but one recent report 
has shown that the BDS Movement’s own list of organizations 
that were responsible for its formation included: 
[I]llegal associations, terror organizations, and their 
affiliates, such as the Council of National and Islamic 
Forces in Palestine, which is a coordination forum for all 
Palestinian terror organizations in their ongoing fight 
against Israel.  This forum includes Hamas, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian 
Liberation Front (acknowledged as a terrorist 
organization by the U.S., EU, and Canada) and 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (acknowledged as a terrorist 
organization by the U.S., EU, UK, Japan, Australia, and 
Canada).448 
 
Policy Implications, 103 AMERICAN JEWISH YEARBOOK 3, 10, 11 (2003), 
http://www.bjpa.org/Publications/details.cfm?Publication ID=14672.   
 446.  Khameni Manifesto, supra note 443, at point 6. 
 447.  Neither the BDS Manifesto nor the Khameni Manifesto is forthright 
with its call for replacing Israel with a Muslim state, but if their objectives 
are achieved, a fortiori, that is exactly what would result.  Muslims make up 
over 80% of the current Arab population of Israel, so it follows that any 
Palestinian Arab state would have a similar constituency. 
 448.  Adam Shay, Manipulation and Deception: The Anti-Israel “BDS” 
Campaign (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions), JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. 
AFFAIRS (Mar. 19, 2012), http://jcpa.org/article/manipulation-and-deception-
the-anti-israel-bds-campaign-boycott-divestment-and-sanctions/#sthash.E4n 
S2Rcf.dpuf.  Further ties between the BDS Movement and designated foreign 
terrorist organizations were outlined in a 2014 report:  
Letters of support [for the BDS Movement’s formation] were 
accepted from senior figures in various PLO factions, such as Abu 
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Even if the ties between the BDS Movement and designated 
foreign terrorist organizations are not sufficiently demonstrable 
for a § 2339B prosecution, prosecution under § 2339A could 
proceed based on the types of support the BDS Movement provides 
with respect to terrorism generally.449  The BDS Movement is 
thus susceptible to government prosecution under either § 2339A 
or § 2339B without regard to RICO and, using violations of either 
of these laws as RICO predicates, both private plaintiffs (since 
there is a private right of action under RICO) as well as the 
government may bring civil or criminal (in the case of the 
government) RICO actions against the BDS Movement and its 
supporters.450  Potential remedies as a result of a successful case 
 
Maher Ghneim, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee; Ahmed 
Saadat, Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP); Rakad Salem, Secretary-General of the Arab 
Liberation Front (ALF); and Jamil Shahada, Secretary-General of 
the Palestinian Arab Front (PAF); as well as from many trade 
unions in Europe, South Africa, Canada, Australia, and the United 
States.  Finally, the conference called for the continuation of the 
BDS campaign until the three obligations mentioned above were 
fulfilled. 
In September 2011, following President Abbas’ speech at the United 
Nations, Dr. Sabri Saydam, the president’s adviser on high-tech 
affairs, revealed Palestinian plans for the coming months: to use 
weapons that were made available by modern technology—recruit 
and develop social networks in order to organize campaigns for 
boycotts of Israeli goods; apply more pressure on the Israeli academy 
by asking universities in countries supporting the Palestinian cause 
to cut their ties with these institutions; organize demonstrations 
with more attendees; and strengthen the relations between various 
solidarity groups, so they can better communicate and listen to each 
other and not fall under specific factions. 
Ehud Rosen, What is the Real BDS Endgame? The Elimination of Israel, 
JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://jcpa.org/article/what-
is-the-real-bds-endgame/#sthash.zhZ0b4fS.dpuf.  
 449.  Because § 2339A requires the defendant to have an intention to 
further specific terrorist activities, prosecution of the BDS Movement under 
this section would be more complicated and less certain.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2339A(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).  Section 2339B only 
requires that the defendant provide material support to a designated 
terrorist organization, without regard to whether the defendant intended for 
a terrorist act to be committed.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (Westlaw).  
Section 2339A does not require that a designated foreign terrorist 
organization be involved, which in some cases may make a prosecution under 
that section more certain (where there is ample evidence that the defendant 
intended to provide support to a terrorist attack by individuals not affiliated 
with a designated foreign terrorist group).  See § 2339A(a) (Westlaw).   
 450.  To the extent they have RICO statutes, individual states may also be 
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or prosecution include monetary fines (including treble damages 
and legal fees), injunctive relief, forfeiture, and imprisonment. 
C. NOW, Policy, and the BDS Movement 
The NOW cases demonstrate that protests and boycotts like 
those of the BDS Movement are not per se protected speech.  To 
the extent such activities interfere with commerce and involve 
property deprivation, which is the proclaimed purpose of the BDS 
Movement’s actions, those activities may be prosecuted as Hobbs 
Act and RICO violations.  In addition, since the BDS Movement’s 
activities are intended to provide material support to terrorist 
organizations, they may constitute RICO offenses under the 
Material Support Laws, in accord with the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Humanitarian Law Project.  Read in conjunction with the Holy 
Land Foundation cases,451 Humanitarian Law Project and the 
NOW cases provide a solid foundation on which to make a case 
that the activities of the BDS Movement are not protected by the 
First Amendment and are indeed actionable in cases brought by 
either the United States government or private individuals under 
extortion statutes (including the Hobbs Act) and the Material 
Support Laws, individually, and as predicates for a RICO 
prosecution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The objective of the BDS Movement, as set forth in the BDS 
Manifesto and its countless public statements, is to disrupt 
commerce in the United States as a means of inflicting economic 
harm on a United States ally.  The purpose of the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law, anti-trust laws and RICO (and its predicates) is to 
protect American commerce and to prevent Americans from being 
coerced into participating in foreign conflicts in contravention of 
United States’ policy.  While the First Amendment generally 
protects the right to engage in a wide variety of protest activities, 
as the Claiborne Court explained generally,452 and the 
 
able to bring RICO actions against the BDS Movement.   
 451.  See generally Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 
F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885 
(N.D. Ill. 2004), vacated sub nom. Boim, 511 F.3d 707, vacated, 549 F.3d 685, 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009); United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 
(5th Cir. 2011). 
 452.  458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982). 
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Humanitarian Law Project and NOW Courts held specifically, the 
First Amendment is not absolute.453 
It may be the case, as others have argued,454 that the federal 
government sometimes acts in ways that are outside of its 
constitutional authority.  Yet, even in light of such complaints, the 
general authority of the federal government to regulate commerce 
and conduct foreign affairs has never been successfully 
questioned.455  The primacy of federal government authority in 
these two areas can be traced back to the founding documents of 
this nation, where James Madison opined that: “[the power to 
regulate commerce and relations with foreign nations] forms an 
obvious and essential branch of the federal administration.  If we 
are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect 
of other nations.”456 
Madison’s point was that the rights of individuals under the 
nascent American system may be sacrosanct in virtually all other 
matters, but for the United States to operate as a sovereign nation 
among other sovereign nations the control of foreign policy had to 
be vested exclusively in the hands of the federal government.457  
 
 453.  Holder v.  Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010); NOW 
III, 547 U.S. 9, 17 (2006). 
 454.  See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, THE LIBERTY AMENDMENTS: RESTORING THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1st ed. 2013).  In arguing for a series of constitutional 
amendments to return the government to the founding principles of limited 
power, Levin chronicles the gradual expansion of the federal government 
from “[w]hat was to be a relatively innocuous federal government, operating 
from a defined enumeration of specific grants of power . . . [to] . . . an ever-
present and unaccountable force.” Id. at 6. The enumerated grants of power 
that Levin refers to are contained in Article I of the Constitution and include 
the power to regulate commerce and the power to regulate affairs with 
foreign nations.  These powers are the ones that are directly implicated by 
the BDS Movement’s activities.  Id.  
 455.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 456.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 260 (James Madison).  
 457.  There is some tension between the rights of individual states and the 
supremacy of the federal government’s role in foreign affairs, but even to the 
extent states may have some residual powers to act in the periphery of 
foreign affairs, it has never been the case that individuals or non-
governmental entities have had any power superior to the federal 
government’s in the realm of the conduct of foreign affairs.  The Constitution 
vests the government, not individuals, with the power to conduct foreign 
affairs.  See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–14 (2003) 
(citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)):  
There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of 
state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the 
National Government’s policy, given the “concern for uniformity in 
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Individuals and groups, particularly those with ties to foreign 
concerns agitating against American interests, may not 
undermine this exclusive federal power.  By acting on its own in 
contravention of United States’ foreign policy to impose foreign 
boycotts and other sanctions in the United States, the BDS 
Movement undermines United States foreign policy and interferes 
with the functioning of domestic commercial markets. 
Humanitarian Law Project can be seen as outlining the 
contours of constitutional government powers in the context of 
inherent individual rights that are protected by the First 
Amendment: at the intersection of a legitimate government 
interest in regulating an area of foreign affairs and the desire of 
individuals or non-governmental entities to advocate in that area 
in a way that interferes with the government’s interests, the 
government’s interest must prevail. 
The United States government has enacted a number of laws, 
including the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and the Material Support 
Laws, that evince its intention to be the sole arbiter of American 
tolerance for foreign boycotts involving American businesses and 
individuals as well as what kinds of support, if any, may be 
provided to foreign organizations that may be connected to 
 
this country’s dealings with foreign nations” that animated the 
Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the 
National Government in the first place.  
See also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381–82 n.16 
(2000) (“[T]he peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a 
part.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, pp. 535–36 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) 
(Alexander Hamilton)); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, p. 299 (James Madison) 
(emphasizing “the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to 
foreign powers”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, p. 279 (James Madison) (“If we are 
to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other 
nations”).  See also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 511 (2008) (“The conduct 
of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution 
to the Executive and Legislativee—‘the political’—Departments.”) (citing 
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)); Japan Line, Ltd. v. 
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (negative Foreign Commerce 
Clause protects the National Government’s ability to speak with “one voice” 
in regulating commerce with foreign countries (alteration in original)); First 
Nat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 (1972) 
(plurality opinion) (act of state doctrine was “fashioned because of fear that 
adjudication would interfere with the conduct of foreign relations”); Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“Our system of government is such that 
the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the 
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the 
field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.”). 
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terrorism.  If American commerce is to be used as a weapon 
against foreign countries, it is up to the United States 
government, not an organization affiliated with and controlled by 
foreign nations and terrorists, to make that decision and then to 
outline the methodology for its implementation.  The BDS 
Manifesto asserts that the BDS Movement is an anti-apartheid 
movement and on this basis the National Lawyers Guild assures 
the BDS Movement that it is on firm legal ground to operate in 
the United States.  Based on these overt and other implied 
assurances, a number of individuals and organizations, including 
unions, have been lured into supporting the BDS Movement 
without fully understanding the potential liability for their 
participation. 
As Mark Twain famously said, “a lie can travel halfway 
around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes.”  The 
BDS Movement and its supporters have certainly tried to 
legitimize their agenda by repeating the lie that Israel is an 
apartheid state, but repeating an unfounded and self-serving 
accusation does not make it so.  Richard Goldstone, author of a 
critical United Nations’ report on Israel and a former justice of the 
South African Constitutional Court during the apartheid era, 
dismantled the apartheid libel in a 2011 New York Times 
editorial: 
In Israel, there is no apartheid.  Nothing there comes 
close to the definition of apartheid under the 1998 Rome 
Statute: “Inhumane acts . . .  committed in the context of 
an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and 
domination by one racial group over any other racial 
group or groups and committed with the intention of 
maintaining that regime.”  Israeli Arabs—20 percent of 
Israel’s population—vote, have political parties and 
representatives in the Knesset and occupy positions of 
acclaim, including on its Supreme Court.  Arab patients 
lie alongside Jewish patients in Israeli hospitals, 
receiving identical treatment.458 
The fact that the BDS Movement’s actions against Israel are 
based on a libel discredits the movement as a whole.  Indeed, the 
 
 458.  Richard J. Goldstone, Israel and the Apartheid Slander, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/opinion/israel-and-the-
apartheid-slander.html?_r=0.  
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BDS Movement’s connections to global terrorist organizations 
provide ample reason to deny it the opportunity to further its 
objectives with American support.  Yet, when it comes to the 
application and enforcement of United States laws, more 
important than opinions and accusations are precedent and policy.  
United States policy was opposed to South African apartheid and 
Congress enacted a law imposing sanctions on South Africa until 
such time as the apartheid system was dismantled.459  Not only 
has the United States not declared Israel to be an apartheid state 
or imposed sanctions on Israel, the EAA Anti-Boycott Law 
explicitly announced that, “[i]t is the policy of the United States to 
oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed 
by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United 
States or against any United States person.”460  This law was 
specifically enacted in opposition to the Arab boycott of Israel and 
the policy statement reflects American policy in support of, not in 
opposition to, Israel. 
The BDS Movement, however, in its short history has proven 
to be adept at getting issues wrong, and it has erred 
monumentally in asserting that its activities are legal by virtue of 
its own hijacking of the anti-apartheid label and history.  The 
United States opposes, rather than supports, sanctions against 
Israel.  Israel is a longstanding and important ally of the United 
States.  United States law and policy supports unfettered 
commercial relations with Israel.  And, as this Article has 
demonstrated, the BDS Movement’s activities against Israel are in 
violation of United States laws. 
Far from being an anti-apartheid movement, the BDS 
Movement seeks to impose a form of ethnic cleansing in the 
Middle East by eliminating the sole exception to Arab and Islamic 
hegemony in the region.  In all regards, United States law and 
policy is in opposition to the objectives and activities of the BDS 
Movement.  To illustrate how strong the case against the BDS 
Movement is, it is worth returning to the quote from Claiborne 
that appeared at the beginning of this Article:  “Secondary 
boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited, as part 
of Congress’ striking of the delicate balance between union 
 
 459.  Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–440, 100 
Stat. 1086 (1986) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5001 (repealed Nov. 1993)).  
 460.  50 U.S.C.A. § 4602(5)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).   
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freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers, 
employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced 
participation in industrial strife.”461  If “coerced participation in 
industrial strife” was a basis for countenancing the government’s 
prohibition on secondary boycotts, coerced participation in 
international strife should be no less of a basis for the prohibition 
of cooperation with the BDS Movement. 
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law, antitrust laws, and RICO are all 
common sense, reasonable and narrow regulations of speech that 
further the important goal of promoting American foreign policy 
objectives and commerce.  As Justice Stevens noted in Claiborne, a 
boycott, especially one that is secondary, loses its First 
Amendment protections when it is “designed to secure aims that 
are themselves prohibited by a valid state law.”462  Congress and 
various states have made it clear that foreign boycotts of Israel 
cannot be tolerated.  Enforcement of these laws clearly supersedes 
any First Amendment rights that may be claimed in connection 
with participation in the BDS Movement.463 
In fact, in some cases, such as labor union participation in the 
BDS Movement’s activities, government enforcement of the laws is 
essential.  Labor unions often have a de-facto monopoly on the 
supply of labor in critical industries, such as cargo handling, 
granted with the government’s imprimatur.464  In other cases, 
unions are allowed to represent public sector employees, such as 
university employees.  In the case of unions whose members are 
employed by government entities, such as universities, there is 
clearly a conflict between public funding of the underlying 
employers and employee participation in illegal foreign boycotts.  
This, in effect, compels all taxpayers to fund (and thus participate 
in) a campaign that not only may be against an individual 
taxpayer’s beliefs, is contrary to American foreign policy.  Having 
given unions unparalleled power over broad segments of labor 
activity,465 government acquiescence to union contravention of 
 
 461.  458 U.S. 886, 912 (alteration in original).  
 462.  Id. at 915. 
 463.  See, e.g., Trane Co. v. Baldridge, 552 F. Supp. 1378, 1387–88 (D.W.D. 
Wis. 1983) (finding that the EAA Anti-Boycott Law advanced a substantial 
government interest and was narrowly drawn, thus it did not violate First 
Amendment rights). 
 464.  See Morgan O. Reynolds, Labor Unions, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF ECON., http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/LaborUnions.html. 
 465.  See Edward S. Mason, The Monopolistic Power of Labor Unions, 79 
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United States foreign affairs and commercial policy would be a 
breach of public trust and potentially a violation of the 
Constitutional non-delegation doctrine.466 
 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 161 (1959) (giving an overview of how unions monopolize 
labor markets under government authority); see also Robert H. Lande & 
Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Reducing Unions’ Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits, 
28 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1985).  See also Marla Dickerson, Louis Sahagun & Dan 
Weikel, Ports Get Back to Business, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2002), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/10/business/fi-ports10 (giving an example 
of the dockworkers unions domination of the labor market for cargo handling 
and describing union officials as hand-selecting those who are allowed to 
work at ports and preventing anyone outside of the union’s favor from being 
allowed to work). “[U]nion bosses, and the security guards who blocked the 
iron gates of the hiring hall, dissuaded the longshore hopefuls. The only 
workers allowed in were those with ‘casual cards’ designating them as 
members of the formal pool of laborers who take the dock jobs unfilled by 
union members. Most hope to join the union when there is an opening.  
‘People without a casual card, go home. You’re not going to get a job today,’ 
came a voice over a loudspeaker. ‘For the rest of you guys, welcome back.’”  
Id.   
 466.  The non-delegation doctrine proscribes congressional delegations of 
power outside of the boundaries set by the Constitution.  See Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989).  “The nondelegation doctrine is 
rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite 
system of Government.  The Constitution provides that ‘[a]ll legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,’ 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, and we long have insisted that ‘the integrity and 
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution’ 
mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to 
another Branch.”  Id.  In the case of unions using a government granted 
monopoly to exercise foreign and commercial policy powers reserved 
exclusively for the government, the delegation of power would have been to a 
non-government entity, rather than another branch of government.  Such a 
delegation to an unaccountable, private entity would clearly violate non-
delegation doctrine principles.  See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“We open our discussion with a 
principle upon which both sides agree: [f]ederal lawmakers cannot delegate 
regulatory authority to a private entity. To do so would be ‘legislative 
delegation in its most obnoxious form.’”) (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 
U.S. 238, 311 (1936)).  See generally Alexander Volokh, The New Private-
Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust 
Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931 (2014) (making an argument that 
the issue in a case such as this should be governed by the Due Process 
Clause, rather than under non-delegation doctrine).  Under either Due 
Process or non-delegation doctrines, the delegation of foreign policy and 
commercial regulatory authority to not only a private entity, but a foreign 
private entity, would be uncontrovertibly a violation of fundamental notions 
of federalism and constitutionalism.  If there are to be boycotts of or sanctions 
against a foreign country promoted in the United States, that is a matter for 
the federal government, and only the federal government, to decide, as it has 
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The EAA Anti-Boycott Law, in particular, provides a broad 
remedy for domestic propagation of illegal foreign boycotts.  By its 
terms, the EAA Anti-Boycott Law prohibits any individual from 
acting with an “intent to comply with, further, or support any 
boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign country.”  Individual 
Americans who act to further or support the BDS Movement’s 
activities, even if they do not comply with the boycott dictates 
themselves, are subject to the prohibitions of the EAA Anti-
Boycott Law.  As a result, those who encourage others to 
participate in BDS Movement boycotts can be found to be in 
violation of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law without need to show that 
such individuals participated in any boycott activity on their own. 
Claims that the EAA Anti-Boycott Law does not apply to the 
BDS Movement due to the fact that the BDS Movement is not an 
official government are simply without basis and contrary to the 
text and objectives of the law.  The EAA Anti-Boycott Law was 
enacted to provide a broad defense against foreign boycotts of 
friendly nations.  To assert that a popularly selected 
representative of Palestinian Arab civil society is not a 
representative of that nation is to deny the existence of a 
Palestinian Arab nation.  Unless and until there is a unified 
Palestinian Arab political system, the fragmentation of the 
Palestinian Arab nation into multiple governing and 
representative units, such as Hamas, Fatah, and the BDS 
Movement, dictates that each of these entities can be considered 
parts of the Palestinian Arab “country.”  The BDS Movement is no 
less capable of imposing and fostering a boycott of Israel than the 
Arab League, Hamas, Fatah or any other organization that 
represents national interests. 
As was the case in Humanitarian Law Project, nothing in this 
Article has argued for limitations on individuals exercising their 
independent First Amendment rights.  An American citizen is free 
to take to the streets to criticize Israel and no American citizen 
would be prevented from engaging in a truly grass roots, 
independent primary boycott of Israeli goods.  However, when 
Americans join with foreign operatives to further an external 
campaign against Israel that is contrary to United States policy 
and law, and arguably is coordinated with the objectives of global 
 
on numerous other similar situations (such as in the case of South Africa, 
Cuba, Vietnam, Russia, Iran and numerous other instances).  Id. 
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terrorist organizations, the First Amendment provides no 
protections.  The rationale for anti-boycott prosecution announced 
in the House Boycott Report’s is as applicable today as it was in 
1976: 
[T]he secondary and tertiary boycotts are tantamount to 
blackmail and of concern to every American . . . [t]he 
United States has always been committed to the 
protection of businesses, large and small, against unfair 
practices.  The Arab boycott is a direct attack on these 
values, harmful . . . to all American businesses   
. . . . Congress must now act to uphold this tradition by 
outlawing compliance with boycott practices which 
intrude on American domestic concerns and on business 
relations between American companies and Israel, a 
nation with which we maintain close and friendly 
relations . . . [t]his kind of intrusion into our domestic 
order . . . directed against any country with which we 
maintain friendly and close relations, is an invasion of 
our national sovereignty.467 
Indeed, enforcement of laws prohibiting cooperation with the 
BDS Movement would not deny Americans the choice to not 
support Israel; rather, by preventing foreign interlopers from 
unilaterally preventing Israeli goods and services from entering 
American markets, enforcement would simply preserve the right 
of American consumers and businesses to choose whether or not 
they will engage in commercial relations with Israel. 
The risks of a continued failure to enforce existing laws 
against foreign boycotts are best demonstrated by reference to the 
current European experience with the BDS Movement.  European 
consumers, companies and academia are being denied access to 
Israeli goods, services and academic resources as a result of a 
highly coordinated and largely unopposed BDS Movement 
campaign.468  The European BDS campaign is not simply a 
secondary boycott of Israel; it is part of a coordinated offensive 
against Israel, pairing a facially non-violent economic attack with 
 
 467.  HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 98. 
 468.  See Christa Case Bryant & Sara Miller Llana, European boycotts 
begin to bite, catching Israel’s attention, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 16, 
2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0216/European-
boycotts-begin-to-bite-catching-Israel-s-attention-video.  
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troubling and pervasive support for the radical Islamist 
movements, including Hamas and Hezbollah, which wage war on 
Israel.469 
While it may not be the policy of European nations to prohibit 
foreign boycotts of Israel, this Article has shown that the BDS 
Movement’s activities in the United States violate the letter and 
the intent of not only the EAA Anti-Boycott Law but also the 
Hobbs Act, Material Support Laws and federal anti-trust laws.  
These violations are substantive, inflict harm on important 
national interests, deny American consumers and businesses the 
choice to deal in Israeli goods and services and contribute to the 
rise and spread of extremist ideology and violence.  Private parties 
that have been economically harmed by the BDS Movement and 
its supporters have multiple avenues of recourse and should avail 
themselves of the remedies available under RICO and applicable 
anti-trust laws, which can provide for treble damages and legal 
fees. 
BDS Movement activities in or affecting the United States 
unquestionably violate American law and policy.  The BDS 
Movement and its supporters can and should be prosecuted under 
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, Material Support Laws, RICO, and 
anti-trust laws.  To the extent the decision to prosecute BDS 
Movement activities is at discretion of political appointees and 
agency personnel, the President should require that those 
responsible for exercising prosecutorial discretion either 
commence prosecution or explain why a blanket non-prosecution 
policy is in place.470  Prosecution of BDS Movement activities in 
 
 469.  Matthew Levitt, Islamic Extremism in Europe: Beyond al-Qaeda–
Hamas and Hezbollah in Europe, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (Apr. 27, 
2005), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ view/islamic-
extremism-in-europe-beyond-al-qaedahamas-and-hezbollah-in-europe; see 
also Steven Erlanger, Europe Tries to Stop Flow of Citizens Joining Jihad, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/world/ 
europe/isis-europe-muslim-radicalization.html?_r=0 (documenting the large 
number of citizens from European Union nations who have joined with 
radical Islamist terror organizations to fight against western interests in the 
Middle East); Ben Winsor, Hundreds Of Westerners Have Joined ISIS–Here’s 
Where They Came From, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-recruiting-westerners-countries -2014-
8#ixzz3MebNqkU8. 
 470.  While a President and his or her agencies have a right to make case 
by case decisions on how and when to apply a law in specific cases, this 
discretion does not allow a wholesale abdication of the constitutional 
requirement that the Executive “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
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the United States would have ample precedent.  Moreover, it 
would be a necessary and proper governmental action undertaken 
to preserve the federal government’s exclusive power over the 
conduct of foreign affairs, prevent American support from being 
provided to terrorist organizations and protect the integrity and 
efficient functioning of American commercial markets. 
 
 
executed.” U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing 
Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1985).  
Congress, through its power of the federal budget, also has a role to play in 
ensuring that agencies enforce laws. 
